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Abstract
In this dissertation, I examine the conceptual underpinnings of a new management theory
called authentic leadership to discover why so little attention has been paid to gender. In
much of the scholarly literature on authentic leadership, I suggest there is a failure to
interrogate the complexities surrounding the concept of authenticity, especially as it relates to
the diversity of lived experience. Rather than encouraging a genuine approach to leadership,
this theory’s normative foundation is more likely to encourage social conformity. By
contrast, I suggest that Hannah Arendt’s insights into uniqueness provide a different lens
from which to consider how lived experience influences the manner in which gender,
authenticity and leadership intersect. As part of this inquiry, I conducted a phenomenological
study. My guiding question was: how do senior women leaders describe their experiences of
authenticity, or lack thereof, in the university workplace? These women’s descriptive
accounts reveal ethical tensions regarding personal principles and institutional priorities, and
suggest that gender prejudice is embedded in organizational practices, as well as the cultural
imagination. In exploring gender prejudice, I trace authenticity’s modern underpinnings to
the emergence of bourgeois selfhood. Historically, women’s desire to lead was affected by
notions of gender propriety. These societal restrictions still bear a trace on some women’s
sense of possibility, which serves to perpetuate gender inequities. Research findings also
suggest that it is the self in relation that is fundamental to comprehending what it might mean
to lead authentically. When we broaden our definition of what constitutes authentic
leadership so as to account for the myriad ways in which we live and lead, we discover how
people without positional authority can change their communities in profound ways. Thus,
leadership is not dependent upon a person’s organizational position, but rather on how their
actions demonstrate how much they care for the world. This more expansive context,
together with Arendt’s insights, opens up new avenues of thinking about the interconnections
among gender, authenticity and leadership.

Keywords
Hannah Arendt; authentic leadership; authenticity; gender; women leaders; pluralism;
uniqueness; social conformism; feminist theory.
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Preface
The common and the ordinary must remain our primary concern, the daily food
of our thought – if only because it is from them that the uncommon and the
extraordinary emerge.

1

Hannah Arendt.

In this dissertation, I examine the conceptual underpinnings of a new management theory
called authentic leadership to discover why so little attention has been paid to gender. In
much of the scholarly literature on authentic leadership, I suggest there is a failure to
interrogate the complexities surrounding the concept of authenticity, especially as it relates to
the diversity of lived experience. In failing to account sufficiently for lived experience, I
suggest that this theory has a tendency to privilege a leader’s self-knowledge above her
connection to others. For Arendt, a focus on the self leads to alienation from the world

2

because it serves to suppress plurality and the creation of a meaningful environment.
A critical interrogation of the scholarly literature on authentic leadership reveals an
underlying presupposition that authenticity means the same thing to everyone, and manifests
itself in the same way. I disagree with this viewpoint by showing how an Arendtian focus on
uniqueness reveals problems with the assumption that a quality like authenticity can be
measured. As such, her concept of uniqueness can uncover inherent difficulties with the
discourse of authentic leadership, not least because it allows us to think about how the
intersections of identity influence our social life. Following Arendt, I contend that each
individual, because of her life experiences, has a unique way of perceiving the world. This
uniqueness is, however, mediated by the social world. Thus, our way of being is constantly
impinged upon by social factors, many of which we remain unaware. Nevertheless, this
background knowledge has an effect, not only upon the way that we perceive the world, but
also on how we interpret the actions of others. In short, context matters. But context is often

1

Arendt spoke at a conference in her honour in Toronto in September 1972; this is purportedly taken
from her speech. See Margaret Betz Hull, Hidden Philosophy of Hannah Arendt (London and New
York: Routledge 2002), 36.
2

World is not to be confused with the Earth but refers to the sum total of human interaction and
durable objects.
vii

overlooked in authentic leadership scholarship, which means that differences fade into the
background. The result is that uniqueness is obscured by normative ways of thinking about
the place of authenticity in leadership.
Thinking with Arendt can deepen our understanding of authentic leadership by revealing how
much this theory takes for granted. For instance, underlying this discourse is an assumption,
sometimes explicit, on other occasions implicit, that authentic leadership will result in
individual success, as well as better organizational outcomes. But insofar as all action is
contingent, we cannot predict leadership success ahead of time. Moreover, I find myself
puzzled by scholarship that seems to suggest that leaders can effect positive change merely
3

by dint of their charisma. Not only does this tend to reinforce the great man theory of
leadership that rests on the belief that a leader can dominate others through strength of will,
but it also ignores the damage that some leaders cause. In addition, perceiving leaders as
distinct from others serves to reproduce hierarchical modes of being whereby some bodies
are judged to be better, or in this case more authentic, than others.
I see authentic leadership as an example of a theory that on the surface seems to foreground
ethical issues, but is sometimes implicitly underpinned by concerns regarding leadership
efficiency. For Arendt, the modern drive to organizational efficiency has severe drawbacks,
4

not least of which is that in Western society we have become “a society of jobholders.” The
ideology of market forces dominates our political and social landscape, and the current focus
on economic accountability is a prime example of this mentality. But fiscal accountability is
not the same as, and may run contrary to, ethical action. Thus, no amount of rules and
policies are sufficient to stop some leaders from doing bad things if they chose not to care for
others. I will show how instrumental ways of thinking tend to obscure deeper dimensions of
human life.

3

Charisma can be both a positive and a negative force for leadership. See Donna Ladkin, “The
Enchantment of the Charismatic Leader: Charisma Reconsidered as Aesthetic Encounter,”
Leadership, 2 no. 2 (2006): 165-179.
4

Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958), 40.
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Many scholars who write on authentic leadership are from the discipline of social
5

psychology, and lean toward behavioral explanations. Arendt is resistant to modern theories
such as behaviorism, because she argues that these theories focus on some of the insidious
trends in modern society, especially the promotion of indifference, and the ensuing
suppression of uniqueness. As an example, she views bureaucracy as potentially the most
6

tyrannical form of leadership, since it is based on the rule of nobody. This nameless,
faceless form of organizational rulership serves to suppress uniqueness and plurality in
favour of social conformism.
While Arendt has much to tell us in terms of how we need to create environments where
dialogue and debate flourish, she has little to say about gender and leadership. Therefore, I
augment her ideas about leadership with the descriptive accounts of the ten senior women
leaders whom I interviewed. This interweaving of different perspectives is important from an
Arendtian perspective since, by thinking in the place of another, we can expand our own
understanding. In considering the interconnections among authenticity, gender and
leadership, I chose to interview senior women leaders in the higher education sector. The
reason why I chose this particular sector is because of my background knowledge, having
worked for more than twenty years in university administration, and as a member of various
leadership teams. Interviewing women leaders served to deepen my understanding of how
gender affected their understanding of authenticity and leadership.
In addition, I argue that gender normativity influences how we think about leaders. I contend
that some of the prejudice against women leaders exists because they challenge the
normative, hierarchical framework of officialdom. Simply put, women leaders are out of
place in the gender hierarchy. This lack of “spatial” belonging may mean that some women
resort to hierarchical ways of leading in order to fit in. But while assimilation may appear to
be a strategic route to the “top,” it leads to a continuation of structural inequalities.
Furthermore, in trying to live up to some ideal leadership standard, women perpetuate what

5

For an informative review, see Bruce J. Avolio, Fred O.Walumbwa, and Todd J. Weber.
“Leadership: Current Theories, Research, and Future Directions.” Annual Review Psychology, 60
(2009): 421-439.
6

Arendt, Human Condition, 40.
ix

Arendt termed the “what” over the “who” - that is, they become so caught up in their desire
for success that they forget to distinguish between their role as leader and themselves as
individuals.
Furthermore, in much of the published research on authentic leadership, there is limited
acknowledgement of intersectionality, so important in the area of women's studies, but under7

examined within authentic leadership scholarship. In my assessment of authentic leadership
scholarship, I draw upon some feminist critiques that alert us to the importance of taking into
8

account multiple axes of identity. By bringing an intersectional analysis to bear on the
theory and practice of authentic leadership, I highlight some of the gaps in authentic
leadership theory. Integral here is the need to comprehend how different social factors such
as race, class, sexuality and age influence perceptions of leadership.
Chapter Breakdowns
In chapter one, I provide a literature review of authentic leadership, and outline some of the
problems I see with this discourse. I argue that this theory has, for the most part, overlooked
gender dynamics and the ways in which lived experience influences our ideas about
authenticity. A secondary research aim is to try and understand why the theory of authentic
leadership has emerged at this particular historical juncture. Specifically, why do today’s
leaders need a theoretical justification to teach them how to act authentically? Is a desire for
authentic leadership an antidote to an ever-increasing bureaucratic existence that serves to
distance people from one another, or is it an attempt to make leaders more accountable for
their actions? For example, one thing that surprised me was how often authenticity in
9

leadership is linked to greater efficiency. While I understand that it is important for a leader

7

This situation is changing. See, for example, Evangelina Holvino, "Intersections: The Simultaneity
of Race, Gender and Class in Organization Studies," Gender, Work and Organization (2010): 248273.
8

For more on this topic, see Jan Shaw, "Papering the Cracks with Discourse: The Narrative Identity
of the Authentic Leader,” Leadership, (2010): 89-108.
9

See, for example, Adrian Chan, “Authentic Leadership Measurement: Challenges and Suggestions,”
in Authentic Leadership Theory and Practice: Origins, Effects and Developments, ed. William L.
Gardner, Bruce J. Avolio, and Fred O. Walumbwa (Amsterdam: Elsevior, 2005), 227-251.
x

to be effective and ethical, there are times when I feel that the former is taking precedence
over the latter.
In the section on leadership training, I suggest that training programs designed to increase a
person’s authenticity may serve to reinforce normative ideas of what constitutes a “good”
leader. Thus, rather than developing genuine leaders, as is hoped, the theory of authentic
leadership may result, paradoxically, in increasing conformity. I see this conformity working
in two ways. First, there is external conformism in terms of the laws we obey as a member of
society. Second, there is the manner in which we modify our behaviour to fit what we
perceive is in keeping with others. Social conformity may also be marked by a desire to
please, which may prove problematic for some women leaders. Additionally, there is often an
assumption within the literature that by displaying particular behaviors a leader is being
authentic. However, this ignores how they may be merely complying with what they think is
expected of them and, thus, being hypocritical. While I am not arguing that leaders should
not adhere to rules, I do contend that following social rules per se, as well as leadership
programming that purports to teach authenticity, is not necessarily conducive to authentic
action.
In chapter two, I explore how the concept of authenticity is shaped by bourgeois ideas about
gendered identity. I trace the antecedents of authenticity back to the Age of Enlightenment,
10

since this was when modern ideas surrounding authenticity were initially formulated.

In

regards to the formation of the liberal subject, I show how authenticity is linked to virtue, and
describe the ways in which virtue was gendered differently. I argue that Enlightenment
notions of virtue serve to constrain women’s autonomy and, hence, limit their ideas about
their own possibilities. These gendered values concerning what constituted virtuous action
placed limitations on women’s ability to perceive themselves as leaders within the sociopolitical sphere. Furthermore, I suggest that this historical diminishment of women’s
potential ability to lead may still bear an influence on gender prejudice in regards to
leadership. I argue that theories of the present are influenced, in some manner, by gendered
perspectives of the past. Hence, a lingering trace of gender prejudice toward women leaders

10

See Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 1991, 25.
xi

is embedded within the cultural imagination. My hope is that by understanding authenticity
through the lens of the past, we may open up new avenues of inquiry that shed light on the
connections among gender, authenticity and leadership in ways that complement current
scholarship.
In chapter three, I consider the concept of authenticity through the lens of existential
phenomenology,

11

because this tradition has gone the furthest to develop an account of the

authentic self. Here, I explore the connections between Arendt’s work and Martin
Heidegger’s theory of authenticity, as elucidated by the latter in Being and Time. I rethink his
concept of authenticity in light of her diverse insights into the complex webs of relationships
and interwoven narratives that affect our comprehension of what it means to be authentic.
Specifically, I argue that Arendt’s account of what it means to be unique enriches
Heidegger’s definition of authenticity. While Heidegger sees authenticity as emerging from
silent resolution, for Arendt, uniqueness lies in our speech and action. She argues that it is
natality, not finitude, which is central to understanding existence. For Arendt, natality refers
to the fact that through action, we “insert ourselves into the world.”

12

As such, each act is

like a second birth that brings something new into existence. Her emphasis on natality stands
in contrast to Heidegger’s belief that it is by coming to terms with death that a person can
realize her potential for authenticity. In short, I suggest that, taken together, Arendt’s
concepts of uniqueness and plurality add depth to Heidegger’s concept of Mitsein (being
with), because she emphasizes how we are always in relationship. Her focus on the
importance of plurality illuminates hidden consequences that arise from leadership that is
self-oriented. Put simply, a focus on the self can lead to a disconnection from the world of
others.
Throughout the thesis, I suggest that thinking with Arendt illustrates how authenticity in
leadership requires not only an internal sense of purpose, but also responsiveness towards

11

In common with thinkers in the existential phenomenological tradition, I will often use the term
“we.” I recognize that this is somewhat contentious since the “we” may cover over the inequities that
exist. However, I hope that my larger argument of the importance of uniqueness and plurality will
show that the “we” is meant as an inclusive phrase.
12

Arendt, Human Condition, 176.
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others. Such a responsive orientation necessitates being willing to think from different
perspectives. To enhance my own understanding of the intersections among gender,
authenticity and leadership, I conducted a qualitative phenomenological inquiry.

13

In chapter

four, I discuss my methodological approach, which is rooted in hermeneutic, existential
phenomenology. Arendt used the term “thinking without banisters” to describe her
methodological approach, a way of thinking that I try and adopt for this project. Thinking
without bannisters refers to the manner in which we try and think from the position of
another; this is not so as to attempt to think in the same way as someone else but rather to
enrich our understanding of different perspectives. Since Arendt chose not to discuss her
methodology in any detail, I briefly compare different methodological approaches to
phenomenology by the major thinkers of this tradition, specifically, Edmund Husserl, Martin
Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. As well, I examine some feminist contentions
regarding phenomenological inquiry that, to my mind, enrich phenomenological inquiry by
illustrating how a gendered analysis offers a fuller understanding of lived experience.
Central to Arendt’s oeuvre is that storytelling is intrinsic to comprehending how we live in
the world. The reason why storytelling is central to human existence is because each one of
us has a story, unique to ourselves, that can be told. I suggest personal narratives can enrich
an understanding of what constitutes authentic leadership. These descriptive accounts enable
us to comprehend how each person’s unique experiences are important to understanding
authenticity as it pertains to gender and leadership. In chapter five, I examine the descriptive
accounts of the women leaders whom I interviewed. While I recognize that what is
remembered is only one person’s perspective on what occurred, nevertheless, each person’s
understanding of their particular experience opens up fresh ways of thinking about
authenticity as it relates to gender and leadership.
My original research question asked in what ways senior women leaders describe their
experiences of authenticity (or lack thereof) within an institutional context. What emerges
from my research findings is a different way of thinking about the place of authenticity in
leadership. Not only do these women offer insights into ethical dilemmas in regards to the

13

Research Ethics Approval for this study was obtained from Western University in fall 2010. The
ethics review number is 17419S.
xiii

institutional workings of power and privilege,

14

they reveal how gender affected their ability

to navigate institutional barriers. In examining common themes, these descriptive accounts
illustrate how gender differences reinforce hierarchies in subtle and, sometimes, not so subtle
ways. As a result, a woman’s sense of belonging may be undermined by gender prejudice
regarding normative ideas about what constitutes a good leader, which, in turn, may impede
her ability to speak or act in a manner consistent with personal conviction.
These women leaders’ descriptive accounts also serve to complicate the notion of what
constitutes an authentic leader, and run contrary to most scholarship on authentic leadership,
especially as regards to the importance of self-knowledge. Instead, their accounts emphasize
how leadership is a relational enterprise, founded upon mutual respect and trust. As such,
they reaffirm Carol Gilligan’s contention that women are socialized to lead differently, in a
manner that is relational rather than hierarchical.

15

Viewing authentic leadership through a

relational lens allows us to see previously hidden aspects of this phenomenon. For example, a
common pattern to emerge from the interviews was the importance of building strong
relationships through care. Indeed, caring was perceived as integral to many research
participants’ understanding of the place of authenticity in leadership. A focus on situated,
gendered embodiment brings to light new ways of thinking about authenticity and leadership.
Over the course of writing this thesis, my thinking about leadership has shifted dramatically.
Something that one of the women I interviewed said has stayed with me. She argued that we
need to explode the notion that leadership is dependent upon a particular institutional
position. Women lead in all walks of life: the problem is that much of this leadership is
unnoticed or ignored. Her words reminded me of what I had always known, but had
forgotten. From the account of a mother starting a Girl Guide troop for little girls from
families of different ethnic and racial groups, to the story of how a single mother acts on
behalf of others to change school policy by showing how the school privileges the nuclear
family, we see instances of authentic leadership in action. I perceive a correspondence

As an example, see Mary Uhl Bien, “Relational Leadership Theory: Exploring the Social Processes
of Leadership and Organizing,” The Leadership Quarterly, no. 17 (2006): 654-676.
14

15

Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982). While it is true that scholars mention relationships, it
seems to me that the major focus is on the leader, and their capacity to enact change.
xiv

between the extraordinary but everyday actions that these women described to me, and
Arendt’s insistence that power can spring up anywhere that a group of committed individuals
are willing to work together to fight against perceived injustices. From an Arendtian
perspective, such spontaneous acts demonstrate how individuals work alongside their
communities to try and improve others’ lives. Yet these everyday acts by women in their
communities are rarely described as leadership, since common ways of thinking about
leaders are tied up with power and prestige.
In the conclusion to this thesis, I explore how my own ideas about the interconnections
among gender, leadership and authenticity have altered. At the beginning of this project, my
intention was to focus on leadership within an institutional setting. What became apparent
through dwelling with the descriptive accounts, however, is that leadership within the context
of an institution is not how these women described what it means to be an authentic leader.
Rather, they spoke of leadership as situational, and considered it from a wider, societal lens
than I had anticipated. What emerges from these accounts is that it is not sufficient to
describe how women lead in institutions; rather we need to describe how women lead in a
diversity of situations. By considering what it means to lead beyond the confines of the work
environment, we obtain insights into how a focus on gender can redefine our understanding
of the role of authenticity in leadership. While I am not implying that these accounts are
indicative of women’s leadership per se, I am suggesting that patterns emerge that may
expand our understanding of the interconnections among gender, authenticity and leadership.
Curiously, what started out as a phenomenology of authentic leadership has ended up being
concerned with what might be termed a phenomenology of social conformity. Perhaps this is
not so surprising, since to concern oneself with lived experience is often to find that theories
regarding truth are out of step with how we live in the world. Yet it is still somewhat
perplexing to set off on the way to somewhere and find oneself on the path elsewhere.

xv
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Chapter 1

1

Authenticity, Leadership and Gender

In this chapter, I provide a review of the main trends in authentic leadership scholarship. I
argue that this leadership theory has, for the most part, overlooked gender dynamics, and
the ways in which lived experience influences our ideas about authenticity.

16

Within

current scholarship on authentic leadership, I suggest there is a tendency to abstract
knowledge such that it offers a limited view of human existence. The problem with such
abstraction is that it can lead to a lack of understanding of the multiple ways in which we
live. Furthermore, I contend that authentic leadership, as currently construed, has a
tendency to privilege a leader’s self-knowledge over their connection to others. For
Arendt, a focus on self leads to an alienation from the world. Theories that privilege self
over others serve to suppress a plurality of perspectives, and the creation of a meaningful
environment.
I suggest that examining authentic leadership through the lens of hermeneutic, existential
phenomenology may offer a richer way of thinking about the connections among gender,
authenticity and leadership, because of its emphasis on situated, embodied knowledge. In
particular, thinking with Arendt complements existing scholarship because it alerts us to
the need to consider equality and difference. Specifically, her concept of uniqueness,
understood as a person’s particular qualities and social location, and her notion of
plurality - that is, how we exist in a world of others - can deepen our understanding of the
role that authenticity plays in leadership. For example, how we see ourselves is always
related to who we are in context with others, since it is through action and speech that

16

There are some leadership scholars who discuss gender in relation to authentic leadership. See,
for example, Alice Eagly, “Achieving Relational Authenticity in Leadership: Does Gender
Matter?" The Leadership Quarterly, 16, no. 3, (2005): 459-474, and Jackie Ford and Nancy
Harding, “The Impossibility of the ‘True Self’ of Authentic Leadership,” Leadership, 7 no. 4
(2011): 463-479.

2

each individual reveals herself to others.

17

This individual revealing is always related to a

person’s cultural and socio-historical place in the world.
A secondary research aim is to understand why, at this particular historical juncture, the
theory of authentic leadership has emerged. Specifically, why do today’s leaders need a
theoretical justification to teach them how to act authentically? Is a desire for authentic
leadership an antidote to an ever-increasing bureaucratic existence that serves to distance
people from one another, or is it an attempt to make leaders more accountable for their
actions? One thing that surprised me was how often in the scholarship the concept of
authenticity is linked to greater efficiency in leadership. While I recognize that it is
important for a leader to be effective, there are times when I felt that “efficiency” may
serve to obscure ethics. Some leadership scholars who write on this topic impose a
framework through which they attempt to determine and measure authenticity. This
instrumental way of thinking is potentially damaging to human relations, and brings to
mind Heidegger’s notion of Gestell, or enframing.

18

A serious problem in modernity, according to Heidegger, is how we see things through a
scientific worldview that privileges calculation and efficiency. This mode of thinking
tries to establish in advance how we encounter the world. I suggest that current
discussions of authentic leadership adopt a mode of what Heidegger terms “enframing”
through the overemphasis on measurement, efficiency and quantification. This
instrumental way of thinking can have damaging consequences, not least because it fails
to comprehend the depth and breadth of human existence. Rather than offering us insight
into what it might mean to lead authentically, this somewhat narrow approach may lead
to a rigidity of thinking, and a covering over of difference. In part, this is borne out of a
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Arendt, Human Condition, 181-88.

Heidegger’s notion of Gestell is encapsulated in his essay “What is Technology?” in Basic
Writings, ed. and intro David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1977), 283-319.
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desire to control and quantify human interactions.

19

For example, we will see that some

scholars argue there are four dimensions to authentic leadership, that is, self-awareness,
balanced information processing, relational transparency and internalized moral
perspective. But focussing on these four dimensions leads to a prescriptive way of
thinking that obscures the multiplicity of lived experience.
Thus, the theory of authentic leadership may result, unintentionally perhaps, in increased
conformity to a particular way of thinking. Social conformity is a problem for leadership
because it works to suppress uniqueness in favour of uniformity. In Arendtian terms, in
trying to live up to some uniform standard, leaders may, sometimes unwittingly, other
times deliberately, perpetuate the “what” of being over the “who.” That is, their unique
identity may become covered over by their social role as leader. Social conformism is
counterproductive to authenticity, I suggest, because it is founded on fitting in, rather
than being one’s unique self. In a way, then, the discourse of authentic leadership is
paradoxical in that on the surface it suggests an inclusionary model, while on a deeper
level it may lead to sameness.

20

Social conformity is a particular problem in terms of gender since women have generally
been socialized to please others rather than forge their own path. I see this conformity
operating in two ways. First, there is conformism in terms of laws and rules we obey as
members of society. Second, there is our complicity with regard to how we take up social
rules, and modify our behaviour to fit what we perceive is in keeping with others.
Moreover, the suggestion that by displaying particular behaviors a leader is authentic
ignores how they may just be complying with social norms, as well as being hypocritical.
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We will see in chapter five that those women I interview have very different things to say about
what may, or may not, constitutes authentic leadership. While I am not suggesting that these
women’s accounts are by any means the last word on this topic, I do want to suggest that what
constitutes authenticity in leadership shows up in different ways.
20

Following Michel Foucault, I use discourse to mean the ways in which we speak, act and live
in the world. Some discourses gain priority over others and, in so doing, seem to offer us a
particular truth. Questions of truth are always bound with systems of power and knowledge, as
well as our socio-historical circumstances. See Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality, Volume I,
trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Random House, 1991), especially part 5.
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Such conformity may also prove dangerous in crisis situations, where there is no “moral
handbook” to offer leaders guidance.
I try and demonstrate how social factors affect the ways in which we think about the
connections amongst gender, authenticity and leadership. I suggest that Arendt’s theory
of uniqueness, which I discuss in detail in chapter three, has parallels with the notion of
intersectionality. The term “intersectionality” refers to how identity is influenced by
multiple factors, for example, class, race, or gender.

21

Both concepts alert us to the need

to take into account how different facets of identity work together. Being alert to
difference helps us to consider how the intersections of identity play a role in how we
think about leaders. That being said, I face something of a dilemma, since Arendt made
limited reference to women leaders, and the public statements she made were far from
positive. Therefore, I augment Arendt’s lack of concern with gender with feminist
accounts of leadership. Later in the chapter, I show how gender normativity influences
how we think about women leaders. I suggest that prejudice against women leaders is, in
part, because they challenge the normative, hierarchical framework.

22

Simply put, for

some people, women leaders seem out of place in the higher echelons of organizational
and public life. This prejudice has an additional effect in that to conform to leadership
“standards,” some women choose to lead by assimilating to dominant styles of leadership
that serves to perpetuate structural inequities.
I begin by outlining the main themes put forward by scholars of authentic leadership.
Then, I compare dominant ideas with ethical themes that emerge in the area of leadership
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and Uma Narayan (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1997), 178-194.
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The continuing prejudice against women leaders, while shifting, is still firmly embedded in the
cultural imagination as a recent survey shows. In this survey of more than 60,000 individuals in
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studies. As part of this discussion, I consider some problems with leadership
programming as it relates to authenticity, especially the way in which such training
reinforces Anglo-American models of leading. Then, I turn to Arendt to see what insights
we can obtain from her thinking about leadership and related aspects such as authority.
Next, I explore the question of authenticity in leadership through the lens of gender. In
the conclusion, I gather together these divergent strands to see what has emerged with
regard to the interconnections among authenticity, gender and leadership.

1.1

Authentic Leadership – A Review

The concept of authentic leadership gained popularity in 2003 with the publication of Bill
George’s book Authentic Leadership: Rediscovering the Secrets to Creating Lasting
Value. Due to the myriad ethical scandals within the corporate sector, he argued that the
concept of leadership needs to be completely rethought. What is required to fix the
ethical gap are leaders who are morally responsible, have a deep sense of purpose and
stay true to core values. These qualities, he suggests, enable leaders to establish the
relationships necessary to build a strong organization, while at the same time allowing
them to lead with conviction and self-discipline.
At around the same time as George published this business bestseller, within scholarly

literature, the construct known as authentic leadership was gaining importance in the
academic community. According to Peter Northouse there are three different approaches
to authentic leadership.

23

First, there is the intrapersonal as outlined by Boas Shamir and

Galit Eilam who argued that authentic leaders are original since they choose not to copy
others. From their perspective, it is the insights gained from their life stories that enable
authentic leaders to obtain self-knowledge. The second strand is that represented by Alice
Eagly who focuses on the interpersonal - that is, the relationships between leader and
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See Peter Northouse, “Authentic Leadership,” in Leadership: Theory and Practice (Thousand
Oaks: Sage 2013), 266.
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follower. But the dominant scholarly perspective is the developmental perspective
identified by Bruce Avolio and colleagues.

24

In the definition put forward by Avolio et al., authentic leadership has four main
dimensions, that is, i) self-awareness, ii) balanced information processing, iii) relational
transparency and iv) internalized moral perspective. It is suggested that authentic leaders
possess greater self-awareness, which enables them to understand their strengths and
weaknesses, and be cognizant of the effect they have on others. Second, balanced
processing means that a leader - as part of their decision-making process – is able to
analyze information objectively. Relational transparency refers to being trustworthy and
demonstrating appropriate emotional responses. Authentic leaders are genuine in their
self-presentation so that there is no “fake self” on display. Not only are these leaders
always honest, they display the right emotion for the right situation. Finally, an authentic
leader’s internalized moral perspective means they are guided by internal values rather
than societal pressures.
While past research in authentic leadership was mostly conceptual, Bruce Avolio and
Keith Mhatra

25

state that there are now measurable tools, as well as reliable techniques,

to test for authenticity in leadership. They employ a survey instrument known as the ALQ
(Authentic Leadership Questionnaire), developed by Avolio and others. Through
empirical testing, Avolio and Mhatra contend there is now positive proof that there are
four dimensions to authentic leadership, namely, self-awareness; relational transparency;
internalized moral perspective and balanced processing are verifiable. Empirical data
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For earlier work on this topic, see Bruce J. Avolio and William Gardner, “Authentic
Leadership Development: Getting to the Root of Positive Forms of Leadership.” Special Issue of
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Leadership,” Handbook of Positive Organizational Scholarship (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2011), accessed May 10, 2013, doi 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199734610.013.0059.
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from various research studies backs up previous theoretical claims about authentic
leadership.

26

Avolio and Mhatra assert that it is because authentic leaders have a deeper understanding
of self that they are able to be consistent in their dealings with others. Through this
heightened sense of self, authentic leaders foster strong relationships by role-modeling
positive behaviour. In developing a positive environment, authentic leaders not only
improve overall morale, but also increase employee effectiveness. Put simply,
authenticity can be good for the bottom line. It is further argued that leaders who are
authentic are better able to achieve institutional goals because they are transparent in their
dealings with others. Together with their ability to be unbiased, authentic leaders lead in
accordance with their values, and remain steadfast to their principles.
In addition, four positive psychological components are perceived as relevant to authentic
leadership. These components are confidence, hope, honesty and resilience. Confidence
ensures that a leader has the belief that they can accomplish tasks successfully. Hope
means that leaders have the capacity to inspire others through their willpower. Optimism
ensures that they can overcome obstacles, while resilience allows them to recover from
adversity. Furthermore, a leader’s positive behaviour encourages a sense of institutional
belonging amongst employees, which leads to higher levels of hope and trust.
Furthermore, what constitutes right thinking about leadership seems more to do with
what we currently perceive as positive thinking. The following statement by William
Gardner et al. serves to illustrate my point in that they maintain the core components of
authentic leadership are “self-awareness, positive self-regulation, positive self-
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Bruce J. Avolio et al., “What is Authentic Leadership Development?” in Oxford Handbook of
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development and a positive moral perspective.”

27

Here we see that there is a strong link

made between positive psychology and authenticity in leadership.
In their discussion of the relationship between authenticity and self-awareness, Avolio
and others distinguish between adaptive and maladaptive self-reflection in authentic
leadership. 28 Adaptive self-reflection means that a leader is aware of, and can critically
assess their beliefs and behaviors in a constructive manner. Conversely, maladaptive selfreflection is destructive, since too much rumination may generate negative emotions such
as self-doubt or anxiety. It is only through what these authors describe as “positive
developmental interventions” that leaders can make the right decision.29 This suggestion
is worrisome, because it suggests that it is possible for leaders to take up the right amount
of self-reflection. Thus the distinction between maladaptive and adaptive self-reflection
may have more to do with conforming to dominant paradigms about what constitutes
good leadership than being connected, in any deeper way, with authenticity.
Recent breakthroughs in neuroscience offer additional techniques to gauge authenticity in
leaders, according to Paul McDonald. He claims that neuroscience can provide scientific
evidence to back up previous claims concerning the four major components of authentic
leadership.30 For instance, McDonald argues that self-awareness has an internal aspect
that is informed by introspection, as well as an external element since self-awareness is
also affected by social factors. He further contends that neuroscience research suggests
that we treat information in a different way depending upon whether we are told
something by someone we know well, as opposed to a stranger. Another component of

William L. Gardner et al., “Authentic Leadership: A Review of the Literature and Research
Agenda,” The Leadership Quarterly, 22 (2011): 1123. This article provides an overview of some
earlier research that relates to authenticity and leadership.
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Paul McDonald, “Neurological Correlates to Authentic Leadership,” Working Paper Series,
Victoria Management School (2009): 1-23.
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authentic leadership – relational transparency - can be informed by neuroscience, since it
appears that particular facial elements create a negative response in the amygdale, which
affects how we judge people. What this means is that we judge some people as more
trustworthy than others based on how they look. Those whom we find non-threatening
are more likely to gain a positive appraisal, especially when we perceive them as similar
to ourselves.
Neuroscience research can also offer insight into balanced processing since, according to
McDonald, the brain processes soft and hard data in the same way. As a result, the brain
perceives rewards such as financial incentives or enhanced reputation in an equal manner.
He suggests that this may be the reason why some people are willing to forego financial
compensation for a better job title. Another component of authentic leadership is
internalized moral perspective. From his research, McDonald states that people who are
inclined to focus on negative experiences are less able to engage in self-regulation, which
seems to reinforce Walumbwa and colleagues’ claim about adaptive versus maladaptive
thinking. It appears that negative thinking adversely affects the ability to access the
prefrontal regions responsible for self-focused thinking, and may cloud our ability to
31

make balanced decisions.

In terms of moral thinking, neuro-imagining techniques can also offer insight into how
we make ethical decisions. Apparently, each person has their own neuroimagining
signature that operates independently from cognitive decision-making. In practical terms,
this suggests that ethical decisions are spontaneous, rather than rule-bound. What this
means in practice is that reason alone will not be enough to explain a person’s moral
competence. If McDonald’s assessment of neuroscience research is correct, then it seems
that we make ethical decisions in the moment. Such spontaneity is also relevant to how
Arendt understands human action. It is through action that each of us brings forward
something new into the world. No matter how much we may desire control, the
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spontaneity of action exceeds our grasp, and this may have a detrimental effect on the
outcome of what appear to be ethical decisions.
Another aspect that emerges from the literature on authentic leadership is a connection
between authenticity and greater efficiency. While I understand that it is important for a
leader to be effective, there are times when I felt that this was taking precedence over
ethical matters. It seems to me that current explanations of authentic leadership veer
toward an instrumental way of perceiving relationships. This means-ends way of thinking
can be seen in how scholars begin with the hypothesis that authentic leadership rests upon
a particular set of characteristics. From this list of characteristics, scholars build survey
instruments to gain empirical evidence to confirm their thesis. But all this does is to
reaffirm what they already believed. Thus, I suggest that the diversity of human
experience is covered over by this desire to quantify and measure things. What this body
of evidence does is to produce a particular way of thinking about authenticity, but it may
obscure other ways of thinking about this concept. While it is laudable that these scholars
are concerned about ethical behaviour in leaders, I do not believe that ethical dilemmas
will be solved through instrumental ways of thinking. I think there is a danger to connect
questions of ethics with questions of efficiency, because it may result in the former being
obscured by the latter. Efficiency understood by the language of performance
measurement and outcome-based thinking serves to ignore contingency in favour of
scientific explanations that privilege consistency.
This predilection for measurable results in authentic leadership scholarship may be
problematic, because it encourages a belief that truth is obtainable from data without fully
acknowledging that leadership is context-dependent. Moreover, as Joanne Ciulla points
out, there is often confusion in leadership accounts between description and prescription.
This can lead to false assumptions being drawn. For instance, she states there is a
“dichotomy between leaders who are morally good and leaders who are effective at
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exercising leadership.”

32

Ciulla refers to this as the “Hitler problem,” that is, a leader can

sometimes appear efficient without in any way being ethical. Furthermore, she contends
that leadership studies should be rooted in the human sciences, not least because when we
study leadership we are looking at ourselves.

33

Ever since the Enlightenment, however,

scientific discourse has been afforded more cultural cache. Nonetheless, Ciulla maintains
that stories can offer insights in ways that scientific theories cannot.
When we think about what authentic leadership might mean, each of us will have
different ideas, informed by the stories we read, the movies we watch and our
experiences in the workplace and beyond. What characterizes an authentic leader in
Antonio Marturano’s opinion will change over time and space, since each community has
34

different values that are “embedded in social relations and institutions.” Certain traits
have meaning within a particular community, he argues, rather than being rooted in a
person’s psychology, as some leadership scholars maintain. Furthermore, Marturano
claims that it is not so much that individual leaders possess charisma, but that others
believe them to be charismatic. It is easy to become swept away by the rhetorical genius
of charismatic leaders. These larger than life personas may prove detrimental to an
organization, according to Amanda Sinclair, since their belief in themselves may override
alternate viewpoints.
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From her work with leadership teams, she has observed a

common tendency exhibited by senior managers toward dependency and obedience. This
manifests itself as believing that the leader is the only person who can solve a particular

Joanne B. Ciulla. “Handmaiden and Queen: What Philosophers Find in the Question: What is a
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problem. As a result, the leader starts to perceive himself as omniscient. Too much
emphasis on a leader’s capabilities may be a way for people to mask their own
insecurities. This dependency on leaders may actually be an abrogation of personal
responsibility. Ignoring these power relationships is a mistake, asserts Sinclair, since it
does not help us understand how leaders may, at times, feel powerless to act while, in
other circumstances, gain too much power over others.
Until recently, much of the published work on authentic leadership was based either on
conceptual ideas or quantitative research.

36

In reviewing studies conducted on authentic

leadership, William Gardner and others note that there is too much reliance on survey
measurements to gauge authentic leadership. Of the ninety-one publications on authentic
leadership published up to 2010, Gardner et al.

37

contend that fifty-nine were conceptual,

with fifty-five of these reflecting a positivist orientation while the other four were
interpretive. Furthermore, 74% of the articles published come out of the fields of
management or business studies in either Canada or The United States. What is required,
they contend, is research that elicits thick narratives and explores ethical issues in greater
depth. I’ll return to ethics later in the chapter.

1.1.1

Alternative Perspectives on Authentic Leadership

There are some scholars who adopt a different approach to authentic leadership as I
indicated earlier. For example, in their exploration of authentic leadership, Boas Shamir
and Galit Eilam see a connection with the Aristotelian concept of eudaimonia.

38

From

their perspective, to be authentic a leader must act out of personal conviction so as to
encourage others to share her vision. Similarly, Lester Levy and Mark Bentley argue that
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to be authentic, leaders need to be true to themselves and act upon their beliefs for the
common good.

39

What these definitions fail to acknowledge is that truth, like authenticity, is a contestable
concept. Such an approach to the study of leadership does not account adequately for the
myriad ways in which institutional bias and social prejudice adversely affect who gains
access to leadership roles. Moreover, there are many times when a leader’s convictions
may have appeared to be genuine, but have led to disastrous results. Here we may do well
to remember Arendt’s claim that it is not whether leaders are good that matters; rather, it
is whether their leadership is good for the world that is important. In fact, we need to ask
ourselves: would a world populated by authentic leaders necessarily be a better one? I
will return to this question in the conclusion to this chapter.

1.1.2

Authentic Leadership and Narrative

Authenticity does not arise out of the awareness of inner values, according to Raymond
Sparrowe, but through narrative.

40

He takes up Paul Ricoeur’s work on the narrative self

to show the limitations of current leadership research. For example, Sparrowe is critical
of the emphasis on the inner self, because he argues that it ignores our relationships with
others.

41

By viewing authentic leaders as constant with their beliefs, this abstracts them

from their situational context, and ignores how past history are relevant to present events.
Being authentic, states Sparrowe, does not necessarily mean a person will be moral. I
think we can take this insight further, since to suggest that authentic leadership is
inherently moral is to contend that we are all the same. Not only does this ignore how
leaders act in narcissistic or duplicitous ways, it also overlooks each person’s unique
mode of being. (We will return to the issue of narrative in later chapters.)

Lester Levy and Mark Bentley, “More ‘Right’ than ‘Real’: the Shape of Authentic Leadership
in New Zealand,” (Auckland: The University of Auckland, 2007), 10.
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In thinking about the place of authenticity in leadership, we need to take into account
how each of us understands the world in a singular but different fashion, because of the
myriad experiences that make up our life. Context matters. But context is often missing
from discussions into what constitutes authenticity in leadership. So, too, is any
discussion of the body. The reason why embodiment is ignored by most authentic
leadership scholars, according to Donna Ladkin and Steve Taylor, is due to the focus on
the leader’s ‘true’ self.

42

Yet it is not a person’s inner thoughts that are important; rather

it is through speech and action that leaders are judged.

43

While Francis Yammarino et al.

contend that authentic leaders can enhance overall workplace effectiveness,

44

because a

leader’s honest approach will be received positively by others, Ladkin and Taylor express
reservations. One of the underlying problems they perceive with the theory of authentic
leadership is that it does not account for how a leader may act in what she regards as an
authentic manner but still not be perceived as genuine by others. For instance, one of the
main roles of a leader, state Ladkin and Taylor, is to embody “the identity story of the
group.”

45

In conveying the institutional narrative, a leader needs to evoke a rapport with

her audience. Whenever leaders are unable to convey the institutional story in a
meaningful way, they will not persuade others to share in their vision and effect change,
something deemed critical to leadership success.

46

So we see that context is critical to understanding the role of authenticity in leadership.
Yet, according to Alice Eagly, many authentic leadership scholars ignore the “fault lines
that exist in communities between people who differ in gender, social class, education
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and ethnicity.”

47

What this means is that those who are not considered to be traditional

leaders may have problems being seen as genuine. She points to tensions that may occur
when a woman leader displays a lack of stereotypical feminine behaviour by being
perceived as aggressive or autocratic. Because of her gender, rather than her action, a
woman leader may be castigated for what would, from a male perspective, appear to be
‘normal’ leadership behaviour. But it is not only gender that needs to be taken into
account. Depending upon the particular situation, different axes of identity can be
foregrounded. In some instances, a leader might be discriminated against because of her
gender, while in another situation a male leader might experience discrimination because
of his race or sexual orientation. In considering what it might mean to lead authentically,
an array of intersectional factors have to be noted.
I have surveyed some of the main theorists in the field in order to offer some background
to current discussions. Now I want to look at what is perceived to be a fundamental
component of leadership, that is, vision.

1.2 Vision
Herminia Ibarra and Otillia Obodaru maintain that the one thing that is holding women
48

back from leadership positions is vision.

From their empirical research, they argue that

while women are perceived as just as competent as men in the majority of managerial
tasks, envisioning is the area where women leaders express unease and are also perceived
to be less successful by others. If more women wish to lead organizations, Ibarra and
Obodaru contend, it is necessary for them to become more comfortable with putting
forward their own vision. In short, women need to stop dismissing vision, and become
competent in this area of leadership.
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The purpose of vision, state James Kouzes and Barry Posner, is to offer leader a blueprint
to follow that serves as their guiding light for the future.

49

They argue that some leaders

have an image of what success looks like even before they embark on a project, much
like an engineer builds a model.

50

This clarity of image enables a leader to move forward

provided they can enlist others to help them achieve their vision. Yet I suggest we need to
be cautious when we think about leadership in such a predetermined manner. Such a
planned approach to leadership may not always be sufficient. For example, as action
constantly brings new problems, reverting to a blueprint will be of little use in times of
crisis. Furthermore, this way of thinking seems to be based on the illusion that leaders are
able to control what might happen, because they are able to plan everything in advance.
Some scholars perceive vision as vital to authentic leadership. For example, R.W. Terry
contends that a “truly visionary leader teaches, providing insight so that people
understand.”

51

But not all visions are positive for organizations. Indeed, if a person’s

vision is disconnected from an ethical worldview, it may create problems. There are
times when a leader’s vision may prove counterproductive. Moreover, too much
confidence may encourage a leader to behave in self-indulgent ways. Indeed Terry Price
argues that an “undue focus on issues of authenticity can actually promote unethical
leadership.”

52

In thinking about vision in relation to leadership, we must account for the

fact that not every leader engages in an ethical way of behaving.
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1.3 Authenticity and Ethics
Ethical decision-making depends on the leader’s willingness, not only to listen to their
conscience, but to act accordingly. In thinking about the place of authenticity in
leadership, Chris Branson argues that “all ethical decisions are based on the interplay
between rational objective knowledge and our subjective, interpretive knowledge.”

53

The

problem is that moral integrity can be compromised by our selfish desires. He maintains
that we must ensure that the “the pure voice of the moral self is heard above the
54

confusion and chatter that fills our minds.”

Here, Branson seems to have fallen back on

his own abstraction, since the purity of a person’s moral self is, at best, a dubious claim.
It is only when leaders face an ethical dilemma, state Milorad Novicevic et al., that
questions of authenticity become relevant in the workplace.

55

In differentiating between

personal and organizational responsibility, these authors claim that executives experience
tension wherever their personal values collide with organizational expectations. In
stressful times, it is important for leaders to hold on to their self-esteem, rather than be
swayed by others as moral decision-making may be affected adversely by “group think.”
One effect of this moral disintegration, contend Novicevic et al., is that executives refuse
to accept personal responsibility for the organization’s ethical failures.
At times of organizational crisis, Donna Ladkin suggests that Heidegger’s notion of
dwelling might have much to offer leaders.56 When there is no easy solution, she
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contends that dwelling with a particular problem can help leaders solve particularly
intransigent issues because it enables them to see, not just from our own perspective, but
also from the viewpoint of others.57 This way of orienting oneself to the world requires an
open disposition, and a willingness to tarry. Such openness to the other, and to the world
around us, is our way of showing we care. Furthermore, Ladkin contends that
Heidegger’s notion of “coming into right relationship” may provide a more inclusive
framework for dealing with ethical dilemmas. Thus, she suggests that leadership studies
could benefit by adopting his notion of dwelling to address organizational problems.
Hence, Ladkin argues that dwelling can offer new, creative solutions that allow a leader
to stay with their own values, while at the same time, being willing to enter into a deep
relationship with others. In practical terms, such openness requires the leader to be
present-minded rather than future-oriented, and to be willing to create an environment for
thinking through, rather than determining the right vision ahead of time. For this to take
place, a leader needs to suspend their positional power so as to openly engage with
others.

58

This suspension of power requires courage and humility on the leader’s part, as
59

well as a willingness to engage with the world and others.

Ethical action requires us to ensure that our decisions are responsive to other people’s
feelings. We act ethically by offering a person, or a problem, our meaningful attention.
This requires us to step back from our own concerns to be open to the particular situation.
When we are open to experience, we allow things to come into appearance that otherwise
we may not notice. In so doing, we become more receptive to the problem at hand.
Sometimes, the decision a leader makes will be influenced by gender. Ladkin argues that
Carol Gilligan’s notion of moral differences between men and women may reveal why, at
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times, a woman leader may act differently from her male counterpart.
woman’s “ethical action is centrally informed by relational values.”

61

60

This is because a

Gilligan’s work has

been roundly challenged for what seems to be essentialist ways of thinking. But if we
allow ourselves to be open to the notion that both men and women have the ability to lead
in a caring manner, then her work may open up positive avenues for leading.

1.3.1

Authentic Leadership and Spirituality

It is noteworthy that underpinning some authentic leadership scholarship is a religious or
spiritual foundation. For instance, Karin Klenke argues that spirituality is at the heart of
authentic leadership.

62

This spiritual dimension enables employees to gain meaning as

they search for something transcendent to augment the paucity of their working lives. But
there may be problems with too much emphasis on spirituality in the workplace. If we see
spirituality as essential to authentic leadership, what happens to those employees who are
agnostic or atheist? While spirituality may be beneficial for some, it may negatively
affect those who do not conform to a particular belief system. Hence, Amanda Sinclair
cautions that a spiritual approach to leadership may not be conducive to workers’
spiritual enlightenment, as it may mask structural inequities, and be adopted by
unscrupulous leaders to coerce others into doing their will.
The current leadership craze regarding authenticity is, in Sinclair’s view, a response to
the growing anxiety that we are losing our identity in the workplace. But the definition of
authentic leadership currently proposed is troubling, because as she notes the “norms by
63

which authenticity is judged have deeply social, economic, political causes.”

As an

example, Sinclair argues that performance measurement is likely to encourage leaders to
be authentic within a framework that has little to do with Arendtian notions of
uniqueness, and much more to do with conformity. In addition, Joanne Ciulla criticizes
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“modern management for focusing more on trying to make one feel good than on creating
a just workplace.”

64

Management should be careful to resist any practices that border on

psychological exploitation; instead employers should offer their workers respect and a
decent wage.

65

To sum up, I have explored the main arguments by proponents of authentic leadership, as
well as considering some of its detractors. The desire for an authentic leadership
construct may result in inauthentic behaviour as leaders conform to this prescriptive
model. In their haste to put forward a new theory, as Puck Algera and Marjolein LipsWiersma have pointed out, leadership scholars fail to comprehend fully the ontological
roots of authenticity.

66

It is a mistake to look for methods and techniques before dwelling

on the fundamental question of what it means to be authentically human. If authentic
leadership becomes a management technique, then it may lead to valuing leaders in terms
of their individual success, rather than engaging in an ethical relation with others. What is
missing in many accounts, as Dominik Heil points out, is a deeper understanding of the
connections between authentic leadership and a particular way of viewing the world.
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Furthermore, there is a tension between ethical considerations and the desire for leaders
to be more effective. Effectiveness is desired because it is assumed that leaders will be
more successful. Increasingly, the way that we judge success is through profit or
outcome-based measurements. There is nothing inherently wrong with wanting leaders to
be more effective but when we focus on effectiveness we may move away from
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authenticity. When questions of authenticity are connected to financial and organizational
success, it may be to the detriment of personal integrity.

1.4 Leadership: An Overview
I want to spend some time situating authentic leadership within the broader domain of
leadership studies to see whether this offers us insight into why authenticity is regarded,
by some scholars, as an important attribute for leaders. In 1978, James MacGregor Burns
published a book entitled Leadership, widely regarded as a foundational leadership text.
He viewed leadership as “a structure of acting that engages persons, to varying degrees,
through the levels and among the interstices of society.”

68

In his account, Burns

differentiates between two types of leadership. First, transactional leadership points to
how leaders act in an instrumental manner to achieve their goals. Second,
transformational leadership refers to leaders who exhibit charisma, and are able to effect
change by dint of their powerful personalities. Authentic leadership comes out of this
belief in transformational leaders who can create organizational change. This change may
not always be beneficial, however, since charismatic leaders sometimes wreak havoc on
organizations, especially when a leader’s self-regard is narcissistic. Moreover, a leader’s
excessive adherence to a particular vision may work to the detriment of the organization
as a whole. To understand leadership, Burns argues that one must first comprehend the
essence of power and realize that, ideally, leadership is formed in relationship, and
connected to purpose.
In the modern workplace, Burns argues that bureaucratic structures may work to the
detriment of ethical leadership, because stability is prized over spontaneity. This desire
for stability ensures bureaucracies take on a culture of mediocrity that permeates the
organization, and functions to obstruct challenges to the status quo. Whether a person’s
actions are virtuous or not matters less than that she comply with a particular mode of
behaving. While subordinates may perceive bureaucratic authority as legitimate, they will
fight against its constraints, sometimes consciously, sometimes unconsciously, because it

68

James MacGregor Burns, Leadership, (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), 3.

22

fails to offer them a space whereby they are able to be the best they can. Spontaneity is
also negatively affected by the language of job descriptions, goals, objectives and
outcome-based measurements. People lose hope when the workplace is no more than an
environment of conforming to policies, which they may find unsatisfactory or even
unethical. Thus, we see how bureaucracy, in its desire for conformity, suppresses
individual uniqueness. (I will return to problems with bureaucracy in chapter three.)
A different approach to leadership was advanced by Peter Greenleaf in 1977, with his
69

concept of “servant leadership.”

His theory proved popular with people who desired a

more communitarian approach to leading, and also for those looking for a spiritual
dimension. Because of a lack of caring and an overwhelming desire for profit, Greenleaf
contends that concern regarding human flourishing, understood as the well-being of a
community, is becoming erased by the desire for profit. He further argued that one of the
major problems in the modern workplace is that we place too much emphasis on the
leader instead of seeing her as part of the organizational team. In exploring why it is
important for leaders to serve their communities and act ethically, he points to some
negative trends. One such trend in the modern workplace is that, increasingly, individuals
with conceptual skills are sidelined in favour of those who are more operationallyminded. But conceptual thinkers are needed, Greenleaf maintains, since these are the
people who ask the most difficult questions. Without the input of those who are willing to
question a leader’s action, a management team may become complacent.
In his discussion of universities, Greenleaf notes that it is not sufficient for conceptual
thinkers to be part of the faculty; they must also be part of the senior leadership team.
Without the influence of conceptual thinkers, he argues that a university can turn into an
uncaring institution, and lose sight of its deeper purpose. Larger questions are overtaken
by economic imperatives, such as the belief that growth is necessarily good. Those who
have the tenacity to reject this model will quickly find themselves out of place. When
someone chooses to dissent, they are often regarded as disloyal, rather than perceived as

69

Robert K. Greenleaf, Servant Leadership: A Journey into the Nature of Legitimate Power and
Greatness, ed. Larry C. Spears. (New York: Paulist Press, 2002).

23

upholding personal beliefs. According to Keith Grint, those who dare to question are
replaced by “yes” people who turn into irresponsible followers, precisely because they
refuse to tell the leader she is wrong for fear of reprisal.

70

What leadership needs most, he

states, are “constructive dissenters” who recognize that leaders are not omniscient beings.
In Grint’s opinion, we need to “abandon Plato’s question: ‘Who should rule us?’ and
71

focus instead on Popper’s question: ‘How can we stop our rulers ruining us,’

a

sentiment with which Arendt may well have found common cause.
I have provided this brief overview of leadership to situate authentic leadership within
leadership studies. What emerges for me is the concern expressed regarding too much
emphasis on leaders which may, in turn, lead to a lessening of bonds between people. We
have also seen how instrumental ways of leading and bureaucratic structures place a
greater emphasis on organizational effectiveness, which can be detrimental to ethical
action. From this overview of leadership scholarship, we learn that authentic leadership
comes out of the desire for transformational, charismatic leaders who can provide
solutions to organizational problems. The desire for a strong leader may, at times, prove
detrimental to an organization, not least because too much belief in a leader’s capabilities
can lead to a lack of responsibility on the part of others, something I will discuss in depth
in chapter three.
I want to turn now to look at how various scholars perceive the benefits and drawbacks of
leadership training, and how it relates to authenticity.

1.4.1

Leadership Training

Just as business schools can teach students management skills so, too, can leadership
programs train people to be leaders, according to James Kouzes and Barry Pozner. To
master the art of leadership, these authors assert, one must first develop ‘the instrument of
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leadership,’ that is, the self.

72

Other scholars believe that leadership programs can teach

people to be authentic. For example, Adrian Chan contends that when leaders add
authenticity to their leadership skills, it serves as a ‘leadership multiplier,’ which
improves individual and organizational success.

73

Yet this presupposes a person’s ability

to know herself is a straightforward process, and that it is possible to train a person to
become an authentic leader. I see two problems with this type of thinking. First, it is
difficult to comprehend how such leadership training could be evaluated. Would program
evaluation consist of the completion of a questionnaire where a leader ranked her
‘authenticity quota’ before and after completion of a training course? Or would program
success be judged on the perceptions of others prior to and after a leader’s makeover?
Second, what complicates the idea of leadership programming, as it relates to
authenticity, is that training someone to perform in a particular way would seem to run
counter to a person expressing her personal views. Hence, my second concern is the idea
that authenticity can be learned through the “right” education. If authenticity is perceived
as an individual attribute, it seems paradoxical to train leaders to be authentic. In fact,
training people to perform leadership authentically would seem to curtail individuality.
On the one hand, it is difficult to see how something as deeply personal as an individual’s
authenticity can be gained from specific training. On the other, if such a quality can be
taught, then it suggests that Western notions of individuality are a myth.
Indeed, Cecily Cooper, Terry Scandia and Chester Schriesheim argue that it is pointless
to develop authentic leadership programs until there is agreement as to what the construct
means.
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Moreover, it is unlikely that an adult’s ethical behaviour can be changed, these

authors contend, since a person’s moral outlook has already been formed through social
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and cultural processes. Bill George concurs, arguing that leadership training that consists
of “lists of leadership characteristics that one is supposed to emulate”

75

will not help a

person develop their leadership strengths, or lead in a genuine manner. Rather, such
training merely encourages people to construct what they consider to be an acceptable
leadership image. George sees this image-making to be at the heart of the contemporary
crisis of contemporary leadership, since it encourages inauthentic behaviour. He connects
the current leadership crisis in corporate America with the narcissistic cult of personality
that is endemic, not only to the corporate sector, but also in other arenas.

76

Because

leaders of Fortune 500 companies are perceived as possessing knowledge, wealth and
prestige, it is not surprising in our status-conscious world that others may want to emulate
them. If someone wishes to adopt the methods of a successful leader, perhaps they will be
more effective. However, I fail to see how adopting another person’s style of leadership
is, in any meaningful way, authentic.
While some scholars maintain that they can develop leadership training programs that
allow leaders to express themselves in an individual way, this is disputed by a recent
Swiss study, conducted by Nada Endrissat, Werner Müller and Stephanie KaudelaBaum.
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In this study, twenty-six managers were interviewed and asked to give their

opinions about leadership training. These managers expressed hostility toward leadership
training, not least because they felt it forced them to act in a particular way, which they
regarded as inauthentic. It would seem from this study that leadership training, far from
allowing leaders to discover their own style, made them feel like phonies. So while some
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leadership scholars see authentic leadership as a way for people to express their
individuality, this is not borne out by this particular study.
A significant problem with leadership training, according to Amanda Sinclair, is that it
draws from positivist social psychology and the notion that it is possible to “track down
the truth about leadership and train [people] in it.”

78

Such training, as well as being

prescriptive may, as Jill Blackmore points out, obscure socio-cultural differences.
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It

appears that leadership training is often designed according to Anglo-American models
which, she argues, do not necessarily mesh well with other cultural environments.
Because different cultures operate out of different ideological frameworks, Blackmore
suggests that people think about leadership in different ways. From a Western
perspective, ideas about individuality may have relevance whereas in other cultures with
different beliefs a focus on the self may be less salient. When local context is ignored,
this results in leadership development programs failing to respect cultural diversity.
Jackie Ford agrees with Blackmore, maintaining that there is a tendency for leadership
training to mask its Anglo-American roots and to appear as if it is a universal idea.
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Moreover, there is an implicit assumption, in Ford’s view, that leadership is necessary to
an organization’s well-being. Yet this emphasis on leadership may evoke a sense of
helplessness on the part of employees, who become convinced that leaders are essential
for their organization to flourish.
In examining some of the strengths and weaknesses of leadership training, we see how
ideas about authenticity are culturally specific. Thus teaching leaders to be authentic may
not translate well across cultures. What becomes apparent is that particular experiences,
rooted in time and place, affect the ways that we think about leadership. In thinking about
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the place of authenticity in leadership, it is important to consider cultural context, as well
as social and historical factors.
I want to turn now to consider what insights Arendt can offer.

1.5

Arendt

As I suggested earlier, thinking with Arendt can help us reconsider the role of
authenticity in leadership in a manner cognizant of equality and difference. We have seen
that while there are dissenters, the dominant motif is that authentic leadership is
composed of four dimensions: balanced information processing, self-awareness,
internalized moral perspective and relational transparency. In this section, I want to show
why some of these claims are problematic from an Arendtian perspective.
For Arendt, self-knowledge as the basis for understanding is a deeply flawed notion.
Rather than self-knowledge, she maintains that it is through action and speech that
81

humans “show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal identities.”

The

widespread belief in inner depth is, in her opinion, a fallacy. Thus, a person can never
know herself in the way that proponents of authentic leadership suggest since, according
to Arendt, the person who appears clearly to others remains partially hidden from the
actor herself. It is because we can never know fully who we are that we cannot base a
theory of leadership on the self.
A central motif in Arendt’s work is an insistence that we fail to comprehend who
someone is because we concentrate on their “whatness.” For instance, in Western society,
when introduced to a new person, a common question is “what do you do?” People are
judged, consciously or unconsciously, depending upon their response, as certain
professions are regarded more highly than others. But someone’s profession fails to alert
us to a person’s uniqueness. Rather,
[w]ho somebody is or was we can know only by knowing the story of which
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he is himself the hero…everything else we know of him, including the work
he may have produced and left behind, tells us only what he is or was.

82

In The Human Condition, Arendt notes how the Greeks used the term “daimon” to refer
to something that was intrinsic to a particular individual, not a fleeting quality like
happiness. This distinctive identity is not the same as a person’s talents or shortcomings;
these character traits tell us what a person is good, or bad, at doing. The daimon relates to
“who” a person is. For the Greeks, a person’s essence could only be articulated after their
death, at which point it was the role of the storyteller to recount a person’s life. Arendt
asserts that no-one can be the author of their own life story, because it is impossible to
fully grasp who someone is until after they are dead. Hence, an individual’s life-story can
only be told, in its fullness, as a narrative delivered by another after their death. The
purpose of narrative is to provide a powerful means of remembrance. Indeed, it is through
the stories that we share that we obtain an understanding of the world.
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In Arendt’s view, a person’s unique identity is always to be understood as both relational
and embodied because each time we act and speak we do so within an already existent
web of human relationships. Yet how we perceive ourselves is often different to how we
appear to others. We do not appear to the world in the guise of an inner self; rather, we
appear before others through self-display.

84

In The Life of the Mind, Arendt notes that

self-display has two meanings. The first meaning is to display ourselves in terms of being
seen, heard or touched. The second meaning is to display our inner self. She concentrates
on the former notion of self-display, since it is our outward appearance that others engage
with. While we may try to manage our self-presentation, there will always be aspects that
escape our control. Furthermore, Arendt contests the surface/depth idea of subjectivity by
stating “our common conviction that what is inside ourselves, our ‘inner life,’ is more
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relevant to what we ‘are’ than what appears on the outside is an illusion.”

In the world

of appearances, that is the world of others, we show ourselves through deeds and actions.
In the world of the mind, that is the world of self, we reveal ourselves through the
medium of thought. Simply put, it is through action that we reveal ourselves to others,
while it is through reflection that we reveal ourselves to ourselves.
In relation to leadership, Arendt argues that too much emphasis on self-knowledge
contradicts the contingent nature of action. She maintains that a leader should not be
judged on her achievements, the outcome of which can never be known in advance, but
on her initiative, since it is impossible to plan for all eventualities because of action’s
unpredictability. Such unexpectedness, although intrinsic to human existence,
contravenes the rules and regulations a society puts in place to ensure law and order. In
The Human Condition, Arendt traces the desire for self-control back to Plato who, she
contends, disliked the vagaries of action. He regarded men as mere puppets on a stage,
controlled by the invisible hand of fate, and preferred poeisis (making) to praxis (action)
because the former had a predictable outcome.

86

It was because Plato wanted to give

human affairs solidity that he argued that action, because of its capricious nature, should
be separated from thought.
Arendt maintains that Plato’s disillusionment with political life, as a result of the trial and
subsequent execution of Socrates, was to have major repercussions on ways of thinking
about leadership. Instead of the collective equality of the citizens of the polis, the new
criterion for ruling was based upon a separation between leader and the led. In her words,
The supreme criterion of fitness for ruling others is, in Plato and in the
aristocratic tradition of the West, the capacity to rule one’s self. Just as the
philosopher-king commands the city, the soul commands the body and reason
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commands the passion.”

87

Here we see that the Platonic notion of leadership is based on a hierarchy of values. In
laying a political foundation based on law, Plato argued that action, because of its
unpredictability, must be separated from thought. Over time, knowledge became linked to
commanding others, whereas action is connected with obedience and the execution of
orders. With this decisive split between beginning and ruling, Arendt maintains that Plato
led the way for a conception of ruling that was anathema to human freedom because
plurality was denied in favour of sovereignty.
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Arendt is critical of the way Plato conceived of public leadership as akin to that of the
head of the household. In ancient Greece, the head of the household was like a tyrant,
since he had total power over all who lived in the household. Basing a theory of
leadership on the master/slave relationship of the household ensures that communal
action is usurped in favour of a supreme hierarchy between the head of the household and
everyone else. This form of leadership as mastery undermines the role of action in
leadership, because the ruler is seen as the person who initiates action while others carry
out his orders. In Arendt’s view, this separation between the one who envisions
something and the one who carries out that task brought about a hierarchical
understanding of rulership, which served to debase an “authentic understanding of human
freedom.”
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In time, the separation between thinking and action led to the rule of the few over the
many, and “the fallacy of the strong man who is powerful because he is alone.”

90

Yet the

notion of the strong, isolated leader is a myth, states Arendt, as it is only through working
together that action can be accomplished. She notes how the Greek word archein
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originally meant to begin something, as well as to lead, whereas the Latin equivalent was
agere, which means to lead by setting something in motion.

91

These linguistic changes in

the notion of rulership result in the importance of working collectively becoming
forgotten. Instead, a leader is seen as someone who begins an action, which others
execute on their behalf. This disconnection between the leader and others is potentially
dangerous, since a leader’s isolation from others creates an atmosphere of fear and
suspicion.
In addition, in her exploration of the Athenian world, Arendt argues that to show oneself
was essential to the Greek understanding of action. Excellence, known as arête in Greek
and virtus in Latin, was limited to actions in the public arena. Thus, the political sphere
was equated with the highest form of existence. The political realm was where a man
could gain public admiration, so important to assuage individual vanity. Hence, the Greek
polis represented a place to commemorate the deeds of great men. Initially, the word
“hero” did not refer to someone who is courageous. Its original Homeric meaning was a
free man who participated in the Trojan wars, and of whom a story could be told. It was
through the storyteller’s words that a hero gained immortality, something that the Greeks
desired above all else. In Homer’s retelling, everyone shows courage when they are
willing to take action. Hence, poets like Homer had a political function, that is, to
immortalize Greek action.
The Greek polis was regarded as the exclusive realm of freedom because citizens came
together to share their opinions and make decisions on public affairs. A willingness to act
was perceived as the foundation of freedom; however, it required courage to devote
oneself to public life because it meant that you had to be willing to share your views with
others. For the Greeks, the word “public” had two meanings. The first relates to being
seen and heard, and is the manner in which an individual appeared before others. The
second meaning of public is world, which represents the sum of human activity. Arendt
often refers to this as “inter-est,” meaning the space that resides between us, such as a
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table that we sit around to share ideas. This in-between space constitutes the place of
human interaction. As well, for the Greeks, a life lived at home was not regarded as a
good life, because it meant that a man was not taking an active part in the polis. In fact,
privacy originally meant to be deprived of something. Being outside the public realm, the
fate of most men and all women in Ancient Greece meant that a person was not
considered to be fully “human.” Although the polis was the exclusive realm of freedom
for male citizens, for the majority, that is, women, slaves, as well as working men, this
arena of liberty was closed.

92

In her later work, such as The Life of the Mind, Arendt argues that too much
concentration on action ignores a critical function of leadership that is reflection, or what
she calls the “stop and think.” She distinguishes between the thinking being and the
acting self, arguing that when we act we take on a singularity of purpose, whereas when
we think we engage in internal dialogue. Thinking alerts us to the fact that we are what
Arendt, following Socrates, refers to as “the two in one.” In contradistinction to action,
when we think, there is an interior dialogue that takes place between me and myself.
Thinking enables us to understand, not in terms of knowledge, but in terms of meaning.
Without the capacity for reflective thought, leaders may lose their ethical moorings since
they will not be able to reflect upon their mistakes. Without this ability to reflect, a
person may end up taking action that is harmful to others. Arendt underscored this fact in
her examination of Adolf Eichmann, whom she regarded as evil because he was
thoughtless. The “banality of evil,” which she saw as Eichmann’s signature, derived from
his seeming inability to think about the effects of what he was doing, together with his
refusal to take responsibility for his actions.
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What is clear is that leaders must not only

be able to act, but to reflect on their actions.
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To use an analogy, one could say that this originating realm of Western freedom was an elite
men’s club, since it was only those male citizens with property and birthright who were allowed
to take part.
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Arendt begins The Life of the Mind questioning Eichmann’s thoughtlessness, and asking
whether it is thoughtlessness that is at the base of what constitutes evil. I explore this further in
chapter three.
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1.5.1

Authority and Leadership

To understand leadership, according to Arendt, it is necessary to comprehend the
94

meaning of authority. In her essay “What is Authority?” she explores the different ways
that belief in legitimate authority has virtually disappeared in modern times. The
breakdown in authority is due to increasing secularism, and the ensuing lack of faith in
traditional beliefs. The problem, in her view, is that there is a distinct possibility that
modern society has chosen to stop learning from the past. But it is valuable to delve into
history, Arendt asserts, because it enables us to understand ourselves through the stories
that we share over time and space.
In Arendt’s exploration of the meaning of authority, she tries to ascertain what we can
learn from the past through an examination of legitimate versus illegitimate forms of rule.
A central facet of her argument is that we no longer understand what authority means
because we confuse authority with force. But she maintains that the use of force is
indicative of a failure of authority. Conversely, authority is when both the person in
power and her subjects regard this rule as lawful. For Arendt, authoritarian rule stands in
opposition to forcible coercion, or persuasive argumentation, because it is based upon an
implicit relationship between the one who commands, and those who obey. This form of
rule represents a legitimate hierarchy since both the leader and the follower concur with
the relationship. In her view, power stands in opposition to its negative counterparts,
force and violence, which are emblematic of harmful ways of ruling. But Arendt
contends that liberal thinkers fail to distinguish between these phenomena. As an
example, she shows how the term “all power corrupts,” is a meaningless phrase, because
it overlooks the crucial distinction between legitimate and illegitimate manifestations of
power.

Arendt, “What is Authority?” In Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political
Thought. (London: Penguin, 1993), 91-143. In her essay, she traces the difference between the
Roman and Greek notion of authority. For the Romans, authority is based on the notion of
tradition, and a veneration of important events in the past.
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An illegitimate manifestation of power is that of totalitarian rule. Regimes based on
totalitarian rule, as Arendt tells us, stand in opposition to human plurality, because “a
95

polis belonging to one man is no polis.”

Accordingly, any leadership regime that is

conceived as deriving from a sovereign will is not conducive to good government. Hence,
she vehemently disagrees with Rousseau’s notion of the government of one will because
sovereignty denies the basis of human freedom, that is, the ability for people to share
perspectives. This, for her, represents an illegitimate form of rule. Conversely, Arendt
argues that leadership functions best when it arises out of individuals working together,
rather than directed by a person in charge. A type of polis can appear at any time when
people come together for a common goal. In our time, we can see an Arendtian-style
polis emerge whenever there is concerted action taken by groups who are striving for
justice such as Occupy Wall Street, the Arab Spring, or the Idle No More movement in
Canada. When people come together over common cause, they discover the strength that
comes from collective action. This is why Arendt contends it is possible for a small group
of concerted individuals to overthrow a dictatorship. Collective power has a libratory
quality because it is through the medium of collective action that a committed group of
people can topple dictators.

1.5.2

Social Conformity

For Arendt, there is another form of rule that is contrary to human flourishing and that is
social conformism, which results in an inability to respect and foster uniqueness. In her
view, social conformism is a modern phenomenon that arose in the eighteenth century.
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Rather than equality for all, it created a kind of no-man rule where society dictates what
we do, and how we think. Within this framework, action became subservient to behaviour
because we do what is expected of us. We obey and do our duty. In our desire for
acceptance, we risk turning away from our personal values to embrace social standards.
When this happens we become unclear as to our moral responsibility to take a stance
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Arendt, “What is Authority,” 105.
For more on this topic, see Arendt’s discussion in The Human Condition, 38-50.
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against injustice. For Arendt, “rules of uniqueness and exclusiveness are, and always will
be, in conflict with the standards of society.”

97

Seen in this way, individual freedom,

understood as a right to uniqueness, is curtailed whenever we believe we are all equal,
but fail to take into account that we are all equally distinct.
For Arendt, the fundamental aspect of freedom is connected with the ability to speak and
act in the public realm. I suggest, however, that social conformity is counterproductive to
a deeper notion of authenticity since, rather than a world of unique others, what we have
is a regulatory framework of policies and procedures. This we see constantly in the
twenty-first century workplace as concepts such as risk management are put in place so
as to tighten up institutional practices. In the introduction, I questioned why it is that
authentic leadership has emerged as a topic of interest. Could it be that a guiding motif of
our time is that of distrust, not only of leaders but of each other? A society of distrust
emerges, in tandem with a penchant for instrumental modes of thinking, and may result in
a lack of caring for others. But I am not sure that, in its current form, authentic leadership
is able to offer us the guidance we need to create a more harmonious society.
In this section, I have argued that thinking with Arendt reveals some of the negative
implications with leadership theories that purport to be about authentic relationships but
are based on quantitative measurement that ignore broader questions regarding care, and
highlight the problems with conformity.
We need to consider authenticity through a different lens in order to obtain a more
rounded view of leadership. In the following section, I want to concentrate on women and
leadership.

This quote is from Arendt’s contentious essay where she argued that the marriage laws against
miscegenation were worse than school segregation. Arendt was roundly criticised for her
comments, and she did apologise to Sidney Hook. I think her argument makes more sense within
the context of her overall views on social conformity, and the dangers of assimilation. See
“Reflections on Little Rock,” in The Portable Hannah Arendt, ed. Peter Baehr (London: Penguin
Books: 2000), 239.
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1.6

Women and Leadership

Arendt referred to herself as old-fashioned when it came to her views about women
leaders. In response to an interview question from Günter Gaus, she stated: “It just
doesn’t look good when a woman gives orders. She should try not to get into such a
situation if she wants to remain feminine.”
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Her bias against women leaders is still
99

commonplace in society, as a recent survey points out.

It seems that even in the twenty-

first century a significant percentage of employees state their preference for a male boss.
In this section, I want to explore feminist accounts that critique authentic leadership.
Before doing so, I wish to briefly consider earlier feminist critiques of work.
In looking at feminist critiques of organizational behaviour, Joan Acker contends that
second-wave feminists “denounced bureaucracy and hierarchy as male-created and male100

dominated structures of control.”

An integral part of second-wave feminists’ desire for

change in the workplace was, she states, the creation of organizations that would operate
in non-hierarchical ways. Instead of a new kind of workplace, however, the results were
more of the same, that is, a number of women leaders acted as badly as some of their
101

male counterparts. Partly, this was because, as Dorothy Smith maintains,

there were no

models available for feminists to rethink organizational structures. Therefore, it was
difficult to create an organization model outside of the normative framework.
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In the same interview, Arendt went on to say that while she may be old-fashioned in her
thinking, as far as her own life was concerned she had done exactly as she pleased. These
contradictions between what Arendt says about the need for women to be feminine and her own
determination to follow her own path are one of many paradoxes that appear in her work. See
Arendt, “What Remains? The Language Remains:” A Conversation with Günter Gaus,” in Essays
in Understanding: 1930-1954, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company,
1994), 1-24.
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earlier footnote.
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Joan Acker, “Hierarchies, Jobs, Bodies: A Theory of Gendered Organizations,” Gender and
Society, 4 no. 2 (1990): 139–58, 141.
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See Dorothy Smith’s discussion on the relations of ruling in The Conceptual Practices of
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These earlier feminist critiques are still pertinent to current problems. For instance,
although gender segregation has altered, change is not the same across the workforce,
according to Paula England.

102

While middle-class women have made substantial gains

in professions such as medicine and law there is virtually no change for women in
traditional blue-collar jobs. She suggests that middle-class women chose to go into male
professions so as to gain financial reward and status, rather than follow their mothers into
more traditional feminine occupations, such as teaching. This has resulted in the
continued devaluation of traditional women’s work.
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Moreover, in fields, such as social

work or nursing, there has not been a notable increase in male students because social
discrimination is greater for men who choose to pursue female professions. Those men
who choose traditional female occupations are faced with a lack of status, financial
rewards, as well as social disapproval. Hence England argues there is little incentive for
men to change careers. One reason for this continuing gender segregation is that there has
been no substantial change in social ideas regarding heterosexual relationships. Rather,
the private realm reaffirms gender inequality, which has ongoing implications for the
workplace in general, and women’s leadership in particular.
Stereotypical ideas about gender also continue to affect women’s ability to reach equal
pay, as well as hamper their advancement to higher positions. According to Linda Carli
and Alice Eagly, in 2009 American women who worked full-time earned 80% of the
104

male wage in comparison with 62% in 1979.

In examining why this gender disparity

still exists, they maintain that there is still demonstrable opposition toward women
leaders at the higher echelons of organizational life. As an example in Europe, the United
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Paula England, “The Gender Revolution: Uneven and Stalled,” Gender and Society, 24, no. 2
(2010): 149-166.
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England notes that in 2007, 80% of American college-educated women were employed versus
47% for high school or high-school dropouts. In 1970 the figure was 59% for college-educated
women, and virtually the same at 43% for high school women. These statistics demonstrate that
women with college-education have made tremendous strides in the workplace, but this has not
been the experience of women as a whole.
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Alice Eagly and Linda Carli, Through the Labyrinth: The Truth about how Women become
Leaders (Harvard Business School Press, Boston: 2007).
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States and Canada, women make up less than 20% of senior corporate executives.

105

Paradoxically, Carli and Eagly argue that women exert greater influence when they
exhibit lower levels of competence than they actually possess. As a way of gaining
notice, it appears that some women ask for help from their male colleagues when such
guidance is not required. Moreover, while male leaders do well by being agentic, women
must appeal to communal ideals to be seen as successful leaders. Hence, a relational
approach may actually work against a woman leader, since it reinforces gender
stereotypes.
Eagly adopted the term “relational authenticity”

106

to describe how leaders can promote

social values that followers buy into. Leadership depends upon encouraging others to
share your vision so as to work together for shared values. While many leadership
scholars have previously assumed that followers are persuaded by leader’s words, Eagly
maintains that there is often contestation between a leader’s belief and a community’s
willingness to buy in. Followers need to believe not just that the leader has values, but
that these values will benefit the community as a whole. During the last decade, she has
conducted a series of longitudinal studies on women and leadership. Her research
findings suggest that when women are initially hired to lead an institution, they may act
differently than their male counterparts because of their different value commitments.
Over the long term, however, this gender difference tends to dissipate. So while female
leaders may be more vigilant in regards to business ethics, this gender difference may
disappear the longer a woman is in a position of leadership. This is a problem, since if
women leaders take up similar ways of acting to men, then, while gender equity may be
helped, organizations will not be transformed. Similarly, Barbara Kellerman and Deborah
Rhode argue that “the great man” leadership model still acts as a significant barrier for
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A recent survey by Catalyst in June 2013 shows that while 47.5% of the Canadian workforce
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women.

These authors concur with Eagly that placing certain women in powerful

positions will not lead to the empowerment of women as a group.
In striving for equality in the workplace what has happened is that women’s limited
ascension to top leadership posts has been conceived in terms of representation when, in
reality, what is needed is a troubling of organizational structures. This is one reason why
Jill Blackmore and Judith Sachs state that although individual women may have
benefitted from leadership opportunities on the whole, gender relations have remained the
108

same.

They call for new research on women’s leadership that shines a light on

organizational practices. By considering structural issues, alongside gender relations, it
may become apparent how bureaucracies are intolerant of difference. For example, in
considering the changing educational landscape and the move toward entrepreneurialism
within universities, Blackmore and Sachs maintain there is a greater emphasis on
similarity in understanding, and an expected commitment to corporate goals, especially
amongst senior management. Practices of conformity are evident in the way people dress,
in the rituals of meetings, and the symbolic use of space. Who is allocated the best
location, or the biggest office, serves to reinforce institutional hierarchy, and offers
spatial insight into power dynamics. Consequently, these scholars suggests that the
“ongoing whiteness and maleness of educational, political, business, and community
leadership is not about gender, but is a problem for democracy.”
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Currently, in the educational sector, there is a massive push to corporatize higher
education. Critics like Blackmore contend that such restructuring puts the emphasis on
what are perceived to be masculine ideas of efficiency, accountability and outcomes, over
less instrumental feminized leadership discourses. The problem, however, is that these
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feminized versions, in turn, may serve to constrain women’s leadership, because women
lead in different ways. As well, Louise Morley suggests that it is important to distinguish
between women and feminists in academic leadership. She further argues that feminist
leaders must be willing “to challenge unequal distributions and exercise of power,
hierarchical structures and decision-making processes and discriminatory institutional
practices.”110 In her view, it is the gendered world that is the problem. Yet I am
somewhat uncomfortable with the idea that feminists lead in a particular manner. While it
might be heartwarming to think in these terms, we need to remember that uniqueness is
constantly covered over by social practices and ideological ways of thinking. And this
includes some strains of feminism.
One way to try and overcome structural challenges and gendered biases in higher
education, according to Rita Bornstein, is for women leaders to monitor their own
attitudes so as not to reinforce traditional stereotypes. As the first female Jewish president
of Rollins College she knows, from personal experience, how difficult it can be to
achieve presidential legitimacy. At the beginning of her tenure, Bornstein describes how
she experienced a great deal of hostility. For example, one senior administrator stated that
the College was not ready for a Jewish president, let alone a woman.
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She further

contends that presidents face constant challenges to their moral leadership. For example,
a president may have to suppress her personal views so as to uphold the values of the
institution. But there is, in her view, a lack of information regarding the relationship
between leadership, gender and ethics, which is vital if women leaders wish to address
structural inequities.
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It is important to understand structural power dynamics, and realize that we have agency
to resist institutional norms to some degree. The problem is that over time, social and
cultural systems work to ensure women either do not get power, or do not believe that
they possess it. According to Amanda Sinclair, feelings of “powerlessness are historically
substantiated.”
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This is not to see women as victims, but to recognize how past

injustices may influence present behaviour. She advocates blending the personal with the
professional so as to obtain a deeper understanding of how one’s earlier education and
family dynamics may help, or hinder, one’s leadership. Understanding personal history
can be useful in explaining why so many senior leadership teams, rather than disagree
with the leader, tend to be conformist in their attitudes.
But there are other contradictions at work. For example, while people often say that they
want to work in a caring environment, it appears that most people state a preference to be
led by strong leaders who may posit non-caring attributes, since this is often perceived as
successful leadership behaviour. This role incongruity works against women leaders in
two ways. First, prejudice takes the form of perceiving women as being out of place in a
leadership role. In general terms, she is perceived to have less agentic qualities because of
her gender. Second, if a woman behaves in a manner that fulfills common expectations of
leadership behaviour, for instance, by being assertive, she is evaluated in a negative way
because her action is perceived as inappropriate, perhaps even inauthentic behaviour for
114

women.

For this situation to alter, Eagly and Karau maintain that there has to be major

societal change, not only in the way that most people perceive gender relations, but also
in how we conceptualize leadership.
It appears that women leaders face a double-bind in that while employees say they want
to work in a caring environment, they do not want leaders who exhibit a caring
demeanour, because this is perceived as a sign of weakness. This equation of caring with
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weakness reinforces the belief that we need strong, independent leaders. Yet, according
to Paul Begley, it is only through caring for the values of others that authentic leadership
can occur.
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But it may be difficult for men, as well as women, to lead in a way they

perceive as caring. From her interviews with male and female presidents, Pamela Eddy
illustrates how leaders have problems when they attempt to “transgress” gender
appropriate ways of acting.
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She describes a situation where a male president espoused

a team-based approach. Rather than seeing him as an inclusive leader, faculty perceived
him as weak. Thus, Eddy suggests that people still judge success from an outdated,
autocratic, model of leadership that makes it difficult for leaders to deviate from the
gender norm.
Another issue to consider relates to scholarship. For example, most research in
organizational leadership, according to Jennifer Binns and Deborah Kerfoot, is “saturated
with embodied masculinity.”
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But this is a particular kind of masculinity that views

leadership as mastery, which merely perpetuates unequal power relationships. Similarly,
Beverly Irby and others argue that leadership theory fails to include “feminine presence
or voice.”
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Increasingly, however, there are challenges to this way of thinking about

leadership. For instance, Yvonne Due Billing and Matts Alvesson argue that earlier
feminist work reproduced gendered dichotomies by suggesting that women leaders lead
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differently.

119

Much of the scholarship on women’s leadership that was conducted in the

1980s and 1990s, they argue, became mired in the nature/nurture dispute. Such an
approach to leadership does not fully explain how normative assumptions regarding
leadership reinforce gender prejudice. Instead, we need to rethink notions of masculinity
and femininity as culturally created and reiterated bodily practices.
In a similar vein, Michèle Bowring notes that leadership research that suggests that
women lead differently from men serves to reaffirm dualistic thinking. All this does is
reinforce dominant modes of thinking about gender relations. It is thus not enough to
“lean in” and bring one’s whole self to work, as Sheryl Sandberg asserts, because this
120

does little to explain how structural inequities work.

Furthermore, her assertion that

authentic communication is akin to that which takes place on Facebook serves to show
how authenticity is often perceived in a superficial way. What we see here is a flattening
of a deeper sense of authentic connection in favour of superficial forms of relating. What
we need is a more nuanced theoretical approach that takes into account intersectional
identity as well as lived experience.
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being open to doubt.

122

While confidence is perceived as vital to a particular kind of

masculine leadership, being open to doubt can overturn the dominant leadership “script”
by providing an openness to consider different perspectives, and create new possibilities.
A relational approach to leadership allows a person to not only acknowledge, but learn
from mistakes.
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Perhaps it is through an attention to relationships that combines a

desire for equality and justice with mutual responsibility and care that we may work
toward a different approach toward authenticity in leadership. By acknowledging
contingency, as well as lived experience, we may be able to think further about the
conditions for an ethical leadership praxis. Such an ethical leadership practice may run
counter to the specific dimensions that represent authentic leadership. To think this
further, we must be willing to engage in an open enquiry that is receptive to opposing
views, and tries to take into account situational context. This is what I hope thinking with
Arendt may provide.

1.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have examined the concept of authentic leadership, and its relationship
to gender. I have shown how this theory tends to focus on certain dimensions of leading
that serve to preclude others. There is a desire to restrict authentic leadership to a
discussion of four dimensions, namely, balanced information processing, relational
transparency, internalized moral perspective and self-awareness. Moreover, there is an
implicit assumption that authenticity is good for leadership. In their attempt to develop a
universal theory of leadership, scholars privilege a particular kind of theoretical
abstraction, which serves to deny the contingency of lived experience.
Rather than arguing that authenticity in leadership is necessarily a good thing, we must be
willing to interrogate the reasons why sometimes this might not be the case. This requires

Jennifer Binns, “The Ethics of Relational Leading: Gender Matters,” Gender, Work and
Organization, 15, no. 6, (November 2008): 614. At the same time, Binns notes that this is not
without problems because confidence is usually perceived as a masculine trait whereas self-doubt
is feminized.
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us to critique prevailing power inequities rather than assuming that by adding authenticity
to the mix, we will develop good leaders. Earlier, I posed the question - would a world
populated by authentic leaders be a better one? While some leadership scholars presume
that a world populated by authentic leaders would be a better one, history is littered with
examples of leaders who have been certain they are right, only to be found terribly
wanting by posterity when the untold suffering of their single-minded belief, and the
untold suffering caused to others, is taken into consideration. Thus we need to be willing
to question whether authenticity is necessarily good for leadership.
I have suggested that thinking with Arendt may help to uncover some of the inherent
problems with the discourse of authentic leadership, especially the ways in which a focus
on leadership that privileges self-knowledge can be detrimental. I have argued that some
scholars fail to interrogate the multifarious ways in which the intersections of identity
have a bearing, not only on leadership, but on what it means to be true to ourselves. Put
simply, a focus on the self can lead to a disconnection from the world, which may have
negative implications for a pluralistic society. Moreover, ignoring the intersubjective
dimension of everyday life can result in leaders becoming separated from everyday
concerns, and acting in self-indulgent ways to the detriment of everyone else. Thinking
with Arendt may illuminate some hidden consequences that arise from leadership that is
self-oriented. In addition, her theory of uniqueness reveals how our relationships and
forms of mutual responsiveness are central to existence. By seeing leadership in
relational terms that weaves together diverse perspectives, her work opens up fruitful
avenues of investigation. As such, Arendt provides us with an alternative ethical guide to
considering the place of authenticity in leadership.
I have also argued that social conformity and ideas regarding gender normativity
negatively influence how we approach leadership. In trying to fit in, some women choose
to assimilate to dominant styles of leadership. While assimilation may seem a sensible
route, it may lead to a perpetuation of structural inequality. We need to comprehend how
the many skeins of social, political, historical and cultural forces have a profound bearing
on our thinking about leadership. If, as I argue, gender prejudice is embedded in the
Western cultural imagination, then it may prove fruitful to turn to history to see what
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effects this had on women’s ability to lead, as well as gendered notions of authenticity.
This will be the main topic of the next chapter.
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Chapter 2

2

Enlightened Virtue

In a famous essay written in 1784, Immanuel Kant argued that it is only when a man is
free to make his own choices that he can be said to be enlightened.124 In his opinion,
“enlightened” freedom was composed of three components: the ability to think for
oneself; the ability to think from the standpoint of others; and, lastly, the capacity to think
and act in concert with one’s beliefs. In this chapter, I explore how these ideas about
enlightened freedom relate to women, and look at the effect this had on notions of
authenticity and leadership. I focus on Western Europe, since this was where modern
ideas surrounding authenticity were initially formulated. In tracing authenticity’s modern
underpinnings to the emergence of bourgeois selfhood, I show how women’s desire to
lead was affected by notions of gender propriety. My main thesis is that Enlightenment
notions of virtue worked to constrain women’s autonomy, and limited their ideas about
their own possibilities. In examining Enlightenment ideas regarding the construction of
the liberal subject, I argue that gendered notions of what constituted “right” conduct
served to enhance men’s freedom while, simultaneously, restricting women’s agency.
This is evident in a guiding bourgeois motif of the time that “the sons of reason should
converse only with the daughters of virtue.”125
Gendered ideas concerning what constitutes virtuous action served to instruct, and divide,
men and women, and placed restrictions on women’s ability to regard themselves as
leaders within the socio-political sphere. I argue that gendered notions of virtue were a
way for bourgeois society to redefine its moral standards in opposition to their
aristocratic counterparts, whom they considered to be immoral. These bourgeois attitudes
toward virtue encouraged a separation of gender roles. While for a man virtue was
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exemplified by his character, for a woman her social reputation was regarded as more
important than her character. The effects of this gendered discourse regarding virtue,
alongside women’s economic dependency and lack of political and legal rights, served to
constrain women’s possibilities. Whereas bourgeois man viewed himself as a relatively
free agent within an increasingly competitive public realm, bourgeois woman was
defined by her marital and maternal roles. This had the effect of restricting women’s
sphere of influence to the domain of the domestic, whilst men were able to develop a
more expansive existence through the public sphere of action, ideas and adventure. These
spatial differences between what was considered appropriate action and behaviour had an
adverse effect on the way that women conceived of their agency. To an extent, as I
argued in chapter one, these spatial restrictions still bear a trace on the cultural
imagination, to the extent that many women do not perceive themselves as leaders.
In the eighteenth century, as the rights of middle-class men were being espoused,
women’s freedom became increasingly restrained by social conventions, as indicated by
Rousseau’s popular phrase that women were “born to obey.”126 One way that this lived
obedience manifested itself was through gendered ideas about caring. For women, caring
for others, rather than the self, became regarded as the epitome of feminine virtue. As
well, carefulness became the watchword for women, as they learned how important it
was not just to be selfless, but to ensure that any pretension to talent was kept quiet. This
dual legacy of obedience and selflessness impeded most women’s sense of possibility,
and affected adversely their ability to see themselves, and be perceived, as leaders outside
the domestic sphere. Taken together, these social and cultural restrictions served to limit
most women’s ability to see themselves as leaders outside of the domestic realm.
However, it would be wrong to suggest that these social dictates proved insurmountable.
There were examples of women who were courageous enough to brave public censure in
order to become involved in political debate, although these women remain the
exception.
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The historian Joan Scott contends that we need to examine gender in its historical context
so as to see how, as a phenomenon, gender is “produced, reproduced and transformed in
different situations and over time.”
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In order to obtain a fuller account of the

phenomenon of gender as it relates to authenticity and leadership in the Enlightenment, I
shall explore the life and work of particular thinkers, as well as the wider social, legal and
political restrictions on women’s lives. As part of my argument, I compare the work of
Enlightenment thinkers to gain a deeper understanding of the gendered discourse of
virtue.
After briefly laying out some pertinent historical information, I begin with a discussion of
Montesquieu’s Persian Letters, which represents a veiled critique of the French court as
well as an attack on social hypocrisy. Through his description of a changing Parisian
society we observe how, due to the vagaries of modernity, people’s social roles were
more fluid than in the past. This social flexibility produced not only a sense of hope, but
also increased anxiety. Building upon this discussion, I turn to the 1760’s and Denis
Diderot’s withering critique of Parisian society in Rameau’s Nephew. In this work, he
captured some of the contradictions implicit in a moral versus immoral view of the world.
Next, I consider the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. His writing heralds a new way of
thinking about authenticity that places the emphasis on a gendered self. Rousseau’s
writing was influential, not only in terms of the development of modern notions of the
self, but also in regard to the formation of gender roles. For instance, he argued that
“everything that men and women have in common belongs to the species, and [that]
everything that distinguishes them belongs to the sex.”128 In his view, this gender
difference should form the basis of moral relationships. Here we see a significant gender
dichotomy in relation to questions of authenticity. On the one hand, what constitutes
authenticity for a man was his strength of character. For a woman, on the other hand, it
was for others to judge her authenticity, or lack thereof. In effect, a woman’s role was
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performative, that is, she had to be seen to be virtuous. It was being perceived by others
as virtuous that was the most important element of a woman’s claim to authenticity.
In relation to gendered notions of virtue, I want to consider what happens when the
Enlightenment challenge to think for oneself runs contrary to social mores. This
predicament emerges whenever women try to gain a political voice so as to fight for
gender justice. To explore this in more depth, I look at two women who exhibited
leadership qualities on the political stage so as to demonstrate what happens when a
woman’s political action is in opposition to society’s dictates regarding female virtue.
The first woman I discuss is Mary Wollstonecraft, who came to be regarded as notorious
because of her outspokenness and perceived lack of moral decorum. The second example
of female leadership is that exemplified by Olympe de Gouges. During the French
Revolution, she fought against the establishment of a political system that espoused
liberty while restricting access for women to the political sphere.
Any woman courageous enough to cross the gender divide was regarded in one of two
ways. She was either treated as a figure of scorn, exemplified by Horace Walpole’s
129

phrase “hyenas in petticoats,”

indicating that her action was unbecoming to their sex.

Or she was regarded as having a masculine mind and, thus being different from other
women. This was the case with Mary Wollstonecraft, who was known affectionately, in
her circle of acquaintances, only by her last name. She became, in effect, “one of the
boys.” Olympe de Gouges was also called a “male woman.”
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But in her case, this

masculine identification was an attempt by her detractors to show that her action was
unfeminine. Whenever women were brave enough to risk public censure, they were
accused of acting in a manner inappropriate to female conduct. This gender prejudice had
a negative effect on women’s ability to speak and act in the public realm that, according
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to Arendt, is crucial to freedom. But it is not just gender that is affected by social
constraints. Later in the chapter, I examine Arendt’s biography of Rahel Varnhagen,
where we see how Varnhagen’s desire for social assimilation was a result of ethnic and
religious prejudice.
In exploring issues relating to authenticity within a Western historical context, there are
two interconnected threads that I perceive as worthy of attention. First, eighteenthcentury commentators expressed concern regarding what they viewed as a divergence
between being and appearance, that is, the gap between what is and what seems to be.
Second, rapid changes taking place in society led to confusion and anxiety over who one
could trust. Whether a person was or was not who they purported to be was of increasing
concern as traditional roles disappeared. Indeed, we cannot conceive of eighteenthcentury notions of authenticity without considering the effects of social hypocrisy. In this
regard, I discuss Arendt’s insights into what she calls the rise of “the social.” The social
realm that emerged during the eighteenth century was, for her, a sphere of inauthenticity
because social dictates serve to encourage the standardization of human behavior. Rather
than the agonistic nature of the Greek polis, which Arendt regards as a genuine space of
appearance because citizens were able to enter into dialogue and debate, in the eighteenth
century different mechanisms were used to contain the full range of opinion. One
mechanism that suppressed public debate was the strict censorship enforced in France
and Prussia, which worked to deny political and social alternatives to the absolute rule of
the monarch. Another mechanism was the tyranny of social decorum, which privileged
assimilation over the outward expression of differences of opinion. We will see how both
aspects of tyranny negatively affect the realization of freedom, especially for women.
During the Enlightenment, ideas about freedom fomented social and political dissent. But
while the ability to speak and act was touted as fundamental to “enlightened” freedom,
the problem was that, for the majority of the population, full access to the public sphere
was denied. Through political and legal definitions, freedom was restricted to the
fortunate few, that is, men of property. In addition, one of the harmful legacies of the
Enlightenment, for Arendt, was that people thought about equality in abstract terms. This
had a negative effect on anyone who did not fit the ideal notion of citizen. Herein lies
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some of the contradictions associated with the notion of the equal citizen, since it is based
on an abstract idea that does not take difference into consideration. Instead of being
regarded as a unique “who” which, in Arendt’s view, is a necessary component of the full
expression of human existence, people are regarded for what they are. We will see how a
person’s social location, particularly their gender, could curtail their freedom.
As I showed in chapter one, a person’s social role is but one component of what
constitutes an individual. It is the sum total of a person’s experiences, together with their
social location – their race, class, sexuality, gender, and so forth – that makes up who we
are. Today, we recognize that social factors such as class, race, sexuality and disability
play a part in influencing how a person is regarded by others, sometimes in a
discriminatory way. In eighteenth-century Europe, however, such factors were deemed
irrelevant to the public sphere. So while economic and social disparities make a
difference to how a person may experience the world, these social distinctions often went
unnoticed by others. In On Revolution, Arendt argues that while the Founding Fathers in
America debated what constituted equality of rights for citizens, it never occurred to them
to ask those whom they saw every day about their views.131 Here, I am referring to the
working poor, slaves and women. The reason why their views were deemed irrelevant
was that, unlike propertied men, they had no political rights. Since this is a large topic to
which I cannot do justice, I omit important aspects such as ideas of empire and slavery
from this discussion. Instead, I concentrate on the gendered discourse of virtue and its
influence upon ideas concerning gender, authenticity and leadership.
In the next section, I offer an overview of some socio-historical changes taking place at
this time, and their effect on the emergence of new ways of thinking about morality.
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2.1 Changing Values
In 1750, London was the largest European city with 750,000 inhabitants, while Paris was
the second biggest metropolis with approximately half a million inhabitants.132 Many
middle-class inhabitants of these cities benefited from the wealth amassed from trade and
commercial expansion. For the fortunate few, there was a greater luxury in terms of the
quality and quantity of goods available.133 The power and prestige that resulted from this
new wealth created through trade influenced both public and private life. With their new
wealth, the middle-class gained enhanced social status and, over time, political
legitimacy. As the middle-class in Western Europe gained greater political and social
status, new ideas emerged concerning what constituted good taste.134 For example, rather
than the large banquets of the past, smaller social gatherings became popular. These
kinds of intimate gatherings complemented the emphasis on good manners and
sociability, especially through polite and witty conversation, as we will see later in the
discussion of the salon.135
At the same time, the popularization of scientific discoveries began to challenge
traditional ways of thinking, and undermine religious beliefs. In England, along with
Protestantism, new religious sects, such as the Quakers and Methodists, placed an
emphasis on the relationship between the individual and God. Self-understanding was
seen as a private affair, which should not be regulated by priests. These social and
political changes, as Charles Lindholm notes, brought about the “erosion of a sacred
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hierarchy, the fragmentation of roles, and the sense of a loss of significance.” 136 Indeed,
judging a person’s integrity, or lack thereof, became difficult as people’s social roles
were less well-defined. Increased social mobility, as a result of urbanization and
economic expansion, led to a greater anxiety regarding whom one could trust.
Coincidentally, as Lionel Trilling points out, a desire for authenticity arose out of a
perceived need for greater sincerity in social relationships.137 This search for authenticity
was thus both a response to the vagaries of modernity and a way to define middle-class
morals from those of the aristocracy. The middle-class sought to set themselves apart
from the aristocracy, whom they regarded as irreligious and immoral. These bourgeois
notions of morality were intrinsically connected to beliefs about gender differences. For
example, the idea that middle-class women had a heightened, or more refined, sense of
morality began to take root, and was to have a profound influence on a woman’s ability
and desire to go against social “norms.” For women, individual action was curtailed by
what was deemed appropriate social behaviour, with the result that, as Chris Roulston
notes, the Enlightenment quest for self-knowledge was not “who am I?” but rather “who
must I not be?”138
Questions regarding role-playing became commonplace and observers noted how
eighteenth-century city life in Paris and London resembled a stage. Richard Sennett
contends that the metaphorical use of theatrum mundi served to acknowledge the
operations of illusion within society.139 We can see the phenomenon of role-playing
emerging through the eighteenth-century popularity with masquerades, and the
enthusiasm with which the body was perceived as a mannequin to be adorned with exotic
costumes. A fascination with role-playing was also apparent in the increasing appeal of
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the theatre. Indeed, the ability for an actor to transform himself into a character was
regarded with wonder by philosophes, such as Diderot. He viewed great actors as having
an exceptional ability to distill the essence of human feelings. But not everyone shared
Diderot’s enthusiasm for the theatre. In fact, Rousseau saw theatres as having a
corrupting influence because it encouraged artifice. For some middle-class
commentators, a fascination with artifice was regarded as contrary to the proper, moral
values of the emerging middle-class. For others, such as Immanuel Kant, this collective
role-playing could prove positive for society, since although a person may start by acting,
he thought that virtues would ultimately become part of an actor’s disposition.
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Through this brief review of some of the emerging trends in eighteenth-century Western
Europe, we begin to see a pattern emerging. As well as economic expansion, there were
social and political changes occurring, as the aristocracy begins to lose its place to the
middle-class, whose increasing wealth gave them a say in political affairs. However,
these social and political changes differed depending upon each country. In the next
section, I want to look at how three different writers - Montesquieu, Diderot and
Rousseau - chart the changes that are taking place in France.

2.2 Exploring Freedom – Montesquieu’s Persian Letters
One of the first eighteenth-century writers to explore the connection between the artifice
of social life and its effects on human nature was Montesquieu in Persian Letters, an
epistolary work published in 1721. Putting Montesquieu’s work into historical context,
we note that the early 1700’s were a time of social unrest in France. During this period,
France was primarily an agrarian society. As a consequence of Northern Europe’s ‘little
ice-age,’141 there was a series of poor harvests. Crop failures led to a devastating famine
in 1707, and a peasant revolt ensued. While this revolt was quelled by government forces,
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little assistance was offered to those people most devastated by the famine. This disregard
for the plight of the poor was to have major repercussions later in the century.
Until 1715, France was ruled by the conservative monarch Louis XIV. Together with the
Catholic Church, the Monarchy kept a tight check on the spread of “radical” ideas. This
State and religious censorship made it difficult for writers to disseminate their thoughts.
In contrast to France, England and Scotland had a flourishing public arena, and had
entered a period of scientific and artistic revitalization. Following Louis XIV’s death,
Philippe d’Orléans, the new Regent in France, instigated major changes. An Anglophile,
he wanted to bring a new spirit of learning to encourage artistic and scientific advances in
France. As part of his desire for cultural change, the Court moved from Versailles to
Paris, which became the centre of intellectual activity in France.142
In Persian Letters, Montesquieu investigates how these changes in the political order
were influencing social ideas. Through his comparison of two different locations –
Parisian society in the early 1700’s and the fictional depiction of a Seraglio in Persia Montesquieu explores how social pretensions can negatively influence human behaviour.
He contrasts the static environment of the Seraglio, where everyone’s life is controlled by
their fixed roles, with that of the fluidity of Paris, which is regarded as a place of
transformation, not just of society, but also of the self. Montesquieu’s main characters in
the book are two Persian visitors, the tyrant Usbek and his servant Rica. They act as
dispassionate observers of Parisian society, which they find lacking in moral substance.
In their letters, they comment on the differences between the Parisians they meet and
their own society. They note the discrepancy between what people say and how they act.
In one letter, Usbek comments: “I see people here arguing endlessly about religion; but at
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the same time they seem to be competing over who can observe it the least.”143 What
Montesquieu highlights here is the difference between what people profess to believe in,
and how they actually act. In another letter, Rica describes how, when dressed in his
Persian costume, he was the centre of attention. Adorned in Parisian garments, however,
he finds himself ignored by the very people who had previously found him so fascinating.
In questioning the relationship between a man and his outward appearance, Rica wonders
what effect this might have on a person’s moral attitude. He comments, “if clothing and
manners make the external man will the inner man change to follow suit?"144 Similarly, at
a dinner party, Rica overhears two men conspire on how they can appear witty by
laughing at each other’s jokes. Reflecting on their artifice, he contends that these men’s
"performance displays conviction in the notion that only appearance is authenticity."145
What becomes apparent to the visitors is an inconsistency in people’s words and deeds.
In highlighting the false manners of a young woman, Rica says “her gravest concern is
not to have a good time, but to look as if she’s having a good time.”146 Here Montesquieu
points to the superficial nature of French society and how this woman acts in a way she
thinks others will approve. In his letters, Usbek expressed disgust at what he perceives as
the shamelessness of women’s dress and behaviour. Because of their perceived lack of
propriety in dress and decorum, Rica quips that “Frenchmen hardly ever talk about their
wives; they’re afraid to speak of them in front of men who know them better than they do
themselves.”147 The women in French society are regarded as immodest; they are judged
as promiscuous as a result of how they dress. In addition to observing the dubious morals
of Parisian society, the Persian visitors are appalled at the profound social inequalities
they witness. Usbek observes that for one man to lead the life of an epicure, a hundred
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others must work to satisfy his desire for indolence.148 While he makes disparaging
comments on the inequities of French society, Usbek refuses to examine the inequalities
that exist in his own culture.
Although various wives write declaring their passionate love for him, Usbek exhibits a
growing anxiety that they might not continue to obey him. The longer he resides in Paris,
the more Usbek realizes that a society based on obedience is devoid of genuine
relationships because there is no personal autonomy. Yet this knowledge affords him
little enlightenment, since he is reluctant to change the social order in Persia, even though
his power affords him no contentment. What is common to both cultures is that women
are perceived as the property of men.
Paradoxically, however, through sharing information about the different social
relationships that exist in Paris, it is Uzbek’s wives who, in gaining knowledge about
different ways of living, choose to revolt against their own condition. Usbek is
incredulous to learn of the emerging anarchic disorder in the Seraglio, and is especially
distraught to learn that his favourite wife, Roxana, has committed adultery. In her last
letter to him, Roxana explains that she is about to commit suicide by swallowing poison.
Before she dies, however, she wants Usbek to know her real feelings for him. She writes:
“How could you suppose me so credulous as to believe that the sole purpose for my
existence was to adore your caprices? That while you refused yourself nothing, you had
the right to frustrate every desire of mine?”149 Although it appeared that she was content
to submit to his desires, Roxana had felt very differently. Her deceit enabled her to live as
she chose which, in this case, meant taking a lover. Roxana maintains that her “mind has
always remained independent.”

150

While her external role was that of obedient wife and

servant, her portrayal of modesty had been an act she adopted so as to obtain her own
desires.
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In the fictional Seraglio, each person has a fixed role, subject to one man’s rule. Social
mores are dependent upon the ruler’s whim. Montesquieu sets up this spatial contrast so
as to question whether the world of the Seraglio is really that different from that of Paris.
He suggests that both societies are overly dependent upon the dictates of the ruler. In
societies run by tyrants, it seems that people are more inclined to do what they think they
should, rather than what they wish to do. One way this is demonstrated is through the
ways in which public opinion oscillates as “the French change their ways according to the
age of their king.”151 But when people acquiesce to a leader’s desires, or to the dictates of
social morality, they risk losing their capacity to think for themselves and, concomitantly,
compromise their freedom. Here, as Marshall Berman notes, Montesquieu suggests that a
ruler’s freedom depends upon his willingness to treat others in a caring manner.152 In the
case of Usbek, however, to demonstrate his concern for his people would involve
changing the power structure, something that he will not countenance, since it would
mean relinquishing power. He prefers to rule by force and violence, even though he
knows that his isolation as tyrant means that he is unhappy.
To sum up, Montesquieu intimates that all people have a right to freedom.153 Those
societies that refuse to offer their people freedom are tyrannies, not only for the slave, but
also for the master. There can be no freedom for the ruler or servant in a hierarchical
relationship. For Montesquieu, it is natural for people who have been oppressed to want
to revolt. It is only by overturning the social order that both master and slave can achieve
autonomy. While Persian Letters is often seen to be a satirical observation of the social
mores that existed under the Regency of Philippe d’Orléans, it can also be read as a
political allegory. The wives’ revolt serves a metaphorical function to show what may
happen when a group organizes to defeat the social order. Montesquieu’s work was
prescient, since the French tried to realise their freedom from political and social
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repression through the French Revolution of 1789. In Persian Letters, Montesquieu
makes us aware of two different kinds of tyranny: first that of autocratic rule and, second
of social conformity. Both forms of tyranny can work to deny a person’s autonomy. We
see that the potential for genuine relationships is constrained by what Arendt called ‘the
no-man rule of society,’ and that of autocratic rule.
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In both instances, “we never see

people as they are, but as they are constrained to be.”155
I want to pause here to discuss this idea of social tyranny in more depth. In The Human
Condition, Arendt maintains that the eighteenth-century concern with economics,
together with the rise of statistics, encouraged the standardization of behaviour.156 Both
monarchical rule and bourgeois capitalism lead to social conformism. The Enlightenment
desire for an abstract notion of equality resulted in a denial of difference. Instead of
dialogue and dissent between competing views, we see the move towards a social order
where everyone is encouraged to behave in a particular manner. Arendt argued the
modern world altered how people thought about the private and public realms. With the
introduction of what she terms “the social,” aspects of what were previously deemed
private concerns now appear in the public realm. She maintains that the bringing of what
used to belong to the private, such as those activities that are part of the life process into
the public realm, had a negative influence on the ability of people to excel. The bourgeois
desire for conformity works to suppress excellence, and the type of action that Arendt
argues is critical to human flourishing. When excellence fades from political life, in its
place we have a standardization of behaviour, which serves to deny the full range of
human experience and expression.
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2.3 Rameau’s Nephew: An Exploration of Social Hypocrisy
What constituted virtuous action was a topic of much contention in the eighteenth
century. The philosophe Denis Diderot, for example, argued that it was the task of the
artist to illustrate how vice is evil and virtue attractive.157 In the following discussion of
his satire Rameau’s Nephew, we will see how the concept of virtue is explored through
two very different perspectives. In this work, Diderot contrasts the virtuous man with the
charlatan to illustrate contrasting ideas about the nature of virtue. The virtuous man is
depicted in the character of “Moi,” while “Lui” represents a literary manifestation of
selfishness.158 Published posthumously, Rameau’s Nephew is ostensibly based on a
conversation between Diderot and Jean-Philippe Rameau, the nephew of a famous court
musician. In brief, during the summer of 1761, Rameau lost his position as sycophant to
the house of Bertinhus when, rather than lying, he chose to speak his mind.
In their discussion, each character espouses a different opinion on virtue. For Lui the
good life is about self-enjoyment, gained through wealth and prestige. For Moi, by
contrast, virtuous living is defined through one’s relationships with others, which he
regards as more important than social status or material goods. Lui and Moi disagree on
most topics, including the value of Socrates dying for his beliefs. Moi argues that the
judges erred when putting Socrates to death, showing that not all legal and ethical
pronouncements stand the test of time. Lui counters by declaring that Socrates’
willingness to die for his principles was a futile act. What matters is to be rich and
successful, and use whatever means necessary to obtain what you want, regardless of the
cost to others. While Moi concurs with Lui that life’s pleasures are wonderful, he argues
that there is an intrinsic difference between happiness and virtue. A virtuous life is
preferable, Moi contends, since it is fulfilling to act morally, and to care about the welfare
of others. In Lui’s opinion, such virtuous conduct is downright dull. In fact, he derides
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the notion that there can be a one-size-fits-all notion of the good, which he regards as an
eccentric idea, common to philosophers, but not applicable to eighteenth-century society.
Instead, being immoral is the way to get ahead, declares Lui, and this is the reason why
he is willing to play the dual role of sycophant and jester. As he observes: “Supposing
virtue had been the road to fortune, either I should have been virtuous or I should have
simulated virtue as well as the next man. But people wanted me to be ridiculous, and so I
have made myself that way.”159 Lui justifies his sycophantic action as essential for social
success. As he contends, “I say to myself: Be a hypocrite, by all means, but don’t talk
like a hypocrite. Keep the vices that come in useful to you, but don’t have either the tone
or the appearance, which would expose you to ridicule.”160 In adopting these diverse
personae, Lui suggests that “I remain myself, but I act and speak as occasion requires.”161
Indeed, he maintains that there is only one man who is free to do as he pleases - that is,
the King. Everyone else, he argues, just strikes up a pose.
Lui is a perfect example of a Machiavellian character who justifies his actions according
to his desires, irrespective of their effect on others. Yet while Diderot depicts Lui as a
man without scruples, he is also portrayed as an astute observer of social mores. For
example, in their debate on education, Moi declares his intention to teach his daughter
ethics. Lui derides this suggestion since, he asserts, ethical instruction is pointless for
girls because it is only their attractiveness that counts in a society where beauty has far
more cachet than virtue. Instead, he argues that if you want your child to succeed, you
should offer them a modern education, and train them in the art of deceit. In bypassing
moral instruction, Lui allows his son to develop naturally and observes, with fatherly
pride, that his progeny “is already greedy, smooth, a thief, a waster and a liar.”162 This
amoral education befits the times far more than Moi’s moral instruction.
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In Rameau’s Nephew, Diderot shows how the trickster may have more insight into
society, not least because the virtuous individual fails to comprehend how people can be
tempted by vice. We see that, in a society based on self-interest, what passes as virtue
may actually be its mirror opposite. Paradoxically, then, it is the inauthentic individual
who sees through social pretence, and offers a deeper understanding of human nature,
since he brings to light things that the good man misses. Rameau’s Nephew was to have a
major impact on Romantic thinkers. For example, Hegel was so enamoured with
Diderot’s exposé of social mores that he made use of this fictional account in the
Phenomenology of Spirit, where he inverted the commonplace notion of what is noble
and what is base.163 For Hegel, Lui represents the triumph of the human spirit over moral
orthodoxy in that he sees through social pretence.
The concern with hypocrisy is a recurring trope in the eighteenth century. One reason
why hypocrisy was so manifest in French society, according to Arendt, was because
rulers preferred their nobility to engage in court intrigue, rather than letting them take an
active role in affairs of state. These intrigues fostered an atmosphere of deceit which
pervaded society. In her exploration of hypocrisy, Arendt notes that the Greek root of the
word ‘hypocrite’ is play-actor.164 As we have seen, this focus on role-playing was often
commented upon. She asks why it was that so many writers remarked on the problem of
hypocrisy, which seems to be a far lesser evil than, say, violence. What makes hypocrisy
so bad, Arendt suggests, is that “integrity can indeed exist under the cover of all vices
except this one.”165 Hypocrisy can lead us astray in our judgments of others, since those
who profess honest motives may hide dishonourable intentions. But she acknowledges
that an emphasis on virtue is also problematic since it “transforms all actors into
hypocrites; the moment the display of motives begins, hypocrisy begins to poison all
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human relations.”166 A hypocrite, states Arendt, “is too ambitious; not only does he want
to appear virtuous before others, he wants to convince himself” of his incorruptibility.167
While no-one can be completely sure of their motives, the hypocrite convinces himself
that he is above ambiguity which, as we will see later, can have devastating results.

2.4 The Gendering of Authenticity in the Work of Rousseau
While Montesquieu and Diderot celebrate the liveliness of Paris, Jean-Jacques Rousseau
detested the polite veneer of Parisian society. He especially disliked the rich aristocrat
who, he argued, was corrupted by vanity. The rich acquire possessions, he insists, not
because they need them but because their sense of who they are is related to what they
own. The superficial facade of polite society masked the fundamental prejudices that
existed. For instance, Rousseau despised how the rich treated others, arguing that they
were “pitiless and hard toward all the rest of the world.”168 Social inequalities between
rich and poor were entrenched, not only by wealth and pleasure, but in terms of how
people regarded each other. The poor were not perceived as individuals, but as a
homogenous, expendable group. Rousseau believed that it was only those who had
known suffering who could understand the plight of others. Indeed, it was his
mistreatment by a Countess when he worked as her valet that convinced Rousseau of the
need for social change. As a servant, he was disregarded, and judged “less by what I was
than by what she had made me.”169 Echoing an earlier sentiment expressed by
Montesquieu’s character, Rica, Rousseau notes that, in Parisian society, a person’s outfit
is perceived as a marker for the self. That is, it is dependent upon a person’s status as to
whether or not they are perceived to have a worthy opinion. Yet, he argues, a person’s
social role was no indication of their moral worth. The problem, however, is that
inequality was deeply embedded in the fake morality of Parisian society. In a society
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where falseness is the norm, Rousseau contends, like Diderot’s Lui, it is in each man’s
interest to be a dissembler.
In The Social Contract, Rousseau maintained that there can only be genuine relationships
among people if men are equally free.170 Neither the position of master nor slave enabled
a man to be autonomous. He argued that it was each man’s duty to rebel against this
unnatural state of affairs by refusing to don the mask imposed on him by society.
Rousseau declared that it was only by pledging allegiance to a State, rather than to a
specific leader, that men could ensure their equality. In uniting individual will with the
public will of all, moral freedom would be realized. As part of his argument, he
differentiated between man in nature and man in society. For Rousseau, man in nature is
neither virtuous nor corrupt. While man can be happy in his natural state, he cannot be a
moral being. To be moral, a man must be part of a society. The problem was that the
competitive nature of Parisian society encouraged inauthentic behaviour so that
relationships between people were often false. True intimacy was debased because,
instead of love, which Rousseau maintained was necessary for virtuous conduct, people
engaged in superficial affairs. Furthermore, while society could offer a person
innumerable examples of beauty and taste, each new desire, instead of bringing
satisfaction, created a greater sense of anxiety. It was by recognizing the reasons why
anxiety occurred that, he suggested, it might be possible for people to recognize the
superficiality of their existence.
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In order to gain a more authentic way of life, Rousseau asserted society must change. In
contrast to John Locke, he declared that laws should be less concerned with property, and
more concerned with building a just society. One way that he envisaged such a just
society being developed was through rethinking the role of women. Through their
maternal role and virtuous natures, he maintained that women could provide a civilizing
counterforce to the competitive nature of men. What was needed to encourage human
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flourishing, according to Rousseau, was not just reason, but sensuous reason. One way to
obtain this delicate balance between the sensuous and reason was through moral
education. In Emile, for example, he described how, rather than learning through
competition or being taught by rote, a child must learn through experience. With this
knowledge, he could begin to judge for himself, and guard against falling prey to the
prejudices of others. In so doing, a child would be able to realise his full potential.
Moreover, if a person was taught how to be flexible, then they would be better able to
deal with changing circumstances while, at the same time, sustaining their core identity.
It is important to note that Rousseau’s position on the education of girls was diametrically
opposed to the instruction that he thought boys should receive, as his depiction of Sophie
in Emile illustrates. Unlike her future husband, Sophie is offered little opportunity to
develop her talents, other than through domestic knowledge gathered from her mother.
These domestic skills were all a woman required, he argued, for it was her proper place to
take care of the home and teach her children to be virtuous. Even when a woman had
genuine talent, Rousseau contended that her dignity required that she keep such talents
unknown, since her glory came from her selfless devotion to her husband and children.
This notion of selfless action as integral to a virtuous woman’s role in life creates
dissonance in that, for a woman to believe in herself, she has to go against society’s
dictates about what constitutes virtue during this period. One of the ensuing problems
with this ideology is, as Roulston states, that “the ideal feminine self cannot be articulated
through the public sphere - hence the fundamental contradiction in Rousseau’s social
vision.”172 The ideal feminine self that he admired was an abstract concept that no
woman could attain.
In her discussion of the connections between virtue, authenticity and selfhood in the
eighteenth-century novel, Roulston contends that sentimental narratives depict a
character’s desire for self-revelation as a departure from artifice.173 This self-confession
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is somewhat dubious, however, since this declaration is always affected by the moral
strictures of society. Rather than revealing a ‘true’ self, Roulston maintains that the self
revealed through the language of virtue may be just another form of masquerade.174 The
fictional desire to establish a feminine, modest self is intrinsically connected with
bourgeois constructions of identity. Within the domestic realm, common to most novels
of this period, she argues that “privacy, femininity and authenticity serve as mutually
reinforcing markers”
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that serve to restrict a woman’s autonomy. We see this clearly in
176

Rousseau’s famous novel entitled Julie, or the New Héloïse,

which we will now

discuss.
The novel’s central character, Julie, is a young upper-class woman who has an affair
with her penniless tutor, Saint-Preux, and becomes pregnant. Horrified at his daughter’s
lack of propriety and her besmirching of the family honour, her father beats Julie so
severely that, shortly afterwards, she loses her child. Caught between the opposing
dictates of familial duty, and her desire for love, Julie asks Saint-Preux to try and
comprehend the hopelessness of her predicament, as follows:
Consider the situation of my Sex and yours in our common
misfortunes and decide which of us the more to be pitied is? To feign
insensibility in the throes of passions; to appear joyous and content
when prey to a thousand woes; to have a serene appearance and a
troubled soul; always to say something other than what one thinks to
disguise everything one feels; to be false for the sake of duty, and lie
for the sake of modesty; such is the usual situation of any maiden my
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age. One’s finest days are thus spent under the tyranny of propriety.177
In this extract, Julie rails at the ignominy of her position that requires her to act in a
manner contrary to her desire. Social propriety tyrannizes young women, she argues,
since they are not allowed to show their true feelings. Instead, they must disguise their
desires and behave in a duplicitous manner. Here, we see how the dictates of social
decorum negatively affect a woman’s autonomy. Julie’s ability to do as she wishes is
restricted by societal constraints and familial duty.
Since her father will not allow her to marry the man she loves, Julie acquiesces to her
father’s request to marry his friend, Baron de Wolmar. During the marriage ceremony,
Julie undergoes a kind of spiritual transformation. She decides that from now on she will
become a paragon of virtue, and forego her erotic longings for Saint-Preux. Together
with her new husband, Julie builds a community called Clarens. In this community, each
spouse takes on a role that illustrates Rousseau’s ideals regarding appropriate gendered
behaviour. Wolmar’s role is that of the stern, rational leader, while Julie plays the part of
dutiful wife and benevolent matriarch. In doing so, they act in compliance of the gender
norms which society expects of them.
But the community is not quite the idyll it appears to be on the surface. For example, the
servants who work for the Wolmars are brought into service when they are very young.
These girls and boys come from peasant families in rural villages, since the Wolmars
believe that their lack of knowledge of society will make these children more pliable as
servants. From the day these young people begin work at Clarens, they are not allowed to
visit their families. Instead, the Wolmars act as their parental overseers. To maintain
order, each servant is encouraged to spy on her fellows. When servants do wrong, they
are punished in one of two ways. Wolmar reprimands them in a cold, rational manner;
these stern admonishments are designed to maintain control. Julie takes a different
approach to punishment in that she reproaches the wrongdoer by taking away her love for
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them. Rousseau writes that while the servants may fear Wolmar, they are emotionally
distraught at the thought that Julie may cease to care for them.
At Clarens, Julie endeavours to live her life as the model of middle-class female virtue.
She is a faithful wife to Wolmar, and loving mother to her children. Yet, it is only by
178

sublimating her desire for Saint-Preux that Julie is able to play the part of virtue.

Some

years’ following their marriage, Wolmar invites Saint-Preux to visit them so that he can
see how virtuous Julie has become. In a letter to her former lover, Julie writes of her
perfect life and her contentment with her role as wife and mother. After Saint-Preux visits
Clarens, Wolmar decides that Saint-Preux should become the tutor to their children. But
Julie is unhappy with her husband’s decision, which she perceives as a way for him to
exercise his control by forcing her to be in close contact with her ex-lover while
maintaining her decorum. Julie tells Saint-Preux that she does not want him to live at
Clarens for she is concerned with what might happen between them. But Saint Preux is
delighted that Wolmar regards him as having sufficient character to resist temptation.
Julie starts to feel a growing anxiety as she questions whether her virtuous life may have
been as rich an existence as she had previously thought. This causes her to feel unhappy
without understanding why. As she writes to Saint-Preux:
Will another woman be more sensible than I? Will she love her father,
her husband, her children, her friends, her circle better? Will she be
better loved by them? Will she lead a life more to her liking? Will she
be more free to choose another? Will she enjoy better health? Will she
have more resources against weariness, more attachments to the
world? And yet I live in it with a heart ill at ease, which does not
know what it lacks; it desires without knowing what.179
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In this extract we see how Julie’s growing anxiety results in a questioning of her choice
to forego sexual desire in favour of marital duty. It seems that her previous justifications
are no longer enough. Shortly after writing this letter, one of her children falls into the
lake, and Julie jumps in to save her child. While she is not seriously injured, Julie’s
health deteriorates. Rather than continuing to live a life of masquerade, and deal with the
constant tension between duty and desire, it appears as if she chooses to let herself die.
For Rousseau, it is a woman’s duty to be selfless; her personal desires must always be
sublimated in favour of her submission to her husband. In the figure of Julie, Rousseau
provides us with an ethical dilemma regarding the sublimation of passion and the
limitations of a virtuous life, which is resolved only through Julie’s death. The way to
deal with the dilemma, and stay within the bounds of propriety, is for Rousseau to kill off
the heroine. And yet there seems an ambiguity in his portrayal of Julie in that he not only
shows her difficult choice, but also does so in a manner that is sympathetic to her
plight.
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What we see in Rousseau’s portrayal of his heroine’s predicament is that

authenticity consists of the pull of contradictory forces. According to Marshall Berman,
what Julie wants is to be what society dictates. Ultimately, this is self-defeating because
her desire stands in the way of her wish for social conformity.
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In his reading of Rousseau’s concept of authenticity, Alessandro Ferraro sees three
interconnected threads: sincerity, autonomy and intimacy.182 Sincerity is the avoidance of
being false; autonomy means acting in accordance with one’s ethical principles; finally,
intimacy in relationships is necessary if we want to foster personal authenticity. While an
ethics of autonomy tries to contain these inner deviations, regarding them as unworthy
and undignified, an ethics of authenticity recognizes that these deviations originate in
emotions and feelings. What is important about Rousseau’s notion of authenticity, then,
is that it is derived from genuine action founded on sincere relationships. But, as the
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fictional experiences of Julie illustrate, genuine action is difficult - even for fictional
heroines - because it is necessary to repress desire in order to submit to social dictates
regarding what is proper for a woman. There is a inherent paradox in Rousseau’s sense of
authenticity as inner truth, and his insistence that a woman pay heed to her reputation.
For Rousseau, as Lisa Disch observes, it is a woman’s reputation rather than her character
that matters.
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The problem with Rousseau’s ideas about social relations is that a

woman’s perceived virtue is more important than her character. How that virtue is
perceived is dependent upon the perspectives of others.
If authenticity is about the self, then the notion that a woman’s reputation is more
important than her own conscience points to an inconsistency in Rousseau’s thinking
about this topic, which may stem from gender prejudice. His belief that the viewpoint of
others was more important than a woman’s own conscience serves to undermine his
argument about the importance of thinking for oneself. In the eighteenth century, it was
only masculine minds that were judged to have the capacity to reason and, thus, to be
able to decide what was right. Women, by contrast, had to conform to social standards
concerning what constituted appropriate conduct, even when this might mean a deviation
from their own conscience. While a man needed to have the strength of character to
enable him to go against public opinion when it contradicted his way of thinking, a
woman was obliged to adhere to society’s dictates even when they went against her own
beliefs. Because a woman was perceived as being without reason, these social rules
became more important than her own conscience. This gender contradiction was one that
Mary Wollstonecraft sought to expose.

Lisa Disch, “Claire Loves Julie: Reading the Story of Women’s Friendship in ‘La Nouvelle
Héloïse,’” Hypatia, 3 (1994): 19-45. Disch makes an interesting observation that the passionate
subtext within this novel is the friendship that exists between Julie and her cousin Claire. Within
this relationship what is important to men - that is a woman’s virtue - is immaterial, since
between these two friends what matters is how they care for one another.
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2.5

Wollstonecraft: A Revolution in Manners

In Vindication of the Rights of Woman, Mary Wollstonecraft declared that the kind of
reasoning Rousseau displayed was not really about virtue, but rather designed to keep
women in their place. Contra Rousseau, she contended that a woman’s sense of self was
negated by the emphasis on her reputation rather than her good conscience. In her view, it
is the latter that should constitute the basis of a woman’s rightful place in society. Thus,
for Wollstonecraft, only a revolution in manners and education could bring about human
progress in the way that the Enlightenment philosophes desired. Moreover, she argued
that when women are treated differently from men, this created an environment where
false morals rule, leading to social hypocrisy. Such gender distinctions “corrode all
private, and blast all public virtue.”
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While Rousseau maintained that women should be

educated to please men, Wollstonecraft contended that this kind of reasoning ensured that
women had limited opportunity to develop their reasoning skills. Turning his argument
upside down, she asserted that if women were more virtuous than men, then they should
be able to reason effectively. She challenged Rousseau’s assertion that the extent of a
woman’s aspiration should be to obey.185 It is not the passive, submissive woman who
makes an ideal partner, states Wollstonecraft, but a woman who is willing to be a friend
to her husband as well as a teacher to her children. In her opinion, women will never have
the same abilities to reason unless they are afforded the same opportunities as men.
Furthermore, she brought to light the hypocrisy that occurs when women are seen as
social pariahs. Wollstonecraft rails against the double standard whereby some aristocratic
women insult others while being notorious in their own adultery.186 Not only is this
hypocrisy morally wrong, she argued, it encouraged a superficial assessment of a
woman’s character. What she desired was a new moral sensibility that would herald
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opportunities for women to achieve their full potential. The establishment of ‘true
sensibility’ would encourage a more caring attitude towards others.187 It is only in this
caring attitude that the harmful repercussions of social hypocrisy can be negated.
Wollstonecraft’s work represented a radical critique of social mores that reworked
Rousseau’s insights into the nature of authenticity with a political argument for women’s
rights. Hence, she illustrates the negative effects of living in an unfair, morally corrupt
society, as well as highlighting the potential for change.
In her work, Wollstonecraft is informed by Rousseau’s ideas in terms of complementary
gender roles. But she wanted to carve out a much broader social and political role for
women. By transforming society into one based on reason and virtue rather than
superficiality, Wollstonecraft asserted that men and women could participate actively and
equally in improving human existence. If a nation wanted women to be good citizens,
then alongside political representation women needed to receive a liberal education on
par with men. This meant the eradication of the notion that the only purpose of female
education was to equip a woman “for a single future, marriage.”188
At this time, most people argued that educating girls to participate in public affairs was
unnecessary, since their responsibilities lay in the private realm. In general, there was
great disparagement shown towards women who engaged in intellectual pursuits. Such
intellectual endeavours were perceived to be inappropriate for their future roles as wives
and mothers. Indeed, the language of most eighteenth-century educators in England
revealed a clear distinction between how middle-class girls and boys should be taught.
Boys were given instruction that would help them prepare for the demands of a
competitive society. While competitive activities were seen as preparing boys for their
future careers, educators regarded these forms of action as wholly inappropriate for girls
since, as the educator and moralist Reverend Bennet declared, a girl’s delicate nature

187

Mary Wollstonecraft, “The Wrongs of Woman,” in Mary and the Wrongs of Woman (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1976), 176.
188

Hufton, Prospect before Her, 95.

74

would be harmed by “this scorching method of exposure.”189 As Michèle Cohen asserts,
“the very notion of competition was distasteful in women.”190 The main instruction girls
received, as I showed earlier with Rousseau’s fictional example of Sophie, was how to be
a dutiful wife. This supporting role, reinforced by political and legal restrictions,
encouraged women to be submissive rather than to take the initiative and lead. Simply
put, men were taught how to take charge while women were instructed in how to be
selfless. Neither of these gendered modes of being was going to bring about an
enlightened society.
While Rousseau stated that without virtuous women there could not be a virtuous society,
Wollstonecraft revealed how his ideas were contradictory. For example, she disagreed
with his argument that the female mind was distinct from that of the male mind. The
distinctions that seem to exist are not natural, she declared, but rather a result of the
restrictions society placed on women’s agency. While many regarded the cultivation of a
woman’s mind as inappropriate, Wollstonecraft maintained that if women’s education
continued to be limited, this would be a problem for society as a whole since, without
their full participation in public life it was unlikely that enlightened attitudes would
flourish.
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She argued that it was vital for women to speak out against societal ills.

Otherwise, the pervasive false morals would never change. Without alterations to the
social, economic and political order, women would never be able to reach their potential.
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Whenever a woman stepped over the gender line, and became identified with the public
sphere, as in the case with Wollstonecraft, she became linked with notoriety. Thanks to the
scandalous reception of her biography by her husband, William Godwin, it took more than a
century to reassess her life in terms of women’s rights. Ironically, however, if Wollstonecraft had
lived her life as a virtuous woman, in private, we would probably have little knowledge of her
life. It is because of her willingness to speak out against injustice and to cross the gender
boundary that she is remembered.

75

Moreover, as women were the educators of their children, Wollstonecraft contended that
their lack of understanding would set back the cause of progress for society as a whole.
One curious thing concerning Enlightenment discourses about gendered spheres of
responsibility is that there were many women ruling countries and empires. During the
eighteenth century, these rulers included Catherine the Great in Russia, Queen Anne in
England, Maria Theresa in Austria, Queen Christina of Sweden and Maria I in Portugal.
While there was much discussion regarding the relationship between a ruler and her
subjects, the fact that there were female monarchs did not seem to challenge prevailing
wisdom about prescribed gender roles. In noting this discrepancy, Joan Scott suggests
that when Queens are the predominant rulers, most political commentary focuses on
masculine and feminine ways of being.
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Hence, the presence of a woman ruler tends

not to affect the political discourse of the day because female monarchs are regarded as
anomalies. Women rulers were either trivialized if they were perceived as weak (as in the
case of Queen Anne) or regarded as “mannish” women if they were effective (such as
Queen Christina of Sweden). In 1779, William Alexander pointed out this incongruity:
In Britain, we allow a woman to sway a sceptre, but by law and
custom we debar her from every other government but that of her own
family ... We neither allow women to officiate at our altars, to debate
in our councils, not to fight for us in the field; we suffer them not to
be members of our senate, to practice any of the learned professions,
nor to concern themselves much with our trades and occupations.
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or the freedom to work in most professions, this did little to alter public opinion about the
rightful place of women.

2.6

Speaking Out Against Gender Injustice - Olympe de Gouges

I want to turn now to explore the life of a French woman who, like Wollstonecraft, was
willing to speak out against gender injustice. Olympe de Gouges was a playwright,
courtesan and working-class woman who actively worked for social change, especially
during the initial events of the French Revolution. As Joan Scott notes, Gouges sought to
expose the contradiction that it was natural for men to be leaders while it was unnatural
for women to be so.

194

She argued that revolutionary demands for equality which denied

difference went against the laws of nature. Dividing humans into two groups makes no
sense as each human being displayed both male and female qualities. To illustrate her
point, Gouges described herself as a courageous woman, as well as a timid man. In
playing with ideas about gender, she highlighted the hypocrisy of denying women a place
in the political realm. As a result of her political action, Gouges was branded a male
woman. While this was intended as an insult, she regarded this label as an indication that
a woman could reason just as successfully as a man.
Like Wollstonecraft, Gouges maintained that a nation could not be deemed virtuous when
it denied political representation to most of its people. Indeed, if human progress was
desired, she argued that it was essential that all people have the opportunity to share their
ideas as to how to improve society. She used the platform of speeches and petitions to put
forward ideas about women in politics. By arguing that women could have an active,
rather than a passive imagination, Gouges undercut Enlightenment distinctions regarding
what constituted the proper roles for women and men. In Declaration of Women,
published in 1791, she argued that social and political change in regard to women’s rights
was necessary if the Revolution sought to bring about a just society. If the Age of
Enlightenment was to be the Age of Reason, Gouges asserted, antiquated notions of
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sexual hierarchy needed to be overturned. She maintained that women were not just a
homogeneous group, but individual persons who could think for themselves, but this was
the kind of incendiary idea that was not to prove popular with the new political
establishment.
Freedom from the tyranny of the absolute monarchy of Louis XIV did not result in liberty
for all. Once the Girondists (of which Gouges was a member) lost to the Jacobins, a
different form of tyranny emerged. When the Jacobins took control of the National
Assembly under the leadership of Robespierre, those who dared to disagree with the will
of the Nation, like Gouges, were branded as traitors to the Revolutionary cause. Her
statements became increasingly inflammatory as she railed against the Jacobin
government, asserting that there was no logical reason to deny women political status and
legal recognition. But Gouges’ arguments had little sway as the new French constitution
upheld gender divisions. When she further declared that it would be better to live under a
benevolent monarch than under the Republic, Gouges had gone too far. In 1793 she was
arrested, imprisoned for treason, and guillotined.
The suppression of voices like Gouges was to be emblematic of what has become known
as Robespierre’s “Reign of Terror.” In On Revolution, Arendt argues that his tyrannical
leadership was, in fact, a “terror of virtue,” in part a reaction to the lack of concern for the
plight of the people, emblematic of Louis XIV’s autocratic rule.
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Robespierre’s

Jacobins, influenced by Rousseau’s political philosophy, put the cause of virtue above all
else, demonstrated initially through their compassion for the malheureux. Yet
Robespierre’s rule became tyrannical as his search for the truth and the rooting out of
hypocrisy took hold. By trying to unmask hypocrisy, and to bring the suffering of the
masses to light, it was rage rather than virtue appeared on the political stage. Those who
tried to put forward alternative perspectives were singled out, and declared traitors to the
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Republic. By speaking out against gender oppression, Gouges was one of the many
casualties of this “virtuous” leadership.
For Arendt, one of the key aspects of political life is the ability for citizens to act and
speak freely. The problem is that absolute goodness, like absolute evil, may prove
devastating to the political realm, since goodness (like evil) cannot be altered by dialogue
and debate. What we have instead is the suppression of plurality in favour of the one
voice of the State. Those women who tried to take on a public role in Enlightenment
politics faced humiliation and danger. In the eighteenth century, women risked their
reputations and, at times, their lives to gain a voice on the political stage. Olympe de
Gouges was one of many individuals who paid such a price. Wollstonecraft and Gouges
are examples of women who tried to change the social order through political action. In
their desire to be heard, they exemplified Arendt’s notion of virtuosity, in that they tried
to bring something new into the world by having the courage to share their ideas with
others, and speak out against gender injustice.
I want to turn now to a discussion of a different phenomenon that appeared in the
eighteenth century, the salon, so as to show how women were involved in this new arena.

2.7 The Emergence of the Salon
In spatial terms, the eighteenth century created new opportunities for people to meet and
share ideas. As the century progressed, there was a flourishing of public spaces. Public
life was enriched by discussion in different venues. What was distinctive about the
bourgeois public sphere, according to Jürgen Habermas, is that it represented “the sphere
of private people that comes together as a public.”196 Each European city had diverse
examples of these new public spaces. For example, at the height of their popularity,
London had 3,000 coffee houses, each with its own regular patrons.197 Discussions were
wide-ranging, and included topics from art to politics. Women were denied entry to many
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of these coffee houses, however, thus limiting their ability to speak out in the public
realm. This lack of female inclusion contrasts sharply with that of another eighteenthcentury phenomenon, the European salon.
The salons began to emerge in France during the seventeenth century and continued to
flourish throughout the eighteenth century. Most salons were located in Paris and were
run by upper-middle class women. For a short period, the salon also flourished in other
European cities, such as Berlin. Most salons allowed for a mix of people such as the
upper middle-class, prominent artists and intellectuals, as well as members of the
aristocracy. In France, the rise of the salon had much to do with the strict censorship that
I discussed earlier. It was because philosophes like Diderot had no political voice that the
salons became, according to Dena Goodman, the “civil working space of the
Enlightenment.”198 In Paris, the salons provided an intimate setting for authors to test
their ideas publicly.
Women had an integral part in organizing the salons. Some of the prominent salonnières
were Madame Geoffrin (1699-1777) Mme de Staël (1766-1819), and Julie de Lespinasse
(1732-1776), whose guests included the philosophes, D’Alembert and Diderot. But not
everyone was happy with women’s dominant roles in the organization of the salon. In his
“Letter to D’Alembert,” Rousseau maintained that salons were run by immoral women,
such as Madame de Staël.199 He lamented that, due to social etiquette, men were forced to
pay attention to women. According to Rousseau, such behaviour was demeaning, since
false gallantry was emasculating. His negative assessment of the salonnières seems to
have stemmed from the fact that he perceived women’s presence as a distraction from the
vigour of masculine discussion. Yet while Rousseau regarded the rarified atmosphere of
the salon as restrictive to intellectual debate, Goodman contends that the salonnières
created intellectual venues. Furthermore, the women who ran them were highly
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intelligent, and exhibited that “flexibility of tongue” that Rousseau believed gave women
an edge in conversation, albeit not in intellect.

2.8 Rahel Varnhagen: The Inauthenticity of Assimilation
During the period 1780-1806, according to Deborah Hertz, Berlin salons provided a
venue for the aristocracy and middle-class intellectuals to mingle.200 I want to turn now to
consider one particular Berlin salon run by Rahel Levin Varnhagen. What is especially
notable about the success of her salon was that she was Jewish. Central figures of
German Romanticism, such as Friedrich Schlegel and Friedrich Schleiermacher, were
frequent guests of Rahel Levin’s salon. Her guests were impressed not only by her
sensibility, but also by her intellect. One admirer described Levin as “the most
intellectual woman on earth.”201 While her salon was famous for its witty conversation, it
is noteworthy that women guests had to remain silent so as not to disrupt the elegant flow
of philosophical dialogue.202
But the flourishing of the Berlin salons was short-lived. Life in the city was to change
dramatically following the defeat of the Prussian army by Napoleon in 1806. Jews were
no longer welcome in Prussian society. Previous acquaintances began to ignore Levin,
who despaired of her social isolation.203 To combat the risk of becoming a social outcast,
she changed her surname from Levin to Robert, and wrote to her brother that “the Jew

200

Deborah Hertz, Jewish High Society in Old Regime Berlin. West Hanover: Yale
University Press, 1988), 156.
201

On a visit to Berlin in 1804, Madame de Staël recorded in her diary that, while not as
intellectual gifted as Parisians, the women she met, like Levin, were infinitely superior to the
men. See Hertz, Jewish High Society, 258.
202

Excerpt from a letter from Henriette Hentz to Rahel Varhagen, reprinted in Deborah Hertz,
Jewish High Society, 115.
203

Arendt, Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewish Woman, trans. Richard and Clara Winston
(New York and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974), 121.

81

must be extirpated from us.”204 The erasure of her ethnic identity and religious
background was, in her view, the only way of regaining a place in society.
Levin desired social acceptance above all else. After several unsuccessful love affairs,
she married August Varnhagen, a match that enabled her to take up a place in polite
society. Her husband enjoyed moderate success as a diplomat, and discovered he was
related to some minor nobility, thus further improving the couple’s social standing. In
1813, Rahel Varnhagen joined her husband in Prague where, for the first time, she
experienced what she describes as a sense of belonging because people regarded her as
German, rather than a Jew. Paradoxically, Rahel Varnhagen was more at home in an alien
country since, in that city, her ethnicity did not wholly define who she was. Upon their
return to Berlin, the Varnhagens hosted a new salon, and established a Goethe cult. At
last, Rahel Varnhagen had acquired her twin goals of rank and marriage, but she found
herself discontented. As the wife of a government official, her role was “to represent
something in respectable society.”205 Rahel Varnhagen realized that she had sacrificed
her freedom for the sake of social acceptance. The society in which she lived regarded
her as a mere appendage to her husband. Social assimilation had not afforded her the
expansive existence of which she had dreamed. It was only at the end of her life that she
began to regard her Jewishness as something integral to her sense of self, and not
something of which she should be ashamed.206
In her examination of Rahel Varnhagen’s life, through the use of diary extracts and
letters, Arendt explores the ethnic and religious prejudices that existed in Prussian
society, and how the Jewish intelligentsia sought to belong to a society that despised
them. Because of this prejudice, they were often at the margins of society, and only
allowed to work in certain occupations, such as money-lending or the law. The only way
to become accepted socially was to be regarded as an ‘exceptional’ Jew. One person who
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was accepted into society as an exceptional Jew was the philosopher, Moses
Mendelssohn. He regarded Jewish assimilation as a logical extension of Enlightenment
ideals of progress and equal rights. If such rights are possible, he maintained, there was
no logical reason for such rights not to be extended to Jewish people. Over the long-term,
assimilation was a good idea, he contended, since ethnic prejudice would be lessened
when Jews showed what good members of society they were. The trouble with
Mendelssohn’s argument, for Arendt, is that being accepted into society as an exception
to one’s ethnicity forces a person to reject an integral part of who they are. It is only
when she is willing to recognize her Jewish identity, Arendt argues, that Rahel
Varnhagen is able to find peace with the world.
In her account of Rahel Varnhagen’s life story, Arendt discusses the self-absorption that
was a dominant motif of Romanticism. The Romantic preoccupation with inwardness
was a negative quality for Arendt. For the Romantics individuality, instead of being
displayed in the public realm, shifts to the interior world of the self. This private
isolation, according to Seyla Benhabib, encourages a “concern with the uniqueness,
authenticity, and psychic harmony of the self”
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to the detriment of an engagement with

the world. Arendt argues that one of the gravest mistakes that humans made was to allow
things that are private to appear in the public realm. In her view, the rise of the social
realm, that is, the bourgeois public sphere, had the negative effect of making people
conform to social expectations rather than to excel. Instead of virtue, understood in the
Greek sense as excellence, we see the rise of a particular form of behaviour that teaches
people what they should and should not do. This standardization of human behaviour has
the effect of negating spontaneity. Hence, for Arendt, a homogenization of social
standards is detrimental to individual freedom. As we have seen, this is especially the
case for women who are supposed to behave in a manner that conforms to prevailing
social mores, rather than individual desire.
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Arendt illustrates what can happen when a woman’s life is overly determined by social
expectations. How Rahel Varnhagen defined herself, and how others saw her, was
affected negatively by ethnic and religious prejudice. It seems to me that there are
similarities here between the fictional world of Rousseau’s Julie and the experiences that
Rahel Varnhagen records in her diary. Both women had to deny a part of who they were
to comply with society’s dictates. In the fictional account, Julie resigns herself to a
loveless marriage so as to comply with familial duty and the expectations of middle-class
society. In Rahel Varnhagen’s case, her desire to be accepted in Prussian society required
her to renounce her ethnic background, and live her life pretending to be other than who
she was. But there was a negative cost to this desire to belong. Ultimately, it was by
recognizing the absurdity of social rules that Rahel Varnhagen was able to perceive the
hypocrisy of the society that she once venerated.
Arendt contends that Rahel Varnhagen’s destiny was constrained by gender prejudice,
not least because there is often a “discrepancy between what men expected of women in
general and what women could give or wanted in their turn.”
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What Rahel Varnhagen

was capable of, and what she was able to accomplish, was restricted not only by her
ethnicity but also by her gender. Her solution, as Benhabib notes, was to seek romantic
affairs and marriage to a gentile in order to take her place in society.
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But the problem

is that Rahel Varnhagen never does quite fit into the society to which she desired entry.
At times, Arendt despairs of the political naivety that encouraged Rahel Varnhagen to
believe that social assimilation was the answer to prejudice. In her comparison of the
parvenu and the pariah, Arendt argues that the human cost “demanded of the pariah if he
wishes to become a parvenu is always too high.”210 The problem with assimilation is that
it can never overcome prejudice, since social acceptance meant “assimilating to anti-
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Semitism.”211 Social assimilation is too high a price to pay for giving up one’s heritage
because, in doing so, a person has to give up something of herself. That is why, in
Arendt’s opinion, it is the only the social pariah who is able to remain true to their ideals.
Being on the margins of society offers insights, according to Arendt, because “the pariah
instinctively discovers human dignity in general long before Reason has made it the
foundation of morality.”212 Through her study on Rahel Varnhagen, Arendt points to the
ethical dilemma that ensues when people try to assimilate into a society that despises
them.

2.9

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have considered how authenticity became gendered. In the eighteenth
century, notions of propriety, together with educational differences, defined feminine
ways of behaving in contrast to masculine ways of acting. I have argued that gendered
notions of virtue worked to enforce particular kinds of female behaviour, such as
obedience and submissiveness, which had the negative effect of constraining women’s
belief in what they could accomplish. Gender differences about what constitutes right
conduct had an effect upon the ways in which authenticity and selfhood are
conceptualized and experienced. For example, Dena Goodman sees a correlation between
female timidity in the eighteenth century and Iris Marion Young’s contention that women
lack trust in their own bodies, the result of which is that women lack the necessary
confidence to carry out their projects.213 This lack of self-belief in their talents is a
response to social dictates that encourage women to be submissive, rather than to lead. In
the eighteenth century, prevailing gender prejudice, together with a lack of educational
training, meant that women lacked the necessary skills to take up a dominant role in the
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public sphere. But despite those drawbacks, we have seen that there were some women
who were courageous enough to fight for gender justice.
In the eighteenth century, authenticity was related to gendered ideas of virtue. Social
wisdom decreed that the opinion of others was more important than a woman’s own
sense of self. We have seen in the course of looking at the Age of Enlightenment that
there were social barriers that affected women’s ability to think for themselves, especially
in regard to the widespread belief that women should obey their fathers and, later, their
husbands. If obedience is seen to be the most important facet of a woman’s life, then
being willing to take a leadership role is likely to feel less comfortable. Being authentic,
according to Arendt, depends upon our willingness to express ourselves in words and
deeds. However, the gendered nature of social life barred women from seeing themselves
as uniquely able to do so. While there were exceptions, as my discussion of Mary
Wollstonecraft and Olympe de Gouges shows, nevertheless, when a woman has been
inculcated to believe that her foremost duty is to be obedient, it will be more difficult for
her to find the courage to freely express herself within the political sphere.
Bourgeois ideology privileged some bodies over others. It allowed middle-class men to
view themselves as unique individuals while a middle-class woman’s sense of self was
confined to their wifely or maternal role. Thus, the Enlightenment sets up a paradox in
terms of gendered notions of freedom and authenticity. For Arendt, like Kant, one of the
most fundamental aspects of the human condition is the ability and the courage to think
for oneself. For male citizens, new ways of thinking about freedom engendered an open
attitude toward their potential possibilities. Conversely, for the majority of people
without political rights, the public realm was experienced in a very different manner.
Women who tried to break through such gender barriers were often held up to ridicule. If
authenticity is connected with one’s ability to think and speak for oneself, then being
ridiculed may negatively affect a person’s wish to be part of the social order.
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However, this did not mean that their ideas were lost, but it did mean that they sought
different vehicles for self-expression. In fact, one could argue that the voices of women who tried
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Furthermore, if freedom and human excellence derive from being able to be seen and
heard in the public sphere, as Arendt maintains, then being unable to take a commanding
role in the public arena will have future repercussions, especially for women’s leadership.
In 1933, Arendt reviewed a book on contemporary women’s issues, where she notes that
while women were afforded the same legal rights as men, “they are not valued equally by
society.”215 This gender inequality is evident, not only in the fact that women receive
lower wages, but also because the professional woman often had primary care of her
household and children. In her view, “a woman’s freedom to make her own living seems
to imply either a kind of enslavement in her own home or the dissolution of her
family.”216 While I am not suggesting that Arendt had feminist inclinations, she was
astute enough to recognize that the gendered conditions of women’s lives had a negative
influence on their ability to flourish in the public realm. In this chapter, we have seen
how social conformity results in the vast majority of people concurring with dominant
ideologies without thinking about their full implications. There are vestiges of these
historical inequities regarding gendered roles in our current society in how we think
about leaders, and the ways in which we may overestimate the talents of some while
underestimating those of others. Prejudice toward women leaders was and still is
embedded in the cultural imagination, and has ongoing ramifications in regard to notions
of gender, authenticity and leadership.
In writing this chapter, I have begun to realize the extent to which authenticity is
connected to ideas about freedom, not just in the sense of realizing one’s own dreams, but
also in the sense of envisaging social change. When people are not allowed to share their
visions of a different community that would be fairer to the majority of humanity then
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their voices become erased. Enlightenment thinkers, as Charles Taylor contends, believed
that rational individuals possessed dignity.217 Yet the Enlightenment motto: “Sapere
Aude! Have courage to use your own understanding,” was thought not to apply to women
since they were not regarded as rational, thinking beings.218 So while I concur with
Taylor’s sentiment that “authenticity requires that we discover and articulate our
identity,” 219 what we have seen in the eighteenth century is that the restricted gender
roles available to women limited their opportunities for self-expression in the public
sphere. Thus, while men were able to take up positions of leadership, many women who
were just as eloquent and intelligent were denied that opportunity.
If we define who we are through dialogue and debate with other individuals who respect
our point of view, then we can continue to flourish and grow from these interactions. In
this chapter, we have seen some of the ways in which gender prejudice served to limit
women’s potentiality for intellectual and personal growth, since women have had to
define themselves against abstract notions of virtue. This legacy of gender prejudice still
has traces in our own society. Furthermore, it cannot be through one voice – whether that
of the ruler or that of society - that we can effect a fairer world but through the
recognition and respect for diverse viewpoints. This necessitates a willingness to listen,
and to respect opinions that differ from our own. When we conceive of authenticity
solely in terms of self, we lose an ethical dimension that allows us to take into
consideration the views of others. If we do not attend to the connections between self and
world, the result can be devastating, as I shall demonstrate in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3

3

Authenticity, Ethics and Leadership

In the last chapter, I concentrated on gender and its relationship to authenticity and
leadership. In this chapter, I want to continue this discussion by focussing on authenticity
as it pertains to ethical responsibility. In particular, I compare the work of Martin
Heidegger with that of Hannah Arendt. I shall begin by outlining Heidegger’s concept of
authenticity since his work is often referred to by authentic leadership scholars.

220

Concentrating on Being and Time, I show how his notion of authenticity as resoluteness,
or inner purpose is one that may, at times, privilege self over others. Following on from
this discussion, I return to the work of Arendt. I contend that her concept of uniqueness
builds upon Heidegger’s notion of authenticity in a radical existentialist manner. While
Heidegger gestures toward the importance of relationships with his concept of Mitsein
(being with), I suggest that his conception of authenticity has a tendency toward being
self-oriented. Conversely, Arendt enriches his notion of Mitsein to reveal how mutual
responsiveness is central to a caring human existence. This responsiveness requires a
willingness to think from different perspectives than one’s own, so as to better
comprehend the world.
As part of this discussion, we will consider how personal morality is affected by the
extreme experience of living in a totalitarian regime. I compare specific actions that
Arendt and Heidegger took during the Nazi period in Germany. I suggest that
Heidegger’s foray into leadership is clouded by his vision of bringing about a change to
university education. His action was not an ethical response to the crisis of the time
though it may, from his view, have been authentic. In his desire to promote his vision,
Heidegger seems to have forgotten that Mitsein requires us to care for one another. By
contrast, in her actions, Arendt demonstrates her courage and commitment to others in
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her attempt to fight against a totalitarian regime. As we saw in chapter one, she highlights
the difference between leadership, understood as a collective endeavour, and leadership
as mastery. To explore this distinction further, in the final part of this chapter, we will
consider the connections among bureaucracy, ethics and leadership.

3.1 Heidegger
In Being and Time, Heidegger’s overarching purpose is to understand the nature of being.
By disclosing the ways in which we live in the world, he contends that we will be able to
discern the nature of existence. Critical to Heidegger’s thesis is to demonstrate how we
have failed to grasp the truth of being primarily because of a focus on metaphysics.
According to Heidegger, metaphysics, or an inquiry into what is, has led philosophers to
misunderstand the nature of truth, and focus instead on “scientific” or theoretical proof.
But a metaphysical desire for certainty concerning the nature of existence serves to
privilege what can be perceived or measured rather than what actually is.
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To

comprehend the essence of truth, therefore, we need to uncover what has been obscured
by metaphysics through a hermeneutic, existential analysis.
Contra metaphysical claims Heidegger contends that the nature of being can only be
understood if we consider the question of who we are existentially and ontologically. In
order to question being, therefore, we need to ask who we are in relation to being in
general. His hermeneutic approach represents a continual back and forth between the
question of being and the question of being as beings, that is, between how we appear to
ourselves (ontic) and how we connect this appearing to being (ontological).
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The

difference between an ontological enquiry and fundamental ontology may be construed
as follows. In an ontological enquiry, as Brett Davis contends, we might ask why the
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being of a plant is different from the being of an animal. By contrast, fundamental
ontology questions why anything exists at all.
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It is because man’s essence is grounded in existence, and is inherently temporal, that
Heidegger suggests that we should be able to gain insight into the question of being by
discerning “who Dasein is in its everydayness.”
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According to Tom Greaves,

Heidegger is trying to distinguish between the ‘existentiell,’ which I understand to mean
the way we interpret our lives, and the ‘existential,’ that is, the self-understanding that
arises from this interpretation.
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Hence, the ‘existential’ is concerned with the manner in

which we choose to take up specific projects. Heidegger’s account works on two levels.
On the ontic level, he describes what is observable in everyday life. From these
observations, he tries to ascertain how the ontic phenomena he perceives relate to their
fundamental ontological structure. For Heidegger, phenomena exist as surface and
ground which constitute ontic and ontological. In his exploration of being, he considers
both the ontic and ontological as, together, they underscore the conditions of possible
existence and the variety of ways in which we exist in the world.
As part of his phenomenological investigation, Heidegger is trying to destruct (his term)
common notions of subjectivity. In order to do this, he argues that we need to
comprehend how what we commonly think is “I” is, in fact, a “not I.”

226

Heidegger
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phenomenological question of ‘who.’ This is what his phenomenological investigation
aims to accomplish.
For Heidegger, what constitutes the ‘who’ of Dasein does not change throughout a
person’s life experiences; rather, there is a core essence that stays the same throughout a
person’s life. Yet, for the most part, we live in the world, not as an authentic ‘who,’ but
as someone who fits in with others. Thus, we take up the views of others while believing
that each decision we make is solely our own. Heidegger juxtaposes Dasein, (his term for
the authentic self) with the term ‘the they,’ which refers to our everyday inauthentic
mode of existence. He suggests that Dasein is both fascinated with and absorbed by the
world. Because of this fascination, on an everyday level, we often act without thinking.
This is not an authentic mode of existence because it is focused upon conforming. What
227

happens is that “[e]veryone is the other, and no one is himself,”

and this becomes my

way of knowing the world and myself. In practical terms, what this means is that we
carry out everyday activities without stopping to think about them, and live our lives by
compartmentalizing what we do. Such compartmentalization leads to a failure to
understand, or even question life’s overall purpose. The end result is that we lose our
ability to comprehend fully who we are, since our distinctive identity is obscured by the
‘they’ self. This loss of individual agency ensures that people lead inauthentic lives
without knowing or, in some cases, caring.
Such inauthentic modes of existence can be traced back to instrumental reason, states
Heidegger, and the way that humans perceive the world as a collection of things. In this
instrumental mode of being, we fail to make connections between different entities. For
example, in daily life, we encounter objects without noticing, and become oblivious to
our surroundings, or we may walk past a colleague without stopping because we are late
for an appointment. Instead of caring about what is nearest to us, we turn our minds to the
next activity. Ultimately, this leads to viewing the world as a means to an end, which
constitutes an inauthentic mode of being as it encourages us to see people and things as
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objects to be used and discarded at will. If, instead of viewing objects for their use-value,
we allow entities to be as they are, he suggests we might begin to comprehend being.
Instead of acting in such an instrumental fashion, we need to take a more open approach
to the world. One way to obtain such an open stance is by tarrying with things. Such
tarrying shows that we care about the world and one another, and awakens us to the
possibility of leading a more authentic existence.

3.1.1

Care and Authenticity

Fundamental to Heidegger’s overall argument in Being and Time is that “Dasein’s Being
reveals itself as care.”

228

He maintains that the primary purpose of care is to bring

humans back to their essence.

229

Through an acknowledgment of care, we can engage in

the world in a manner that tries not to dominate others. However, we must guard against
confusing authentic care with inauthentic semblances such as “will, wish, addiction and
urge.”
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For example, an inauthentic mode of being might be to neglect to do something,

and this neglect would constitute a deficient mode of care. Conversely, accomplishing a
task is an authentic mode of care. Heidegger outlines solicitude in a similar manner. An
inauthentic form of solicitude involves ‘leaping in’ and taking over from someone. In
doing so, we limit the other person’s sense of autonomy. This is an inauthentic act
because the other person is forced to become reliant upon us. As well, showing empathy
is an inauthentic instance of solicitude. The reason why he suggests empathy is negative
is because it leads us to project our own desires onto others. Authentic solicitude, by
contrast, seeks to restore care in a genuine manner. An example of authentic solicitude is
listening to someone’s predicament without giving advice, asking appropriate questions,
and allowing that person to resolve her own problem by talking it through together. In so

228

Heidegger, Being and Time, 227.

229

Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” in Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, ed. David
Farrell Krell (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1977), 243.
230

Heidegger, Being and Time, 227.

93

doing, a person is able to make up her own mind, and determine her future actions
without being led by another. Thus, caring means allowing others to be as they are.
What it is critical to note is that, for Heidegger, no-one is authentic in the manner in
which some leadership scholars interested in authenticity suggest. Rather authenticity
represents “an existentiell modification of ‘the they.’”
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What this means is that we do

not live our lives as either authentic or inauthentic persons. As Brett Davis contends,
there can be no authentic existence if what that implies is an existence that “takes
232

complete ownership of itself or completely disclaims itself.”

Furthermore, Davis

maintains that authenticity is only possible for those people who differentiate between
authenticity and inauthenticity, since Heidegger contends that there is another mode of
being-in-the-world, and that is the mode of indifference.
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Indeed, it is this mode of

indifference that may represent the most problematic way of being, states Carmen Taylor,
since it constitutes a lack of care.
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This lack of care for others can be seen in how some

people act in an apathetic manner towards others. Such apathy is one reason why
Heidegger contends that it is important to understand the function of mood.

3.1.2

Mood

A critical component of Heidegger’s phenomenological investigation into the nature of
being is the function of mood. He argues that our moods are the way in which we live in
the world. It is through mood that things show up in a particular manner. We are always
in a mood of some sort, and this influences how the world appears to us. In the mood of
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anxiety, for example, we may express discomfort but not know why. There is a profound
difference, he contends, between the moods of fear and anxiety, since anxiety is not
caused by anything specific. To demonstrate the distinction between anxiety and fear, he
shows how our approach to a situation changes but in different ways. Fear is always a
fear of something. In the mood of fear, for instance, one may become bewildered.
Heidegger offers the example of how people in a burning building pick up what is nearest
rather than what is important because, in their disorientation, they focus on what is close
at hand. Conversely, what threatens us in anxiety cannot be found in a particular place.
Rather, anxiety reveals itself through a vague feeling that we may describe as “uncanny.”
When this anxious feeling occurs, we may exclaim that we feel “out of sorts” or “we do
not feel at home.”
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Hence, mood affects how things appear to us.

Another example of this anxious unease is when, on entering a place for the first time, we
experience a feeling of déjà vu - a sense that we has been there before. Rather than trying
to understand what is happening, people dismiss these feelings since they have no
rational explanation. This is a mistake, according to Heidegger, because these
experiences offer us a glimpse of something valuable. What these uncanny feelings
reveal to us is a sense of otherness, perhaps of authentic possibility.
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These uncanny

experiences are worth paying attention to, because we may obtain insights into the
comprehension of Dasein. If we focus on the ways in which anxiety shows itself, we may
gain understanding about authenticity, and, in turn, a greater comprehension of what it
means to exist. To sum up, unlike fear which can be understood as a fear of something,
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anxiety is a response to nothing in particular. But this nothing is more important than it
might first seem to suggest.
In Heidegger’s view, it is only in those intense moments when we recognize the
inauthenticity of our lives that we may gain a glimpse of what it means to be authentic. It
is through what he describes as the Augenblick (anxious moment of vision) that we can
attempt to transcend our everyday life, and begin to live in a more authentic way.
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The

purpose of these angst-ridden insights is to awaken Dasein to its future possibility. This is
the mode of existence he refers to as resoluteness. For Heidegger, resoluteness is the most
primordial truth of Dasein because it is an individual response to the call of conscience.
In his words, “resoluteness as authentic disclosedness, is authentically nothing else than
Being-in-the-world.”
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What is most authentic to Dasein, for Heidegger, is its resolute

response to the silent call that emanates from within.
For Heidegger, anxiety represents the ontic manifestation of the ontological state of
authenticity, since how we perceive anxiety offers insight into what it might mean to be
authentic. Yet, for authenticity to be unique to each person, he contends that the call of
239

conscience must remain unsaid.

He insists that it is not through speech but via silence

that we comprehend Dasein. To hear the call, it is necessary for each person to listen to
her inner voice. Heidegger shows that there are three distinct ways in which we can hear
or ignore the call of conscience. The first way is when we receive a call that we are guilty
of something, the second is when we obtain a warning as to the possibility of being
guilty, and the third is when we obtain an affirmation that we are not guilty.
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Heidegger, Being and Time, 387-8.
Heidegger, Being and Time, 348.
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This notion of a silent call of conscience has a long history in Western philosophy. As Arendt
points out, Socrates spoke of the daimon which was similar to Heidegger’s notion of Dasein in
that it was unique to the self. See Arendt, Human Condition, 179.
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because we can hear the call of conscience that he contends we know that we are guilty
before we undertake a misdeed. However, the call’s purpose is not to be critical of
Dasein’s action, but to remind Dasein of its potentiality for being. This does not
necessarily imply that we want to have a good conscience, but rather that we are open to
receiving the call of conscience. When the call of conscience arrives, it is often
unexpected and, sometimes, unwanted. Moreover, it is possible for the call of conscience
to be misinterpreted by the “they” self. Nevertheless, the call of conscience is a vital
component of authenticity, in Heidegger’s view, since it is through this desire for a
conscience that Dasein is able to realize its own potentiality.
Heidegger also contends that language is critical to comprehending being. He states that
there can be no “home” for humans outside of the realm of language, since the latter
represents “the house of being.”
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We make sense of our lives through the medium of

language. The significance of an experience, and the meaning we attest to it, arises
through how we speak or think about the event. It is because of language that Heidegger
argues that humans dwell in the world in a different mode than other entities, such as
animals or things.
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Furthermore, he notes that language, like life, is constantly

changing. This is why Heidegger contends that we cannot comprehend the fullness of

causes a person to become guilty, which results in a feeling that we “owe” someone something.
Guilt can also be seen as a “lack,” such as when we fail to do something, which may manifest
itself as regret. Hence, the German word for guilt “schuld” has various meanings such as being
guilty, owing something or being responsible. I thank Helen Fielding for bringing this to my
attention.
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Here Heidegger makes a crucial, if controversial, distinction between the ways in which
humans encounter each other as opposed to animals which, in his view, do not possess Dasein
because they do not have language. His argument that other animals do not possess language has
been disputed by critics as well as admirers such as Jacques Derrida.
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language if we consider words to be “like buckets and kegs from which we scoop a
content.”
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Rather words are “wellsprings” whose meaning shifts over time and space.

The meaning of words alters. This is one of the problems that I see with the way in which
some scholars want to pin down the meaning of the “authentic leadership.” In doing so,
we ignore the fullness of meaning. For instance, if we trace the etymological roots of the
word “authentic,” we discover that it has different meanings that have been forgotten. For
example, one meaning of “authentic” (now obsolete) is "authoritative," which derives
from the Middle English "autentik." The word also derives from the Greek “authentēs,”
meaning author.
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Perhaps if we were to translate these different meanings of the term

into modern-day English, we could say authenticity refers to that which seems to me to
be both authoritative and true. What this suggests to me is that a person’s sense of
authenticity will differ depending upon her particular standpoint.
In addition, it is only possible to live an authentic existence, according to Heidegger,
when we come to terms with our own mortality. But facing up to our own death may be
difficult within a social world where people who talk about death are considered
mawkish. Instead of accepting death’s inevitability, he argues that the “they” transforms
anxiety about dying into fear. Such a refusal to accept death represents an inauthentic
mode of existence, since it is only possible to face death authentically by owning up to its
eventuality. Once we accept our own mortality, this enables Dasein to release itself from
the illusions of the “they.” Consequently, it is through our determination to be true to
ourselves, which involves coming to terms with mortality, as well as our desire to take
responsibility for our actions, that we can move toward a more authentic mode of being.
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A crucial component here is recognizing our own finitude; only then can we begin to live
an authentic existence.

3.1.3

Destiny and Time

For Heidegger, there can be no being outside of time because being and time form codetermining ways of existing in the world. In his view, temporality, or our lived
experience of time, is intrinsically related to being. Hence, we cannot think about what it
means to be authentic without accounting for how temporality influences existence. Each
moment of our lives is an amalgam of past, present and future. When we think about
time, therefore, a residue of the past influences current thinking, such that previous
knowledge and attitudes have a bearing on present situations. The present moment also
includes the future because we are always-already oriented beyond the present moment
toward a future act. The problem is that, at times, we become so focussed on the future
that we can forget the present. This is why we need constantly to see time as in a sense of
flux. Our understanding of temporality means that we are able to comprehend past
actions, present circumstances, and decide on future possibilities. This is why he argues
that “being” and “time” are fundamentally linked.
Consequently, there is no “now” except in this oscillation between past, present and
future. Time is not to be understood as in a series of “nows,” but as a constant to-ing and
fro-ing. Here, as Simon Critchley asserts, Heidegger is contesting the Aristotelian belief
that time occurs “as a uniform, linear and infinite series of now-points.”245 This linear
model of time has been the mainstay of philosophy from the Greeks through to Hegel.
Yet, according to Heidegger, this is not the way that we experience time in everyday life.
Neither is it correct to think of time as in a Christian form of eternity. We see this
connection between temporality and being in language in everyday phrases such as
‘there’s no time like the present,’ or ‘time waits for no man.’ These common sayings
reveal our implicit awareness of the interconnection between personal mortality and time.
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This is what Heidegger refers to as a “reckoning;” he views this reckoning with time as
elemental.
In exploring the ontological conditions through which people relate to history, Heidegger
differentiates between the word “fate” that relates to an individual, and the word
“destiny” that relates to a people. In his view, inauthentic historicity manifests itself in a
lack of steadfastness, which shows itself when people evade choosing their future. He
contends that “[o]ur fates have already been guided in advance … Dasein’s fateful
destiny in and with its generation goes to make up the full authentic historizing of
Dasein.”
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This historical component of Dasein is intrinsically connected with time.

Here Heidegger is suggesting that a people’s fatefulness is within their grasp. But they
must choose not only their destiny but also their hero.
As I will show later, it is possible that Heidegger’s initial support for National Socialism
was because he perceived this regime as a way to awaken the German people to their
destiny. In his infamous Rector speech, Heidegger suggests that an important aspect of a
people’s destiny, and an indicator of Dasein’s authenticity, is its resolute loyalty to a
particular leader. This resolute loyalty is in direct contrast to Arendt’s contention that we
must always be on the alert against the dangers of absolute loyalty, since it may lead to a
lack of questioning, as well as to a refusal to be responsible for one’s actions.
I have discussed Being and Time in some detail because Heidegger’s work is
fundamental to debates about authenticity. Similar themes resonate in Arendt’s writing,
either in the sense of negating Heidegger’s claims about the separation of being and
appearance, or as an ongoing dialogue as in the case of what it means to think. In the next
section, I will contrast Arendt’s approach with Heidegger’s.

3.2

Arendt

I suggest that Arendt re-envisages Heidegger’s concept of authenticity through her
discussion of uniqueness and plurality. She demonstrates that uniqueness, expressed in
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deeds and words, is important, not only in our relationships with one another, but also in
relation to what it means to exist. As I pointed out in chapter one, for Arendt, a person’s
unique identity is to be understood as both relational and embodied because each time we
act and speak we do so within an already existent web of human relationships. In her
work, she fleshes out Heidegger’s notion of Mitsein to show that human existence is
inherently relational, as well as temporal.
Further, Arendt rethinks Heidegger's concept of authenticity to show that it is natality, not
finitude, which is central to understanding existence.
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Her emphasis on natality stands

in direct contrast to Heidegger’s belief that it is by coming to terms with death that a
person can realize her potential for authenticity. Natality refers to how, with each act, we
“insert ourselves into the world.”
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Each action is like a second birth since through each

act we bring something new into the world. While Heidegger sees authenticity as
emerging from silent resolution, for Arendt, uniqueness lies in actions. In her view, it is
through amor mundi (love of the world) rather than a resolute carpe diem (seize the day)
that we can work toward a more inclusive way of thinking about existence.
Arendt was no naive admirer of Heidegger.
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For instance, in “What is Existential

Philosophy,” written shortly after the Second World War, she is harshly critical of his
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philosophical approach. Here, Arendt contends that the reason he adopted the term
Dasein, rather than man, was to avoid a discussion of Kantian definitions such as
freedom, dignity and reason.
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She argues that the Heideggerian self “is a concept of

man that leaves the individual existing independent of humanity.”
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A self without

others is a meaningless concept, however, since we live together within a common
world.
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Moreover, Arendt contests his claim that it is through a resolute acceptance of

personal mortality that people learn to be authentic.
As I mentioned in chapter one, Arendt contends that we have a desire for self-display.
She distinguishes between self-display, which she sees as something beyond a person’s
control, and self-presentation. Self-display is not the same as self-presentation, not least
because appearances can be manipulated. Arendt observes that if we attempt to unveil the
“true” identity of an animal that may have changed colour to better adapt to its
surroundings, what we would perceive is not the truth of that creature, but another
semblance. Similarly, when we unmask a hypocrite, this unmasking may destroy the
deception but it does not “discover anything authentically appearing.”
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Thus, for

Arendt, there is always a possibility of a deliberate manipulation in that a person can
choose to appear in the “guise of seeming, pretense and willful deception.”
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had a positive effect on their writing. In addition, her largesse of spirit, given his Nazi affiliation,
is an example of her ability to forgive.
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problem as it relates to the question of authenticity is that we cannot know whether a
person is being a hypocrite or not.
Our outward appearance is not the same as showing our innermost self. As she states
“appearance is by no means the outward manifestation of an inner disposition, if it were,
we probably would all act and speak alike.”
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Arendt maintains that we do not have

access to an internal, stable self. An ‘inside self,’ if it exists at all, never appears to either
the inner or the outward sense.”
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Rather what we perceive, she states, are inner

sensations. These sensations present themselves to us through our emotions and moods.
Here we see a similarity with Heidegger’s account of mood.
A central distinction between Heidegger and Arendt, however, is her emphasis on action.
It is how we act in the world that matters. Thus, it is not knowing who we are that matters
but appearing to others as we would wish to appear to ourselves. In others words, it
behooves each person, if they wish to act ethically, to be consistent in word and deed.
She argues that whenever we appear in the world, being and appearance coincide.
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Because being and appearing are the same, she states there can be no two-world theory
that bifurcates the depth of being and the surface of appearing. Hence, we cannot go
beyond appearances to the thing itself. Further, she maintains that scientists and
philosophers are in error in their “relentless search for the truth behind mere
appearances,”
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for it is not possible to move beyond the boundaries of perception to the

inner sanctum of truth.
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For Arendt, the world is like a stage upon which we arrive and disappear. Within that
world, each person perceives things from her own particular standpoint. At times, we act
as spectators and in other moments as actors. With each act a person differentiates
herself. Yet such differentiation depends upon one’s ability to belong.
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At different

times, the rights of people to belong to society have been denied for a variety of reasons.
Yet it is only when each person feels that they belong that humans may flourish. In a just
society, each person needs to be recognized and respected for who and not what they are.
It is the focus on the “who,” understood as the unique way in which each person
orientates herself to the world, that we are able to recognize and distinguish one another.
The problem in modernity is that individual distinctiveness, understood as the ability to
speak and act, is covered over by social norms and prejudices. As we saw in chapter one,
Arendt argues that we are inclined to focus on the “whatness” of a person, that is, what
they do rather than who they are. In becoming a “society of jobholders,” she argues that
we have lost a deeper sense of connection with one another. In modernity, this lack of
connection between people, together with a focus on self, has led to an increase in
loneliness. The breakdown of communal ties allows for the emergence of totalitarian
regimes.
As I pointed out in chapter two, Arendt is critical of the Enlightenment’s stress on
equality because it is often perceived in the abstract. Within such an abstract framework,
there is little respect for difference. This is her chief objection to what she termed ‘the
rise of the social’ in the eighteenth century, and the focus on correct ways of behaving
rather than on individual action. Thus, for Arendt, an emphasis on equality, understood as
sameness, is not conducive to plurality, because it is based on an abstract way of thinking
about human relations. Moreover, too much emphasis on equality obscures the fact that
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only some individuals are perceived as equal. For example, she argues that what makes a
tyranny distinct is that everyone is equal with the exception of the tyrant who dictates the
lives of others. For Arendt, human flourishing is based on the ability for each human
being to exist in an environment that allows both equality and distinctiveness to appear.
But, in modernity, human distinctiveness is covered over by abstract notions of equality.
As we saw in the discussion of the pariah and the parvenu in the previous chapter, is not
who we are, but who we are allowed to be.
Furthermore, social conformity can be dangerous for those who are not perceived as in
compliance with social dictates. If a person does not conform, this may result in isolation
and loneliness and, in extreme situations, conformity may threaten the very basis of
humanity. In its most sinister form, as in totalitarian regimes, absolute orthodoxy can
result in a denial of a people’s right to exist. In her preface to Men and Dark Times,
Arendt observes that Heidegger’s observations of ‘the they’ were uncannily precise. She
writes: “[i]n his description of human existence, everything that is real or authentic is
261

assaulted by the overwhelming power of “mere talk.”

Hence, Arendt perceives

Heidegger’s account of the “they” as prescient, given what was to transpire in Nazi
Germany, and the destruction of a plural society.
In this section, I have shown how Arendt’s work both complements and contradicts
Heidegger’s approach to authenticity. She demonstrates how important it is to take into
account self and world. Furthermore, a plurality of perspective is something that runs
contrary to what she terms the Leader Principle, as I will now show.

3.3 The Leader Principle
In chapter one, we saw how the problem with the separation of leadership into those who
think and those who act brought about a hierarchical way of thinking about human
relationships. What happens in modernity, according to Arendt, is the emergence of
totalitarianism and the success of “the Leader Principle,” which leads to the willful
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destruction of pluralistic society, since it is based upon total obedience. In her study of
the origins of totalitarianism, Arendt sees a connection between the beginnings of this
destructive force and nineteenth-century imperialism. For instance, she contends that
empire building has always been concerned with hierarchies of raced and sexed bodies.
Arendt shows how, in the nineteenth century, many democratically-minded European
nations were complicit in the creation of race-based thinking. Chief amongst these was
England’s desire to create an empire based upon trade, no matter the cost to others. She
perceives a link between the colonial mentality and the rise of totalitarianism.
Nineteenth-century expansionist policies sacrificed others’ lives for greed and profit. This
instrumental way of acting, coupled with a complete disregard for human life, opened the
way for totalitarianism to emerge in the twentieth century. Hence, for Arendt, the
destructive exploits of nineteenth-century imperialism led the way to the rise of
totalitarianism.
Phenomenologically, a significant feature of totalitarian rule is that there is no personal
responsibility for any act, other than that of the leader. Arendt sees this lack of personal
accountability as symptomatic of the failings of modernity. She maintains that totalitarian
leaders like Hitler led in a different manner from a tyrant. One main difference is that
while tyrants use people as scapegoats to maintain power, in totalitarian regimes,
everything is conducted based on the will of the leader.
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For example, in Nazi

Germany, all acts were carried out in the name of the Fuehrer. The Leadership Principle
decreed that Hitler’s word superseded written law.
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In effect, this meant that Hitler was

personally responsible for all official action. In practical terms, this way of leading
resulted in each official acting as the living embodiment of the Fuehrer in obeisance to
his every command. What happens when a Leader claims total responsibility in this
manner is that there is a lack of personal accountability on the part of everyone else.
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Furthermore, because of this centralized power in the hands of one man it seems to the
outside world as if the only person who knows what is happening is the leader. Thus,
Arendt is in agreement with Hitler's statement that without him, Nazi Germany could not
264

exist.

The main problem with the “Leader Principle” is that these regimes undermine

the public realm. People stop taking responsibility for their actions and at first are willing,
and then forced, to give up their freedom in favour of what appears to be strong
leadership. Another salient feature of the totalitarian state is mobility. Constant changes
of direction by the Leader ensure that people are kept off-guard. Thus, members of the
elite are constantly changing. These alterations in personnel enabled Hitler to ensure rival
factions did not obtain too much power. In this way, the Leader proves that he is not only
infallible, but indispensible. While there is mobility within the system, for the majority of
citizens, freedom of movement and speech is constrained.
Arendt often conceives of politics in terms of spatial metaphors. For instance, she likens
constitutional government to a space where the law is like a hedge placed between
buildings. The space provided by this metaphorical hedge allows for dialogue and debate
which, in turn, enables human flourishing. Conversely, Arendt argues that tyranny is akin
to a desert where the tyrant’s will to dominate functions like a sandstorm that overtakes
travelers. Conversely, totalitarianism has no spatial topology because it acts “like an iron
band of terror”
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that compresses people together until it appears as if there is no

opposition, since everybody speaks with one voice. In reality, differences of opinion are
contained by this concentration of power. What seems, on the surface, to be an equality
of voice is, in fact, the destruction of different viewpoints by means of force and
violence.
In Arendt’s view, it is not the totalitarian leader’s personality that is important, but his
organizational skills. Thus, she maintains that Max Weber was incorrect to perceive
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charisma as necessary for leadership success.
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Arendt observes that both Stalin and

Hitler were able, prior to coming to power, to build around them a group of people who
were totally loyal since they owed their appointment to the leader. Unquestioning loyalty
by followers is central to any totalitarian leader’s success, since it ensures that no matter
what a leader requests there will always be followers willing to carry out the orders.
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It

is this unquestioning loyalty that is so dangerous, because it ensures that someone will be
willing to do what the leader says.
What also distinguishes a totalitarian state from other forms of rule is that the regime is
based on the Leader’s infallibility, whose success, in turn, is built upon fabrication. Lies
are necessary so that people, whether members of the ruling elite or the mass, see the
Leader as intrinsic to their future well-being. The Leader's absolute command and total
sense of assurance brings with it a false sense of security. After the defeat that Germany
suffered following World War One, Hitler’s leadership appeared to offer an alternative to
past humiliations. Arendt contends that while most of the German population admired
Hitler’s leadership, these sympathizers did not know the full extent of what was taking
place. Only the inner elite were apprised of the Leader’s objectives. The naive followers
express their loyalty to the Leader, while the elite carry out criminal activity in a cynical
way. Moreover, each totalitarian regime adopts a distinctive ideology to obtain its longrange goal of world domination. In the case of the Nazis, their vision was based on Aryan
supremacy. Because the realization of world domination cannot take place within a single
lifetime, what makes leaders like Hitler able to retain power is partly because their
pronouncements cannot be defeated by rational argument. Factual truth is denied in
favour of the totalitarian leader’s vision, which is based on lies and delusions. Whether
the leader is morally right or wrong becomes irrelevant. Under such conditions,
knowledge is disconnected from truth since claims to factual truth are no longer
considered necessary.
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Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, 362 ff.

We saw in chapter one how this unquestioned loyalty to a leader can create havoc for an
organization.
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In this section, I have examined Arendt's thinking on the emergence of totalitarianism,
and its historical antecedents. I wanted to offer some historical and philosophical context
for why totalitarianism emerged in the twentieth century. Now I want to turn to questions
of ethical responsibility and leadership.

3.4 Morality in Dark Times
In the interviews I conducted, the connection between questions of ethics and the notion
of personal authenticity in leadership emerged. While most interview participants stated
that authenticity was important in regards to leading ethically, not everyone agreed. In
one interview, for example, Olive argued that the problem with theories like authentic
leadership is that they fail to account for the "ancient problem of dirty hands." I want to
look more closely at this question of “dirty hands” by exploring the connections among
authenticity, morality and individual responsibility.
In her essay “Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship,” Arendt argues that the
controversy that ensued over the publication of her book on the trial of Adolf Eichmann
raised moral issues that she had not anticipated.
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Her detractors argued it was wrong for

Arendt to judge men like Eichmann, since each one of us might have been morally
culpable under similar circumstances. While her critics maintained she was wrong to
judge, Arendt insists that judging is crucial to an ethical worldview. Moral judgments are
necessary because without a willingness to judge, the world alters without us noticing. To
illustrate her argument, Arendt describes how when she was growing up in Germany in
the early part of the twentieth century, there was little attention paid to moral issues
because ethical conduct was assumed. In hindsight, she sees this early moral
disintegration in German society as a prelude to the abominations that were to follow.
In the 1930s and 1940s in Germany and Russia, Arendt argues that established moral
standards collapsed. This moral decline was more heinous in Nazi Germany, she states,
because there was a tacit acceptance from all strata of society to accept a new way of
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thinking about morality. The German people knew what the Nazis were like because
Hitler did not hide his intentions. In her view, the true moral crimes were not carried out
by the Nazis, who acted out of some perverted sense of commitment to Hitler, but by
ordinary Germans. For Arendt, morality collapses when ordinary people choose to go
along with a regime they find morally repugnant. It is precisely when people choose to
acquiesce with the majority and refuse to make individual judgments that ethical conduct
is found wanting. One way this moral disintegration can be seen, she states, is that at the
moment of Nazi defeat, German morality changed once more. What the world witnessed,
therefore, was a total collapse of a “moral” order not once but twice, which begs the
question of how is it possible for society to change its ethical standards so abruptly.
Arendt contends that this ethical disintegration reveals morality’s true meaning “as a set
of mores, of customs and manners, which could be exchanged for another set with no
more trouble than it would take to change the table manners of a whole people.”
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She

further maintains that the first people to accept this new set of values were respectable
members of society. What this demonstrates is that polite society is not the best judge of
moral standards.

270

The problem when we conform to social mores is that at times of crisis we no longer
know how to act. But, if not to moral standards, then where should a person turn at times
of crisis? Well, according to Arendt, not to religious doctrine. In Nazi Germany, for
instance, religion proved of little assistance in guarding against moral failings because a
person’s religious beliefs were regarded as a private matter. And while moral philosophy
may teach us how to act in times of peace, it is not sufficient in a crisis. At such critical
junctures, she maintains that the Socratic way of thinking is “the only working morality
in borderline situations.”
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Socrates argued that the reason why it is better to suffer than

to do wrong is because it is preferable to disagree with others, “rather than that I, being
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Here I think we see resonances with Arendt’s argument and Heidegger’s discussion of ‘the
they.’
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one, should be out of tune with myself and contradict myself.”

272

From this perspective,

the reason not to commit evil is because it would be hard to live with oneself. This, in
Arendt’s view, is our best defense against evil.
In her discussion of moral responsibility, Arendt considers how other philosophers have
thought about ethical conduct. For instance, Kant argued that it was necessary to have an
imperative to keep the will (an individual facet that she argues was unknown to the
ancients) in harmony with reason.
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This is why he argued that every inclination, both

good and bad, were temptations that led one astray. From Kant’s viewpoint, people do
evil things because of temptation. Contra Socrates, he argued that self-contempt was not
enough to guard against immoral acts because a man can lie to himself. For Kant, moral
274

conduct is an internal matter.

Thus, his categorical imperative serves as a moral

compass that helps individuals guard against human frailty. To obey the Kantian
categorical imperative means to obey reason and, in doing so, remain in harmony with
oneself. With the laws of nature one has no choice but to obey; therefore, Kant
maintained it made no sense to say that a person obeys the laws of nature. Conversely,
with moral law, each person is obligated to obey the laws of the land. When a person
obeys the law of the land, he accordingly obeys himself. (Unintentionally, Arendt
suggests, Kant divorced moral philosophy from religion when he argued that man, not
God, was the basis for the law of morality.) In placing the duties a man has to himself
above those responsibilities he has towards others, this leads to a contradiction whereby it
is love of the self, rather than love of others, that compels us to do right. The problem
with this viewpoint is that it turns the self into the ultimate standard of what is morally
good. As the self can lie, it should never be the sole arbiter of morality. Instead, we must
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Arendt makes this argument on several occasions because she believes that it was in
Christianity, specifically through Paul, that the will become known. See, especially The Life of
The Mind.
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My understanding of Kant is mostly derived from Arendt. As well as the essays I mention
here, I am familiar with her Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, ed. Ronald Beiner (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1982).
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look for a more worldly and intersubjective activity, which Arendt argues exists through
our most plural faculty, judgement.
Originally a theory related to aesthetics, Kant’s notion of good taste serves as the basis
for the Arendtian notion of judgement. Arendt regards judgement as exemplary because
of its intersubjective nature. Through the act of judging a person can take not only her
own perspective into account as she does in solitary reflection, but also consider the
views of others. In the act of judging, Arendt states, one must attempt to come to a
potential agreement with the company of others who may or may not agree with one’s
position but with whom eventually one needs to fashion some kind of concord. Being
willing to consider an issue from different perspectives is why she argued that judgement
is the most essential activity to ensure the flourishing of the world. Having the confidence
to judge for ourselves is vital if we are to save humanity from totalitarian-like ways of
thinking. Being willing to disagree with others is critical if one intends to take a
principled stance.
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This is especially important in times of crisis where there is no

moral guidebook to follow because the situation is novel. Hence, Arendt asserts that, in
periods of moral upheaval, it is neither heroes nor saints that are needed, but ordinary
people who are willing to take a moral stance, which entails judging for oneself.
For Arendt, “an individual’s personal quality is their ‘moral’ quality.”
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This she terms

the moral standard of the self. But this standard is not wholly sufficient. In addition to
this personal characteristic, it is important that there be a moral standard of the world. To
understand this more fully, we need to turn to another thinker. Arendt regards
Machiavelli’s famous statement in The Prince that rulers have to be taught “how not to
be good”
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as astute because he recognized that it is not whether a person’s conduct is

good that matters, but whether that person’s conduct is “good for the world he lives
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Here we might remember Keith Grint’s idea of the constructive dissenter that I mentioned in
chapter one. Constructive dissent is important because it enables us to think for ourselves, rather
than going along with the majority.
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278

in.”

For Machiavelli, in ruling the standard is always political, and, as such, always

worldly. From this perspective, wrongdoing is a necessary evil for leaders. To return to
the issue of dirty hands, I introduced earlier, perhaps we can argue that a leader
sometimes has to make decisions that may negatively influence others. Ultimately, what
is important is whether one’s leadership conduct is good for the world.
Self and world must be taken into consideration if leaders wish to be ethical in their
decision-making. Without taking self and world into account, there can be disastrous
consequences. For example, we saw in chapter two how Robespierre’s apparent goodness
wreaked devastation on the French people, as he tried to root out hypocrisy wherever it
could be found. For Arendt, goodness has no place on the political stage, since once
goodness shows itself it becomes corrupted.
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As she explains in On Revolution, we can

never be certain of a person’s good intentions because we cannot see into the depths of
the human heart. Furthermore, as Dana Villa argues, a demand for authenticity can turn
leaders into fanatics.

280

This is why Arendt, states Villa, is fiercely opposed to a politics

of authenticity, because it transforms actors into hypocrites.

281

He sees a difficulty with

Arendt’s desire to separate action from morality is that celebrating a Machiavellian
concept of virtu can cause amoral attitudes in leaders. But also the political actor cannot
always distance himself from the fact of “dirty hands.” Sometimes, it may be necessary to
choose the lesser evil.
But how do we guard against leaders committing evil on a regular basis? Is evil
indicative of a lack of forethought? This connection between evil and thoughtlessness is
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Perhaps this is why in conversations I have had with people about authenticity and leadership,
Hitler’s name is so often brought up by interlocutors.
281

He perceives a contradiction in Arendt’s view of action and virtue. For instance, according to
Villa, in regards to an agonistic view of action, such as Machiavelli’s, what counts is not whether
the act is good or bad, neither does it matter whether the act achieves it ends. See Villa, Arendt
and Heidegger, 55.
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Arendt’s main thesis in her study of the trial of Adolf Eichmann, where she argues that
evil arises when leaders fail to reflect upon what they do.
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Rather than being radical, as

Kant contended, she argues that evil arises through banality, and is often a result of
putting oneself first. Arendt suggests that acts of evil occur whenever there is an absence
of thought. By contrast, when a person engages in thinking, she is grounded in memory.
Because of this internal memory, it is impossible for a thoughtful person to do evil
because “knowing that he has to live with himself, there will be limits to what he can
permit himself to do.”
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Here we see again the Socratic basis of Arendt’s thought on

questions of moral responsibility. A lack of forethought demonstrates a failure to care.
Moreover, to refuse to question a leader’s orders is, over time, to destroy one’s moral
sensibility. Arendt insists that limitless evil is possible only when reflective thinking is
absent.
In considering questions of guilt and innocence, Arendt maintains that these attributes
can only be applied to individuals. This is why she is fundamentally opposed to the
notion of collective guilt as it can result in a feigned equality. In her view, collective guilt
may lead to a lack of personal responsibility on the part of those individuals who commit
immoral acts. Arendt maintains that “it is as wrong to feel guilty without having done
anything specific as it is to feel free of all guilt if one actually is guilty of something.”
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She argues that collective guilt is a misnomer, because “no moral, individual and
personal, standards of conduct will ever be able to excuse us from collective
responsibility.”
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When it comes to moral questions, Arendt contends that an ethical

response “concerns the individual in his singularity.”
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Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (London: Penguin Book,
1963).
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legal and moral issues since when someone is brought to justice, they always appear as an
individual. In a courtroom, the answer that someone carried out an act because he was
following orders is never sufficient, because it does not address the question of why, as
an individual, a person chose to respond in a particular manner.
Yet Arendt maintains that most Nazis brought to trial denied that there was anything
personal about their actions, contending that they were merely following orders. This was
the argument that Eichmann used at his trial, to her dismay. This refusal to take
responsibility for one’s actions is, from an Arendtian perspective, an immoral act. But
many Nazis officers maintained that it was their duty to obey, rather than think for
themselves. The Nazi fallacy about obedience can be traced back to the Platonic notion
that a body politic consists of the ruler who commands, and the ruled who obey orders. In
her view, obedience leads to a lack of personal responsibility. Contra Kant, Arendt
contends that the word “obedience” has no place in a legal or moral framework. It is
those who refuse to obey, and act out of personal conviction who demonstrate true
leadership in Arendt’s view. Their actions express a willingness to become personally
involved in the public sphere. In contrast, blind obedience to a regime shows a lack of
personal responsibility.
In this section, we have seen how judgement is critical to a person’s authenticity,
especially in times of crisis. In totalitarian regimes, being willing to judge for oneself is
necessary if the regime is ever to be overthrown. One of the problems that Arendt
highlights is the way that people went along with the Nazis, out of some perverted sense
of belief that such a regime could bring about a fundamental change in society.
Moreover, the changes that are wrought by totalitarian regimes serve to suppress human
flourishing in favour of a belief in the certainty of an ideology that is connected to the
Leader Principle that worked by valorizing one person’s vision over all others. As such, it
is contrary to human freedom since one person’s sovereignty negates plurality.

3.5 Authentic Visions?
Previously, I stated that Arendt’s views on uniqueness and plurality are important to
counterbalance notions of leadership that put too much emphasis on the self. As an
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example of her argument, it might be useful to consider Heidegger’s unsuccessful attempt
at putting his leadership vision into action. In April 1933, he was elected Rector of
Freiburg University. In his Inaugural Address, he stated that the purpose of the Rectorate
is to provide “spiritual leadership” to students and faculty.
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Heidegger contended that

the “essence” of a German university could only be revealed if and when leaders are
committed to its mission. To realize this mission, what was required was “leaders and
guardians [who] possess the strictest clarity of the highest, widest, and richest
knowledge.”

288

Each leader must hold fast to their vocation. This is not due to a desire

for power, but rather that in keeping to a resolute stance a leader finds strength of
purpose. In his address, he called for a transformation of the university system from a
“technical organization-institutional pseudo-unity” into a genuine place where learning
will occur. A battle needs to be fought between professors and their students who
collectively would transform the university into an environment where students would
receive discipline and preparation for “the highest service.” But Heidegger was not given
the opportunity to develop a different kind of university because his leadership was to
prove unpopular with faculty and students. He was to fall out with the student leadership
because of their desire to post the “Jew Notice.” His initial refusal to allow the Reich
Student Leadership to post this notice led to a reprimand by the Nazi hierarchy. In April
1934, Heidegger resigned from his post.
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Reflecting upon his brief leadership experience, Heidegger states that his unpopularity as
a leader was because he had little interest in the minutiae of institutional life.
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He
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The following discussion is based on Heidegger’s own remarks in “The Self-Assertion of the
German University.” While I have read around this subject, his own exploration of his actions is a
fascinating document, not least because, in my mind, he manages to apologize without really
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describes his initial reluctance to become Rector. It was his predecessor, Wilhemn von
Mollendorf, dismissed because of his left-leaning politics, who had encouraged
Heidegger to put his name forward. In describing his term in office, Heidegger explains
that it was his spiritual vision that propelled him forward. It appears that he had no
interest in everyday matters; what mattered to him was to return the German university to
its true “historical vocation in the Western world.”
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Forging positive relationships was

less important than establishing a modern university based on platonic ideals. Through
his leadership, he hoped to create “a gathering of what is German unto the historical
292

essence of the West.

His purpose in becoming Rector was to try to instill his authentic

vision onto an institution, and he saw in the Nazi movement the potential to bring this
transformation about. In remembering this period, Heidegger admits to being impressed
with the glory of National Socialism. He explains that his decision to join the party was
one he did for the good of the university.
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Furthermore, Heidegger suggests that it is

only those who do not reflect sufficiently on the matter who would see his Rectorial
Address as being in support of National Socialism.
Heidegger’s explanation and initial support of the Nazi regime suggests to me that he saw
strong leadership as important to the well-being and destiny of the German people. But
he severely misjudged Hitler’s megalomania. What Heidegger shows is a lack of
judgement, together with an unwillingness to admit he was in error.
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In his defense,

Heidegger maintains that he adopted Nietzsche’s will to power in his speech as Rector to

doing so, in part, by suggesting that it was the responsibility of others wiser than he to explain his
error.
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If we take into account his own philosophy about the call of conscience, it is possible that the
reason why he did not make a public apology was because a genuine remorse is not one that is
uttered aloud but is a matter between me and myself.
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show how there was a deficiency in the world that had been caused by secularism. He
describes himself as being “not so wise” as to realize where Nazism would lead.
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What

Heidegger’s disastrous foray into leadership suggests to me, however, is that strong
personal visions, when they do not take the world into account, can lead to self-delusion
and a lack of good judgement. This is why leaders cannot rely solely on self-knowledge
as their guide.
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By contrast to Heidegger, Arendt did not view herself as a leader. Indeed, as I pointed out
in chapter one, she argued that leadership was unbecoming to women, since it was
297

unfeminine.

Yet when we review her actions both before and during the Second World

War, I suggest that she demonstrates courage and leadership. In her interview with
Günther Gaus, she describes herself as apolitical during her early adulthood.
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With the

rise of National Socialism and the burning of the Reichstag in 1933, she argues that it
was impossible to remain a bystander. At the age of twenty-six, Arendt began to engage
in political activity at some risk to her own safety. At the request of Kurt Blumenfeld,
President of the Zionist Organization, she began attending different events in various
clubs in Berlin, as well as reading professional journals, to build a collection of what the
Nazis were doing. Because of her activity, she was arrested by the police. During her
eight days in prison she was interrogated by a police officer. In order not to give herself
and or her comrades away, she spun him many stories about what she was doing. In the
meantime, her Zionist colleagues obtained a Jewish lawyer to help her case. However,
Arendt decided to send the lawyer away because she trusted the police officer, because he
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had an honest face. When she is released, she and her mother make their escape from
Germany first to Prague, and later Switzerland. Finally, Arendt made her way to Paris
where she was to spend the next eight years before emigrating to The United States.
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In the same interview, Arendt states that what disheartened her most about what took
place in Germany before and during the Second World War was the way in which people
co-operated with the Nazis. Arendt’s dislike of intellectuals arises from observing people
she knew voluntarily step in line. It is of note that she believed that there is something
about intellectuals that encouraged this activity. For example, she argues that “I still think
that it belongs to the essence of being an intellectual that one fabricates ideas.”
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What

was worse was that some intellectuals actually believed in Nazism, partly because they
were trapped by their ideas.
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It is hard not to read a condemnation of Heidegger’s

actions in her comments.
In the correspondence between Karl Jaspers, her doctoral supervisor and friend, Arendt
expresses her anger at what she saw as Heidegger’s betrayal of Edmund Husserl. In
accordance with Nazi instructions, and in his role as Rector, Heidegger did end up
signing a letter dismissing all Jewish professors; this act created an irrevocable rift
between him and Husserl. She contends that Husserl would have been indifferent if the
letter had been signed by someone else. Because Heidegger personally signed the letter
dismissing his former mentor, this was a deep shock to Husserl. For both Jaspers and
Arendt, he had a choice in that he could have resigned, rather than signing the letter
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“Heidegger the Fox,” whereby she alludes to how an animal gets trapped within a burrow, and
cannot find a way out. See Arendt, Essays in Understanding, 361-362.
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dismissing the man who had been his mentor.

302

In his desire to promote his vision,

Heidegger failed to take into account his own philosophy, namely that care is
fundamental to being in the world. Without care, which shows itself in the manner in
which we act towards others, leadership lacks Mitsein.
In this section, I have tried to show how differently Arendt and Heidegger dealt with the
difficult circumstances of the Second World War. What we see in their different actions, I
suggest, is a greater willingness on the part of Arendt to consider both self and world.
Heidegger’s authentic vision was so all-encompassing that it led him to forget our
personal responsibility to care for others. I think that Arendt provides us with a deeper,
more relational understanding of the way in which ethics, authenticity and leadership
connect. I want to turn now to explore the question of ethics in relation to how their work
has been interpreted by different scholars.

3.5.1

Questions of Ethics

The Platonic model that Heidegger was attracted to, according to Julia Kristeva, is
diametrically opposed to Arendt’s emphasis on intersubjectivity.
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This difference has a

304

profound effect on the way these thinkers view questions of ethics.

An Arendtian

notion of ethical action is founded upon a commitment to others. In The Human
Condition, Arendt argues that we demonstrate this loyalty to one another through
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promise-making and forgiveness.

It is important to keep to our promises because this

is the only way to compensate for the vagaries of action. We forgive each other because it
is the right thing to do. While we can never forgive a heinous act, we can pardon the
wrongdoer. It was because of her belief in the power of forgiveness that Kristeva argues
that Arendt forgave Heidegger for his Nazi involvement. Such acts of forgiveness are
fundamental to the Arendtian notion of plurality because they enable each of us to start
anew.
Joanna Hodge argues Heidegger’s lack of judgement in connecting himself with Hitler’s
regime makes it hard to decouple his philosophy from his politics. Yet Heidegger’s
political failings need not outweigh his philosophical insights into the problems of
metaphysics. By questioning the place of ethics in metaphysics, Hodge argues he opens
up the possibility to rethink ethical relations. For instance, in his critique of instrumental
ways of being, Heidegger shows how, in modernity, we privilege abstract thinking over
the ways in which we live in the world.
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The problem we face is that ethics has stopped

being concerned with thinking about human flourishing. Instead, ethics becomes linked
to particular issues. Current versions of ethics that proliferate in medical, educational and
political environments are not what Heidegger meant by ethics. As an example ethics is
sometimes linked to specific outcomes, which I suggest obscures a deeper understanding
of ethics as care.
Furthermore, in modernity, questions of ethics have become subordinated to technology
as opposed to being rooted in an understanding of human flourishing. But ethics is
fundamentally about responsiveness. Indeed, Jacob Golomb argues that an ethics of
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authenticity seeks to provide the conditions of a genuine morality.

307

While Heidegger

badly misjudged the political climate of Nazi Germany, he does have much to offer in
terms of a critique of instrumental reason. For example, he shows that acting in terms of
having predetermined ends is unethical, since it subordinates human relations to
instrumental ways of relating. The trouble with instrumentality is that it limits human
expression. Moreover, when language becomes instrumental, it loses significance. By
viewing the world in instrumental ways, we objectify things, and truth, rather than being
a question, becomes a matter of certainty. Hodge argues that any ethical investigation
requires reflection on “ethical questions of action, responsibility, evaluation and
judgement.”
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This may not always be central to Heidegger’s project, but it sounds very

pertinent to Arendtian thought.
In his brief discussion on ethics, Heidegger contends that ethics is under the sway of
metaphysics. In Letter on Humanism, for instance, he maintains that thinking stopped
with the foundation of ethics, logics and physics.
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In his view, morality and ethics are

part of a metaphysical way of thinking that from Plato onwards has barred us from the
truth of being. Despite his claims to the contrary, many critics search for an ethics in his
work. For example, Tom Greaves contends that Heidegger’s work is profoundly ethical,
since his writing encourages us to make a distinction between those actions we undertake
in a genuine way, and those acts we take up because everyone else does.
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As well,
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Mariana Ortega suggests that you can discover an ethics in Being and Time.

Rather
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in chapter two on Rameau’s Nephew.
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than being anti-ethical, she claims that due to its ontological structure, “Dasein has the
possibility of being ethical.”

312

Ortega further contends that Heidegger connects his

phenomenological findings with ethics in his account of authenticity as properness and
resoluteness. In doing so, he equates living a moral life with the call of conscience. While
it is true that in his discussion of guilt, Heidegger shows that it must be possible to detach
individual notions of what it means to be authentic from moral notions of right and
wrong, it is Arendt who reveals why conventional ways of thinking about morality have
the potential to be damaging to human relationships. This is one reason why it is vital to
critique an understanding of leadership as sovereignty or mastery. I suggest, therefore,
that Arendt provides us with a more ethically enriched way of thinking about leadership,
which I will now consider in more depth.

3.5.2

Leadership

As we saw in chapter one, Arendt argues that the notion of the strong leader is a myth
since it is only through working with people that actions become accomplished. She
considers Nietzsche to be the first philosopher to understand fully how men gain pleasure
from control over others. It is by association with authority that she contends that a
person begins to experience a “feeling of superiority which comes from wielding
power.”
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Arendt is adamant that leadership should not be identified with a role but is

context specific - that is, whenever a group converges, a leader will emerge. This is an
organic way of thinking about leadership rather than one that is founded on hierarchy. It
stands in contrast to commonplace notions of leadership, which are based on a profound
unfairness which, as she demonstrates, serves to privilege the few over the many. But the
notion of the exceptional man or woman is incorrect because no-one can control the
outcome of her actions. We all need others to help us. For Arendt, it is the courageous
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act, rather than the person who enacts it, that is deemed worthy of greatness.
Accordingly, heroism means having the courage to take a stand publically. This is
something that everyone is capable of rather than the heroic few.
Arendt suggests that leadership functions best when it arises out of collective action
rather than being directed by a person in charge. Rather than a leader setting something in
motion for others to carry out, the leader’s success depends upon the assistance of others.
Seen in this light, a leader is no more than “primus inter pares, the first among his
peers.”
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It is not leadership that is dangerous to plurality, but leadership in the form of

mastery. It is important to note that for Arendt there is nothing wrong with power per se.
The problem is that we confuse the productive nature of power with the negative effects
of violence. Hence, power is always about potential, and derives from the collective
action of people.
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Conversely, tyranny arises whenever people are denied the basic

form of political organization - that is, speaking and acting together.
Seyla Benhabib distinguishes between Arendt’s notion of the agonistic and associational
public realm. The agonistic public realm constitutes, in Arendtian terms, a place where
excellence can be displayed. This competitive realm is one where people vie for
recognition to ensure that moral valour and political pre-eminence come to the fore. The
agonal space differentiates people. Benhabib makes the interesting observation that
Arendt’s description of the polis is a domestication of the war hero in favour of
Aristotle’s notion of the citizen who speaks and persuades. In so doing, Benhabib argues
that Arendt performs a feminist transformation of the violent hero into reasoned citizen.
In Arendt’s depiction of the associational public space, what is noteworthy is how
humans come together. Within the associational realm, for a short time, places turn into
sites of power, whenever people use speech and persuasion to consider future action,
such as a kitchen table where dissidents gather together to discuss political activity.
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In Arendt’s view, successful leadership is about collaboration through dialogue and
debate, rather than ruling through command and control. But too often the systems under
which we live are not conducive to human flourishing. We have seen how spontaneity is
suppressed when a society expects its inhabitants to conform. I want to conclude by
exploring ethical dilemmas involved within the modern context of bureaucratic life.

3.5.3

317

Bureaucracy

In The Origins of Totalitarianism, as I indicated earlier, Arendt discusses the connections
between race-based thinking and bureaucracy. What connects these seemingly disparate
ideas is the disregard for uniqueness. Within a bureaucracy, uniqueness is threatened
because each person is seen as expendable. Arendt regards bureaucracy as “the least
human and most cruel form of rulership,” because leaders refuse to take responsibility for
their actions, and encourage others to do likewise.
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There is a connection between

systems of bureaucracy and totalitarian-like ways of thinking since both function to
suppress plurality of viewpoints. Arendt also sees a negative correlation between
obedience and bureaucracy because together they work to deny uniqueness in favour of
conformity. Impersonal systems have a detrimental effect on those who attempt to
humanize them. Such systematic approaches to social life reinforce inequality because a
voiceless, autonomous way of life serves to deny, or suppress, individual expression.
As we saw in Burns’ critique of bureaucracy in chapter one, what is demanded in
bureaucracy is assent, not dissent. In response, people may feel alienated and refuse to
take responsibility for their actions, preferring to hide behind corporate policies and
institutional rules. One of the ways that we see this is with phrases such as “I’d like to
help but...” or “This is the way that it’s done here.” This lack of ownership is indicative
of how individuals lose their identity in the bureaucratic speech of the “they.”
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Thus what Arendt calls the no-man rule of bureaucracy is damaging to plurality and
uniqueness. Within the context of the work environment, plurality means not only that
everyone is permitted to speak, but that they are encouraged to express dissenting
opinions. In fact, the space of appearance can only be truly plural when people come
together in the knowledge that their contributions will be received with openness. Yet
such openness occurs infrequently within the modern workplace. This is partly due to the
hierarchical nature of bureaucracy, whereby institutions prefer conformity to freedom of
expression, but also because of a fear of reprisals on the part of many employees.
Without the freedom to dialogue and debate with one another, genuine engagement may
be curtailed. When the multiplicity of human expression is lost, so too is an ability for
genuine interaction.
For Arendt, each one of us has the capacity to reflect upon our actions. Yet, many times
we choose not to take the time to do this necessary reflection. She was enamoured with
the Socratic notion of the inner voice that guides us in the decisions that we make. This
inner relationship is not always one of concord. Rather, this inner voice represents an
internal dialogue that incorporates both thinking and judging. Not only does this mean
having confidence in one’s view but also leaving room for doubt. Doubting is a necessary
part of the thinking process because it enables us to bring to light alternative perspectives.
In many organizational settings, it becomes easier to go along with whatever bureaucratic
decision is made, rather than taking the time to figure out whether or not we agree. This
is part of the problem when action usurps thinking. For a robust public space, both have
to be in productive tension. But it also means that people must be willing to disregard a
leader’s request if it is considered unethical, and be willing to take a stand. Only then will
we be able to create more caring and thoughtful working environments that are not prone
to the alienation, mistrust and obtuseness common in bureaucratic and political life.

3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have compared the work of Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger as it
pertains to authenticity, ethical responsibility and leadership. I have contended that
Arendt enriches Heidegger’s concept of authenticity through her stress on uniqueness.
She shows that it is plurality, not singularity that is central to understanding existence.
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Arendt’s emphasis on natality demonstrates that it is life not death that is vital to
comprehending human existence. Each person’s uniqueness is crucial to an Arendtian
worldview. Such uniqueness has always to be tempered by a commitment to take self and
world into account.
For Arendt, a world built around the self is insufficient to ensure that we care for one
another, and can lead to a lack of genuine responsiveness. By contrast, uniqueness and
plurality represent the ethical foundation of our intricate web of human relationships. In
order to be ethically responsible, it is necessary to be willing to put forward one’s
viewpoint and, where necessary, make a judgement. If we do not, as Arendt shows us in
her depiction of the moral disintegration that took place in Nazi Germany, our
environment may alter without us noticing. When the public arena starts to disintegrate, it
becomes easier for people to refrain from taking a particular stance and behave as if they
were no more than cogs in a machine. This is dangerous because it leads to a lack of
personal responsibility. In its most dire form, in totalitarian regimes, it results in the
destruction of the common world. Without a shared, common world, there can be no
caring relationships. Arendt regards caring as a relationship between self and world,
defined by our respect for one another which we demonstrate through our actions. An
ethical approach as it relates to authenticity and leadership requires not just an internal
sense of purpose, but also receptiveness towards others. Part of this responsiveness
necessitates being willing to think from different perspectives than one’s own, as I hope
to show further in the final chapter. Before then, we will consider methodological
approaches to questions of phenomenology.
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Chapter 4

4

Troubling Method

In the last chapter, I concluded by suggesting that authenticity requires not just an
internal sense of purpose, but also a responsiveness towards others. Such a responsive
orientation necessitates being willing to think from different perspectives so as to enrich
one’s understanding. Arendt described this activity as “thinking without bannisters,”
which requires a person to move beyond the constraints of their own assumptions. As
part of my attempt to ‘think without bannisters,’ and enhance my understanding of the
connections among gender, authenticity and leadership, I conducted a qualitative study.
The main purpose of this chapter is to explain my qualitative approach, which is in the
tradition of existential hermeneutic phenomenology, coupled with a feminist orientation.
I have entitled this chapter “troubling method,” because I find distinctions between terms
such as “method,” “methodology,” and “theory” somewhat perplexing, as it is not always
clear to me where one begins and the other ends. While social scientists try to distinguish
between these concepts, I find it more difficult to do so. In thinking about this issue, I am
also concerned with how gaining knowledge of a technique – in this case
phenomenological methodology - informs my inquiry. Thus, troubling method is my
attempt to comprehend how my feminist orientation may enhance or restrict
phenomenological inquiry, and vice-versa.
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In thinking about the connection with feminism and phenomenology, I tried to find a
balance between these different perspectives. But this was no easy task. While feminist
phenomenology has found its voice, Linda Fisher questions whether feminist inquiry is as
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Anne Kinsella argues that many feminist commentators resist dualities such as theory/method.
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“noisy” as phenomenology.

320

She suggests that feminists need to “amplify” their voices

to critique and unsettle the phenomenological tradition. In this chapter, I hope to partially
answer Fisher’s “call to action” for feminist researchers to push phenomenology further in this particular case, so as to pursue the ways in which gender, authenticity and
leadership intersect.
When I first conducted my literature review, I discovered a paucity of research that
examined women’s experiences of leadership in relation to authenticity. This discovery
prompted me to conduct interviews as part of my overall inquiry. By examining
descriptive accounts provided by the women leaders whom I interviewed, together with
my socio-historical and philosophical inquiry, I hoped to provide a richer
conceptualization of what it might mean to lead authentically. This sums up my original
intent. In what follows, I discuss the actual unfolding of the qualitative component of the
research. Two questions in particular concern me. First, what were some assumptions that
I took for granted? Second, how does one’s epistemological orientation affect the manner
in which one employs a particular methodology? This chapter represents a going back
and forth between my original intent, my gradual understanding of phenomenology as a
methodology, and interviewing as a method of inquiry.
After reviewing my initial research intentions, I discuss theoretical and methodological
contestations as to what constitutes phenomenological research. Following this, I explore
feminist contentions regarding methodological inquiry. Throughout the chapter, I also
discuss Arendt’s approach to methodology. My aim is to offer insights into my approach,
and to discuss the ethical issues I encountered. In addition, I provide contextual
information regarding the interviews and the research participants. In the conclusion, I
circle back to ethical issues, and consider what I learned through the interview process
regarding what it means to me to conduct a feminist, phenomenological inquiry.
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Linda Fisher, “Feminist Phenomenological Voices.” Continental Philosophy Review, 43
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4.1 Phenomenology as Research Methodology
I chose to use hermeneutic, existential phenomenological inquiry as my methodological
approach as it fit with my overall theoretical framework, which focuses on the situated,
embodied nature of social life. In particular, I wanted to adopt the Arendtian concept to
‘think without bannisters,’ which she also describes as “visiting.” For Arendt, visiting
refers to the ability to try and think from different perspectives. This is not the same as
stepping into another person’s shoes. Rather, it represents a gathering of diverse
viewpoints to arrive at a more robust comprehension of the particular phenomenon under
question. Visiting entails coming close to some things, while at the same time moving
away from others. By visiting, one has to think from another place, and move beyond the
comfortable boundaries of a singular perspective. In Arendt’s preference for visiting as a
methodological approach, she has many intellectual companions. For instance, Arendt is
influenced by the Kantian notion of judgement from his Critique of Judgement, which
she regards as exemplary because it is based on a plurality of viewpoints.
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It is through

a diversity of views that she maintains we will be able to comprehend a phenomenon in a
fuller manner. The purpose of visiting, therefore, is to deepen one’s own perspective by
taking into account the perspectives of others.
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In so doing, we should, hopefully, arrive

at a richer understanding.
The problem I face is that Arendt rarely discusses methodology. Neither does she
explicate fully what she means by the term “visiting.”
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As I will show later, on the rare

occasions when Arendt does try to explain her approach, the result is somewhat
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contradictory, as I will demonstrate by looking at her response to the historian Eric
Voegelin’s negative review of The Origins of Totalitarianism. As Seyla Benhabib notes,
even in this response, Arendt’s description of her methodology is somewhat confusing.
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This may be partly due to what Benhabib sees as two distinctive threads weaving through
Arendt’s work. The first thread reveals the deep influence on her thinking of her friend,
the essayist Walter Benjamin.
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Arendt was predisposed to his method of looking to the

forgotten fragments of history in order to bring forth stories from the past that had been
erased so as to dislocate and dislodge commonplace thought. The second influence in her
work was that of phenomenological inquiry.
It is possible that Arendt’s sparse comments regarding her methodological approach may
be indicative of her claim that when we try to clarify what we are doing, we can only ever
achieve a partial understanding. However, it makes it difficult to discuss her methodology
adequately. Therefore, I turn to other theorists who wrote in the phenomenological
tradition. In the next section, I offer an overview of the different approaches to
phenomenological inquiry adopted by Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Maurice
Merleau-Ponty to show how these initial proponents had differences of opinion as to the
manner in which phenomenology should be conducted. As I will demonstrate, the
methodological disagreements between Husserl and Heidegger, in particular, continue to
divide scholars engaged in phenomenological, qualitative inquiry.

4.1.1

Edmund Husserl

Heidegger’s early work was indebted to his mentor and teacher Edmund Husserl, who
opened up phenomenology as a form of inquiry. A former mathematician, Husserl was
interested in how logical problems are affected by worldly conditions. One of his aims
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In her insightful essay on Benjamin, Arendt discusses how Benjamin kept a notebook full of
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reports such as that of a gas company in Vienna which in 1939 wanted to disconnect the gas
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was to distinguish phenomenology from other forms of scientific investigation. In Ideas
Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to Phenomenological Philosophy, published in
1913, Husserl maintains that researchers need to suspend their judgement so that the
phenomena under question are allowed to appear as they are. By bracketing off what he
describes as the natural attitude, Husserl argues it may be possible to grasp the essence of
a phenomenon such that everything significant about it could be described. In her
summation of Husserl’s approach in “What is Existential Philosophy,” Arendt describes
his project as a way to reconnect being and thought so as to re-envision a home in the
world for humankind from which they have become alienated.
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Central to Husserl’s

approach, she states, is that there is an intentional structure of consciousness. What this
means is that each conscious act is oriented toward something, that is, it must have an
object. Husserlian phenomenology is a way to gather together the pieces of the world,
and Arendt sees his project as providing a new foundation for humanism. What makes his
methodological approach of particular importance, she states, is that it represents a
rigorous attempt to free philosophy from the confines of Hegelian historicism. As such,
Husserl brought a new manner of thinking about the world through his emphasis on the
things themselves. The difficulty Arendt perceives with Husserl’s phenomenological
approach is that it turns man into what he can never be, that is, “the creator of the
world.”

4.1.2
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Martin Heidegger

In contrast to Husserl, Heidegger argued that it was impossible to bracket off one’s
attitude from one’s research. Instead, he insists that our moods affect how we orient
ourselves toward things. In Heidegger’s opinion, phenomenology is not a technique that
serves to characterize the “what” of an object; rather, it is an explanation of the “how” of
research. He maintains that phenomenology conducted in a hermeneutic manner must
move beyond metaphysical distinctions toward a deeper understanding of what it means
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to live in the world. Hence, phenomenological inquiry is a way to gain access to
ontology, which Heidegger regarded as the primary philosophical concern. In his view,
critical to the “methodological meaning of phenomenological description is
328

interpretation.”

In conducting a hermeneutic phenomenological inquiry, a researcher must be able to
“intuitively” grasp a phenomenon’s meaning. But this is no simple task since a researcher
might fail to grasp the original meaning of a phenomenon. Sometimes, this is because
semblances of a phenomenon are misconstrued as the phenomenon itself. For example, a
sore throat might indicate tonsillitis, or it could be a viral infection, or something more
serious, such as meningitis. Each symptom does not show the illness as “is,” but reveals
itself only in semblances. Because of this revealing as semblance, researchers must be
careful not to misconstrue the essence of something by assuming that what appears on the
surface constitutes its “meaning and ground.”
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Another way that a researcher may misconstrue phenomena relates to how what was once
apparent might become concealed over time. An example of this concealment might be
how eugenics, in the early twentieth century, was widely regarded - by intellectuals and
members of the general public - as an indication of the superiority of the white race.
Because of a change in what is deemed socially acceptable, there may be people who still
believe in eugenics, but few who are willing to speak about their beliefs publicly. This
kind of concealment is, in Heidegger’s opinion, most pernicious since there is a
possibility of being misled by the false opinion of someone. It is also possible for a
phenomenon to have once been regarded as genuine, but to have become commonplace.
This is because, in Heideggerian terms, things get taken up by the "they.” As such,
phenomena may lose their intrinsic, or unique, value.
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In addition, as I discussed in
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As I explained in chapter three, for Heidegger, ‘the they,’ or ‘the they self’ refers to a readymade way of approaching the world. This can lead to a way of being whereby we no longer judge
for ourselves, because we allow others to do that for us.
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detail in chapter three, Heidegger’s work led him to search for a fundamental ontology
that would explain what it meant to be in the world. In his view, phenomenology is not a
school where you can learn the right technique, but is rather an individual way of
thinking.
There are other major thinkers in the phenomenological tradition, as we will see in the
case of Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

4.1.3

Maurice Merleau-Ponty

Blending an existential approach with phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty contends that the
purpose of phenomenology is to put “essences back into existence.”331 In his early work,
such as the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty was drawn to Husserl’s
discussion of the Lebenswelt, or life-world. In his later work, such as The Visible and the
Invisible, his thought is influenced by Heidegger.
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Truth, for Merleau-Ponty, cannot be

separated from the world because “there is no inner man, man is in the world, and only in
the world does he know himself.”333 Hence, we make sense of who we are through being
in the world, not through self-knowledge. Further, his notion of embodiment is
intersubjective, since it is through our actions within the world of others that we
understand ourselves. Here we note a similarity with Arendt. Both scholars argue that
knowledge of the world can be obtained from each person’s particular perspective. Such
“unique” knowledge is always worldly. Where Arendt and Merleau-Ponty differ,
however, is in the stress they place on different existential aspects of being-in-the-world.
For Merleau-Ponty, the body provides us with a perceptual framework from which to
better understand how interpretation is an embodied pursuit. For Arendt, the emphasis is
on relationality, and how each individual manifests herself through action.
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To sum up, for Husserl, phenomenology is a descriptive method that allows us to let
things show themselves as they are. Alternatively, for Heidegger, phenomenological
inquiry cannot be separated from interpretation. The central difference between
Heidegger and Husserl relates to whether it is possible to bracket off one’s prejudices, as
Husserl maintained, or whether interpretation is a fundamental aspect of phenomenology
inquiry, as Heidegger suggested. By contrast, Merleau-Ponty was chiefly concerned with
embodiment as the obscured ground of thinking.
With this brief review of the main tenets of phenomenological thought, I now want to
consider Arendt’s approach to methodology in more detail. Then, I will look at some of
the ways that qualitative researchers have taken up these different approaches to
phenomenological inquiry.

4.2 Ethical Quandaries
Arendt often stated that the reason she wrote was to understand. As part of her
methodological approach, she was concerned with isolating specific phenomenon across
different historical periods to show why a phenomenon emerged at a particular time, as
we saw in her exploration of totalitarianism. Yet, as I mentioned earlier, it is only on rare
occasions that Arendt discusses her particular methodological approach. One such
instance is her “Reply to Eric Voegelin,” where she argued that questions of method and
philosophical implications are interconnected.
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In his review of The Origins of

Totalitarianism, Voegelin stated that Arendt’s book lacked conceptual unity. In her
response to his review, she argued it was not her purpose to provide coherence. Rather,
her aim was to reveal totalitarianism’s main aspects, and to analyse the components of
totalitarianism historically.
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But Arendt found herself in an ethical quandary since she

was bringing to light elements of a phenomenon that she found abhorrent. While she
argues that the purpose of historiography is to preserve something for posterity,
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preserving totalitarianism was the last thing she wanted to do. At the same time, she
reasoned that to comprehend the full extent of totalitarianism, it was necessary to reveal
how it was distinct from other forms of ruling.
While Arendt concurs with Vogelin’s assertion that she is concerned with the
philosophical implications of totalitarianism, she argues that her approach begins with
facts. As we saw in chapter three, Arendt maintains that the rise in totalitarianism was a
direct result of a loss of consent between people in modernity as a result of the waning of
tradition, religion and authority. What distinguishes modernity from earlier times is that
there are fewer common interests that gather people together.
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This gathering together

results in common consent or inter-est, which has a dual function in that it connects
people while, at the same time, distinguishes them from each other. What made
totalitarianism so heinous was that these regimes attempted to destroy human freedom in
a manner never witnessed before. While there had always been immense cruelty in the
world, Arendt argued, totalitarianism is different in that it tried to eradicate humanity
from people through organized means of terror, such as the concentration camps. In
taking away a person’s dignity, totalitarian leaders were trying to show how some people
were superfluous. Furthermore, the imposition of one perspective, that is the leader,
aimed to deny plurality of perspectives. These aspects of totalitarianism, together with the
aim of world domination, Arendt maintains, make it phenomenologically distinct from
other forms of rule.
In her response to Voegelin, Arendt also states that generalization is a problem for the
historical and political sciences, since oversimplification results in phenomenological
distinctions being covered over in favour of arguments about causality. Rather than
seeing what is new about a particular phenomenon, scholars try to explain it by drawing
analogies. She regards this practice as emblematic of a particular approach that confuses
knowledge with understanding. The only way it is possible to comprehend phenomena, in
Arendt’s view, is to investigate why they appear at particular times, and ascertain what it
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is that makes them unique. It is through the discernment of a phenomenon’s particularity
that we will be able to make sense of it. This discernment requires us to use our
imagination, which represents our “inner compass.”337
In reasoning why she approached the topic of totalitarianism in such a passionate manner,
Arendt maintains that passion was methodologically necessary given her subject matter.
To describe what took place under totalitarian rule in a dispassionate way would, in her
view, be comparable to explaining the abject poverty of the British working classes in the
Industrial Revolution without showing indignation at human suffering. Similarly, by not
showing righteous anger when confronted with the despicable conditions of the
concentration camps, Arendt argues, would be akin to removing this phenomenon from
its social context.”338 Rather than showing disinterest, this passionate approach
underscores her belief that each one of us brings something new to our research. What we
see here from Arendt’s discussion of her methodological approach is her belief that
phenomenology requires a researcher to be willing to engage with passion in her topic.
Furthermore, she shows us how important it is to differentiate seemingly similar events.
Now that we have a sense of the different approaches to phenomenological research, I
want to discuss how those different approaches are taken up in qualitative research.

4.3 Qualitative Approaches to Phenomenological Inquiry
While there is general agreement amongst qualitative phenomenological researchers as to
the importance of providing rich descriptions concerning a particular phenomenon or
aspect of lived experience, Linda Fisher argues there is great debate about how
phenomenological research is carried out.
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She regards this debate as healthy, however,

there are times when criticism turns into confusion, especially as it concerns what
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constitutes “sound” phenomenological research. Much of this debate, according to Fisher,
stems from the different approaches adopted by Husserlian versus Heideggerian inspired
researchers. For example, a common disagreement concerns whether or not the individual
researcher can “bracket off” their individual biases.
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When a researcher states that they

have bracketed off or transcended their assumptions, and then uses hermeneutics as their
approach, she regards their research as muddled because it combines two distinctive
phenomenological traditions.
A further disagreement concerns how explicit researchers should be about how their
embodied subjectivity affects their work. This can be a problem for novice researchers
who, according to Fisher, misunderstand how the Husserlian process of bracketing off
represents an initial step whereby “subjective bias is acknowledged as part of the project
to establish the rigor and validity of the research.”
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Thinkers in the Heideggerian

tradition, conversely, regard openness to bias as an essential component of research. She
argues that research can only be considered phenomenological if it offers an evocative
description of lived experience that includes the researcher adopting an open attitude to
her research. Fisher takes a practical approach to inquiry, arguing that researchers should
tailor their approach to their specific audience, since it is only when the reader feels
moved in some way by the research in question that it can be said to be successful as a
phenomenological exercise.
Divergence of opinion can also be seen in the debate between whether phenomenology is
connected with modernism or postmodernism. Fisher notes that while phenomenology
was originally linked to modernism in that it is an exploration of human subjectivity,
some researchers regard phenomenology as similar to postmodernist thought especially
the notion that the meaning of any phenomenon is unstable and shifts across time and
place. Fisher maintains that it really depends upon how one conceives of these terms. If
postmodernism means critical reflexiveness, then phenomenology would fit into that
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rubric. However, if it means that there is no self, only language, then this runs contrary to
phenomenology’s focus on subjective, lived experience.
An additional bone of contention amongst qualitative researchers relates to what it means
to ‘read between the lines’ in a transcript. For instance, Husserlian researchers like
Amedeo Giorgio contend that phenomenologists must focus solely on the descriptive
account. He also maintains that an active imagination is crucial to Husserlian
phenomenological inquiry.

342

An inquiry into a particular phenomenon may arise from

either a fictional or factual source. What is crucial is that the researcher describes a
particular aspect of the phenomenon. In Giorgio’s view, what is important is that the
descriptions are meaningful.

343

He suggests that a critical component of Husserlian-

inspired qualitative phenomenology is to focus on the descriptive account so as to gain a
deeper understanding of a particular phenomenon.
In considering the problems qualitative researchers face when trying to retain the richness
of lived experience, Les Todres argues that the roots of this dilemma can be traced to
Aristotle, who held that the form of something cannot be said to exist unless it can be
perceived in a particular manner.344 There are two main problems that arise in qualitative
research. On the one hand, there is a danger in focussing too much on the general
structure of a particular phenomenon, because one may lose what is specific to individual
experience. On the other hand, remaining too close to the idiosyncratic might obscure
what is typical about a particular experience. Todres also contends that scholars position
their research as a dialogue, and that researchers ground phenomenological inquiry in
embodiment. (Here we see how much he is influenced by Merleau-Ponty.) By conducting
phenomenology in an embodied way, Todres maintains that it may be possible to “evoke
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the presence of human phenomena.”345 This kind of embodied inquiry is a way to move
toward an open stance that is respectful of differences.
What is critical is that a researcher’s description brings to mind something meaningful for
the reader. Todres encourages researchers to bring “texture” back to structure as the
“thicker” the description, the more the reader will be able to feel a sense of connection
with what has been expressed. Such a rich description needs to work on different levels:
it needs to be understood intuitively as well as being comprehended intellectually. Yet,
because each reader is a unique individual, it is unlikely that every descriptive account
will appeal to every reader. Just as writers have their own way of writing so, too, will
readers understand in different ways. For instance, I may think that by sharing a
particular description, I have provided the reader with insight into the notion of
authenticity. It is quite possible that this description may open up questions of gender
dynamics for one person, while another reader may find the account of little interest. I
cannot know this ahead of time. This is where Todres’s idea that we should write “in a
language that aims to elicit empathy and participation in the reader” 346 is somewhat
problematic. Empathy is a term that Arendt, like Heidegger, took issue with insofar as
both viewed an empathetic stance as a desire for control. One problem with empathy is
that it suggests that we begin as separate selves and have to bridge this separation in our
relations with others. But it is not always clear to me where a sympathetic stance ends,
and an empathetic mindset begins.
Hermeneutic research requires us to bring our prejudices into the open. Yet Liz Smythe
contends that most academic discourse silences prejudices. In her words, “[i]n academia
what is silenced, missing and taken-for-granted is all that is already in our thinking.”
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Hermeneutic phenomenology requires the researcher to try, as much as possible, to
outline prejudices prior to the research. By tarrying with things, as Heidegger might say,
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one gains insight not only into the words themselves but also our own interpretation of
them. The connection between understanding and qualitative inquiry is, according to
Anne Kinsella, because researchers are interested in comprehending different facets of
lived experience.

348

As most qualitative researchers are concerned with questions of

understanding and interpretation, Kinsella argues that such research is implicitly
hermeneutic. In her view, qualitative research constitutes a co-mingling since a
hermeneutic inquiry requires the researcher to be willing to think with head and heart so
as to be open to questioning. She also suggests that when the researcher adopts an open
stance, the reader may discover something about the researcher that the latter did not
anticipate. The researcher cannot know ahead of time what they reveal to another since, if
we agree with Arendt, we are unable to see ourselves in the way that others do. That
being said, each researcher, in taking up the same methodology, will have a different
manner of approach, because their life experiences will influence their work in some
way.
These issues are not only pertinent to phenomenology but also to feminist concerns
regarding qualitative inquiry, as I will now demonstrate.

4.4 Voicing our Opinion(s): Feminist Concerns
The desire for a feminist method, in Sandra Harding’s perspective, arose from a need to
correct distorted accounts produced by traditional methodologies.

349

She maintains it is

necessary to distinguish method from methodology. For Harding, method relates to a
particular way of assembling evidence or a technique, while methodology is an approach
to inquiry. In drawing these distinctions, she claims there are three categories of method.
The first category is interviewing people; next is observing people’s behavior; and the
final method is examining historical documents. Arguing against a specific feminist
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method, Harding contends that preoccupation with method may overlook more important
questions concerning how we live in the world.
Methodology, in Harding’s view, represents a theoretical approach to the way in which
research should be undertaken. She states that many social scientists, because of their
training, do not consider the theoretical assumptions behind their methodological
approaches. Rather, social scientists tend to perceive methodological issues in relation to
specific methods. Thus, a common approach taken by social scientists is to address
methodological issues when they teach methods courses. By contrast, philosophers tend
to raise methodological and epistemological issues when they talk about scientific
method. In her opinion, neither of these ways of thinking is robust enough; hence, it is
necessary for feminists to devise different approaches.
While there are valuable connections to be made among epistemology, methodology and
research method, Harding suggests it is not by concentrating on the latter that we will
ascertain what is distinctive about feminist research. When considering questions of
epistemology, feminists have shown how theories of knowledge have often taken “man”
as the arbiter of knowledge. This male-centeredness has led to a narrowness of thinking
about how we live in the world. As we saw in chapter one, some leadership scholars
maintain that disciplines like organizational studies are saturated with a particular kind of
masculinity. Harding contends that feminist analyses can enrich methodological accounts
by revealing how women’s ways of being in the world differ - not only from each other but also from traditional male accounts of a particular phenomenon.
New ways of thinking about methodology, such as that provided by Dorothy Smith’s
sociology for women,
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provide researchers with a different means of looking at aspects

of lived experience that were previously ignored. She shows how women’s experiences
of a phenomenon offer a different perspective, one which has often been obscured. As we
saw in chapter one, Smith maintains that it is not enough for women to become leaders of
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institutions, because it does not deal with structural limitations that affect a leader’s
ability to connect with people in a caring manner. Instead, it is important to adopt
methodological and empirical approaches that serve to destabilize existing organizational
structures. In this way, we may obtain a richer comprehension of how hierarchical
relations dominate our lives. For example, Smith’s conception of the ‘relations of
ruling,’
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understood as the myriad ways in which organizational structures and systems

of power are interconnected, offers a means to understand how gender relations are
impacted in the workplace. It is noteworthy that few researchers have placed gender at
the forefront of their inquiry into the relationship between authenticity and leadership.
Yet a focus on gender may offer insights that are otherwise overlooked.

352

In the past, some second-wave feminist writers argued that all women’s voices have been
silenced. This contention is somewhat misleading, however, since it fails to show how
silence is experienced differently, depending upon a woman’s social location. As Linda
Alcoff points out, it is important to develop research approaches that help mitigate power
imbalances between the researcher and interview participant.

353

Thus, we need to

consider how the perspective of the situated knower influences how we conduct our
research. For example, when interviews are conducted with a lack of understanding of
cultural difference, this can lead to a distorted version of the experiences of others. In
trying to alleviate power inequities, Lugones and Spelman suggest that researchers
become friends with their interviewees for “only when genuine and reciprocal dialogue
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takes place between ‘outsiders’ and ‘insiders’ can we trust the outsider’s account.”

354

When interviewing people, it is important for feminist researchers to try and develop an
atmosphere of friendship and openness. In their opinion, a vital component of human life
is talking about personal experiences, since being silenced is a form of oppression. It is
vital, therefore, that researchers be cognizant of the power relations between researcher
and interview subject, and how their methodological and theoretical approach may work
to silence others.
While I concur that a researcher must be responsible for her actions, the problem is that
in the interview process things unfold in the moment. There is little time to reflect on
one’s responses, other than giving oneself a metaphorical “kick in the shins” on those
occasions when one interrupts someone. This is where practice and theory diverge
because, no matter how good one’s intentions might be, there is an inherent
unpredictability in the research process. There are times when things just go awry. I will
return to this point in due course. But at this juncture I want to turn to consider
interviewing in greater detail.

4.4.1

Interviewing

When researchers do not consider how theory influences praxis, according to Kathryn
Roulston, it may lead to under-theorized and poor quality interview data.
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This is why

she maintains it is important before embarking on interviews to consider how theory and
practice interconnect. Theorizing about a particular methodology might involve
considering how the data is to be collected, the role of the interviewer, which participants
are chosen, the theory underpinning the interviews, and how the final conclusions may be
judged.
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In Roulston’s view, theory is a process whereby we construct concepts and

354

Maria Lugones and Elizabeth Spelman, “Have We Got a Theory for You! Feminist Theory,
Cultural Imperialism and the Demand for “The Woman’s Voice,” Women’s Studies International
Forum, 6, no. 6 (1983): 573-581.
355

Kathryn Roulston, Reflective Interviewing: A Guide to Theory & Practice, (London: Sage,
2010), 2.
356

Roulston, Reflective Interviewing, 2.

144

ideas about the world. In relation to interviews, the purpose of such theorizing is to
consider, ahead of time, what issues relate to one’s research design.

357

When conducting a phenomenological qualitative study, Sandra Thomas and Howard
Pollio maintain that there are two important criteria in relation to eligibility. First, the
participant must have some experience of the particular phenomenon being studied, and
second, the participant must be willing to talk about the phenomenon.

358

While some

researchers argue for multiple interviews, Thomas and Pollio contend that this is not
necessary providing that the interviewer has done preliminary interviews to test her
questions, and become aware of her own presuppositions.

359

In addition, they argue that

the ideal number for a phenomenological study is between eight to twelve participants.360
For Heideggerian-inspired researchers like Patricia Benner, interpretation is an
inescapable component of the research process. She regards learning the
phenomenological method as akin to literary criticism because the researcher is searching
for different meanings that can be substantiated by the text in question.361 Benner argues
there are three narrative strategies that need to be taken into account. These are paradigm
cases; thematic analyses and exemplars. In paradigm cases, the interview is read for a
global understanding after which certain topics or events are selected for a more detailed
analysis. When you have the paradigm case, it is then necessary to test it against another
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case to see whether similar concerns manifest themselves. Conversely, in a thematic
analysis, you look for patterns across interviews, moving between parts and the whole of
the text. Once you have identified paradigm cases and themes, then exemplars need to be
discovered that display similarities or dissimilarities. Stories will come through that act as
exemplars that capture important meanings.
So we see that there are different ways of reading the text or, in my case, interview
transcripts, because meaning flows from an array of traditions, contexts, and
experiences.

362

It is necessary to consider specific incidents or concerns, rather than

opinions or ideology. Benner maintains that phenomenology is different from a Marxist
‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ or a psychoanalytic reading that tries to reveal the underlying
truth, because phenomenology tries to examine pre-understandings and to confront
otherness, silence and commonalities. This includes the researcher's pre-understanding.
Indeed, she argues that having research questions challenged is part of the process. In this
regard, my own research questions altered over time as a result of conversations with
others. Through discussions, I realised that I needed to develop research questions that
were sufficiently broad to allow for diverse opinions to emerge. For example, my initial
questions were often couched as “why” questions, but with careful guidance, I realized
that to obtain rich descriptive accounts, I needed to couch my questions in a “how” rather
than “why” framework. Furthermore, it is the task of the researcher is to keep oriented to
the thing in question - in my case, how senior women leaders experience authentic
leadership, or lack thereof, in a university environment. Ideally, both interviewee and
interviewer are involved in deciding whether this description is faithful to experience. I
will return to this point in due course.
When conducting phenomenological research, Max Van Manen contends that it is
important to keep each of the four existentials, that is, spatiality, corporeality, temporality

146

363

and relationality in mind.

I thought about how I might do this as I was putting the

research questions together, as well as when I was going through the transcripts looking
for themes. Spatiality represents an important component of how we interact with one
another. I considered spatiality by asking research participants to describe instances
where they felt most comfortable leading and, conversely, to describe those times where
they felt ill at ease. A good example of this from the interview accounts is Dianne’s
description of the feeling of “shrinking” when she has found herself in situations where
she felt unable to speak out. (I will discuss Dianne’s account in more depth in chapter
five.)
Corporeality represents the second existential, and refers to how our interactions are
always embodied. In relation to corporeality, I asked participants to describe any physical
or emotional sensations they experienced when they felt they were acting in a manner
that they perceived as true to themselves, or in an inauthentic way. Most interviewees
described a recurring physical sensation they experienced such as a tightening of the
chest, a sickening feeling in the pit of the stomach, or a painful headache, that overcame
them in difficult situations. It appears that these recurring embodied signals serve as a
reminder that something about a particular situation made them feel uneasy in some way.
It is interesting to note, however, that two of the women I interviewed reported no bodily
sensations in relation to leadership. I sensed that neither of them was keen on answering
the question. I am not sure what to make of this other than to wonder whether they have
trained themselves in a way that they do not pick up on bodily cues.
Temporality, the third existential, is non-linear because past, present and future are
interwoven. Over time, some experiences take on greater meaning, while others recede
into the background. There were many examples from the interviews that relate to how
past events have an influence on present and future action. One of the most poignant was
Jill’s description of being made homeless when her mother became sick, and she lost her
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job. This experience of living on the street influenced not only her current research on
prisoners’ rights but Jill’s desire to try and be responsive to others in her leadership.
The fourth existential, relationality, can be seen from the diverse examples that interview
participants offer of others who influenced their own thinking about authenticity and
leadership. Some interview participants described mentors they had worked with, or how
they tried to encourage others to be successful. Several women also mentioned the effect
particular actions by their mothers had on their desire to lead. The stories that they told
about an event in their childhood seemed of especial significance to them.
I want to turn now to consider why narrative might be important to understanding.

4.5 Narrative
For Arendt, storytelling is intrinsic to comprehending lived experience, since it is through
narrative that we make sense of our lives. Hence, storytelling makes us aware of the
material reality that abstract theory overlooks. Each person has a narrative that is unique
to them, although, as I pointed out in chapter one, she was adamant that we can never be
the author of our life story, which can only be told in full after our death. As action is
ephemeral, we need storytellers to record and memorialize what occurred. In her words:
without action to bring into the play of the world the new beginning ... there
is nothing new; without speech to materialize and memorialize the new things
that appear and shine forth, there is no remembrance, without the enduring
permanence of a human artifact, there cannot be any remembrance of things
that are to come with those that shall come after.
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Narrative gathers together the two aspects fundamental to an Arendtian notion of
subjectivity, that is, action and speech. While Heidegger’s authenticity is a silent
repudiation of communication with others, according to Jacques Taminiaux, Arendt
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views narrative as revealing.365 Arendt did not approve of autobiography, for example,
because it went against her assertion that it was the task of the storyteller, not the actor, to
remember a person’s life. Thus, it is the spectator as narrator who is able to tell another
person’s life-story.
Storytelling, as Julia Kristeva notes, offers Arendt a way to re-create the connection
between philosophy and politics that was lost following the death of Socrates.
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She

perceives Arendt’s conception of narrative as a radical response to Heidegger’s attempt to
essentialize and rationalize being. Unlike philosophers, Arendt argues that storytellers are
able to put themselves into the minds of others without taking a definitive stance. The
reason why storytellers are essential is because we have a plurality of viewpoints from
which to assess a particular action.

367

For actions to have meaning there must always be a

spectator to engage and respond. Thus, for Arendt, it is not through self-knowledge that
we understand what it means to exist but through our interactions with one another.
Consequently, we need others to interpret our actions through storytelling and
remembrance. From an Arendtian perspective, stories are plural in the sense that they are
multiple, but also unique in that they belong to someone.
While Arendt sometimes apologized for using storytelling to advance her argument, Lisa
Disch maintains this was somewhat disingenuous because storytelling allowed Arendt to
make a judgement. Storytelling is always an interpretation of events; hence, Disch
suggests that we need to be wary of making essentialist arguments or calling for a
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privileged standpoint through narrative.

368

One problem with narrative descriptions is

that stories can be taken literally because of what is supposedly “authentic” content.
I want to pause here to consider the implications of this claim. Does it follow that one
person’s account is worth less than multiple perspectives? I ask because, at first glance,
Arendt’s notion of common-sense judgement suggests that a group would have access to
more diverse opinions than a single person. These multiple voices offer a more rounded
view of the world. Yet one could argue that the dissenting opinion is equally valid,
because it takes courage to voice an opinion in opposition from the group. Such courage
is central to Arendt’s notion of heroism for, in speaking up against the will of the many, it
shows bravura. What appears on the surface to be a plurality of perspectives may be no
more than a tacit acceptance of an idea put forward by the most forceful personality in the
group. Without open dialogue and dissent, people may become mired in “group think,”
which has a negative effect on people’s ability to come forward with an alternative
perspective. Argumentation is important for it allows different people to voice their
understanding of an issue, and brings forth a deeper engagement. Arendt refers to the
“interspace” or “inter-est” as the public arena, where a multiplicity of opinions are heard
and considered.
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Intrinsic to such a multifaceted arena is the place for discord. Hence,

dispute and conflict are a necessary component of any political space if plurality is to
flourish. But too often this dissenting voice is marginalized, or even silenced, as in the
case of totalitarianism.
In her work, Arendt tries to grasp the significance of phenomena through the lens of
situated experience. Arendt’s predilection for storytelling is not, in Disch’s opinion,
because she views it as a way to pass on tradition, nor as a way to express oneself.
Rather, the storyteller, through the framework of visiting, is involved in a “practice of
situated critical thinking.”
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This practice requires the researcher to be willing to “think
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without banisters,” a phrase Arendt used repeatedly to underscore how thinking is an
371

individual pursuit.

It is important for the researcher to consider what it is about the

phenomenon that she finds meaningful.
In considering the centrality of narrative to Arendt’s work, Veronica Vasterling suggests
that the purpose of storytelling is to ensure that there is a space where individuals feel
able to participate.

372

While science and philosophy are useful for the establishment of

facts, she argues that these knowledge routes cannot make sense of the world in the way
narrative does. Even qualitative research is not rich enough, in Vasterling’s view, to offer
the depth of understanding that can be gleaned from a good story.

373

This is because the

primary aim of most social science is to clear away the ambiguity and complexity of
phenomena in favour of a consistent pattern. We have seen this tendency in the way that
leadership scholars define authentic leadership through four dimensions: balanced
information processing, relational transparency, self-awareness and internalized moral
perspective. What this desire for consistency may lead to is uniformity of meaning. Such
uniformity may serve to obscure what is meaningful about a phenomenon, because we
focus on similarities instead of particularity. In a phenomenological exploration both
must be kept in view.
Furthermore, Vasterling expresses concern that storytelling is being undermined by
scientific studies conducted by experts. When expert accounts take over from narrative,
all that we are left with is rationalization, which may serve to suppress the “intangible
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web of human affairs.”

374

The problem with rationalization is that expert accounts tend to

privilege a particular mode of being over others. Expert accounts may result in the
privileging of one voice over others. In doing so, we lose a plurality of perspectives, and
the deeper understanding a multiplicity of accounts offers.
To sum up, I have suggested that Arendt places high esteem on narrative since it allows
us to memorialize action. We have seen that it is the role of the storyteller to recount the
story; whose wider perspective enables her to see in a manner that the actor cannot. Now
I want to turn to a discussion of the interview process, participant recruitment and
extracts from field notes to shed light on how I carried out the qualitative component of
this phenomenological inquiry.

4.5.1

Research Participants/Recruitment

Participants were recruited for this study in three ways. First, I sent an email to university
Presidents, Vice-Presidents or their equivalent that belonged, like I did, to an
organization called Women’s Education Worldwide. Second, I used a snowballing
technique where I discussed my research with eligible candidates and asked them
whether they wished to take part in the study, or knew of anyone else who might like to
be involved who fit the profile - that is female, senior-level administrators, preferably
Presidents, Vice-Presidents, or equivalent, who worked in the higher education sector. In
the end, ten women took part in the study. These women leaders, when interviewed,
worked in three different countries - The United States, Canada, and The Philippines. As
well, two research participants came from the Caribbean – one from Trinidad, and the
other from Jamaica.
Most of the women I interviewed had worked in universities for several decades, and the
majority had been faculty members before moving into administrative roles. Two
interview participants had worked in the corporate sector before embarking upon a
university career. Five women had extensive experience leading at least one educational
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institution. The other women leaders were in charge of major portfolios such as academic
planning, external relations and student services. The participants’ ages ranged from early
forties to early seventies. In addition, research participants came from a variety of
disciplinary backgrounds in the humanities, social and applied sciences. Below is a table
that gives salient details about each research participant, followed by a brief description
of each leader.

Name

Role

Age

Country of Origin

Alison

Leadership Director/Vice-

50s

America

President
Claire

President (recently retired)

60s

America

Dianne

Vice-President

40s

America

Jane

Associate Vice-Provost

50s

America

Jennifer

Former Director, Diaspora

60s

Trinidad

Centre and Dept Chair
Jill

President

50s

America

Kate

President

50s

Canada

Laura

International Project

60s

Jamaica

Leader/Vice-President
Olive

President (former)

70s

America

Teresa

President

60s

The Philippines
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Alison developed the leadership program in her university and is also a freelance
consultant. She has extensive experience in the corporate world before moving to the
educational sector.
Claire recently retired from her role as President of a women’s college. She has extensive
experience in the university sector in a variety of administrative roles in North America
and France.
Dianne is a Vice-President of a large women’s college. Previously, she worked in a
similar role at a large university. Dianne was the youngest person interviewed.
Jane is an Associate Provost at a major institution. A full professor, she has been at her
current university for more than two decades.
Jill is the President of a women’s college in the United States. Previously, she was VicePresident in a major university.
Jennifer was recently Chair of an institute dedicated to Diaspora Studies, and has also
served two terms as Chair of Department. She lives in The United States but is originally
from Trinidad.
Kate is President of a large educational institution in a major metropolis. This is her first
job as a President. Previously she held various administrative posts including the role of
Vice-President.
Laura was a Vice-President of a major Ivy League university. She currently works at a
black college in the United States. At 68, she is the second oldest person interviewed.
Olive has extensive experience leading co-ed and single sex institutions. She is now a
Professor at an Ivy League institution, and was the oldest person interviewed.
Teresa was, until recently, the President of a large university in The Philippines. She has
also worked in North America for the World Bank.

154

4.5.2

The Interviews

Due to financial constraints, with the exception of one interview conducted via SKYPE,
interviews were conducted on the telephone. I found that the lack of visual stimuli helped
me to concentrate. While this might seem to go against a phenomenological account of
perceptual encounters, perhaps what I was experiencing was a different kind of bodily
experience, one that centered on auditory perception. These auditory encounters worked
well for me because, as a visual learner, I often find there are too many visual cues.
Conversely, with the telephone, and the concentration that is required to do a successful
interview, there were few distractions. The lack of visual cues, however, meant that there
may have been physical responses to particular questions that I could not see that would
also have been pertinent to this inquiry.
Most interviews took place in the semi-darkness of my bedroom. In my bedroom, the
telephone rests on a table, adjacent to the bed, and in front of a blank wall. When I was
carrying out the interviews, I would face that wall. To my left, there was light coming
through the gap at the bottom of the door, yet, I could not see outside. This was
purposeful on my part to help with concentration, and to cut down on distractions caused
by external noise. There was something about this semi-dark space that offered comfort,
not least, I suspect, because the interview took “place” in my bedroom, a space where I
felt safe. This sense of spatial belonging helped me to alleviate the anxiety I felt as a
humanities scholar carrying out interviews. But I also believe this spatial comfort aided
my learning process. Indeed, I was surprised at how quickly I became used to the role of
interviewer. I do not think that I would have gained as much confidence if the interviews
had been conducted in another person’s favourite space. While the research participants
chose the date and time for the interview, I had that feeling of comfort that comes from
being in a room of one’s own. Similarly the women whom I interviewed were able to
choose a place that felt comfortable to them. In some cases, this was their work office; in
others, it was their home.
I began each interview by asking the participant what name she wished me to call her as a
way to establish a sense of connection. In each case, the participants told me to call them
by their first name. I then asked two questions asking them to describe what the term
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“authenticity” meant to them, and what the term “authentic leadership” brought to
mind.

375

I sensed that interview participants had been expecting questions like these

because they often had answers at the ready. Several research participants spoke about
their lack of knowledge of the term “authentic leadership.” When this occurred, I tried to
put the woman at ease by explaining that it was her experience of leading that I was
interested in, rather than her academic knowledge of the term. As we moved further into
the interview, people often said things like “now I see what you’re getting at,” or “I guess
I do know more about this than I thought.” It was as if, through the interview process, we
were bringing to light an understanding that was already present but that the interviewee
had not previously recognized. This seems to me an example of the way that the
phenomenological approach functions to reveal a comprehension of a particular concept
that the person already had, but of which they may not have been aware.
I had a specific question in my study that elicited stories from research participants with
regard to how their personal narrative influences their desire to lead in a manner that they
perceived as true to themselves. On several occasions, interviewees described instances
where their mothers had played influential roles in instilling not only a sense of doing
right, but a belief that they could lead. These stories, which I discuss in detail in chapter
five, bring to light experiences and understandings that have been ignored. Through the
interviews, I discovered that four of the women came from working-class, low-income
households. The dimension of class enriched the study. Further, three interviewees selfidentified as women of colour. Their insights into racial issues deepened my
understanding of some of the complexities surrounding race, gender and leadership.
Occasionally, during an interview, a research participant mentioned religion. For
example, one woman described how Buddhist thought influenced her ideas about
authenticity. Two other participants mentioned Christianity. One of these participants was
enthusiastic about her early leadership experiences in her church. The other participant
who mentioned religion was less enthusiastic. In this woman’s case, she described how
oppressed she had felt growing up by her father’s change of vocation from lawyer to
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parish priest. She spoke of the disjuncture between the sermons preached in church, and
her home life that she described as difficult to reconcile. For some women whom I
interviewed, it appears that religion provided an early path to thinking about authenticity
and leadership. For others, religion served to reinforce patriarchal systems of oppression.
Turning to the practice of interviewing, on the one hand, an interview is similar to a
conversation in that there is an oscillation between questioner and respondent. On the
other hand, it is different since the interviewer sets the pace with the questions she poses.
The researcher has an unfair advantage in that she knows the questions because she has
the research guide in front of her. In some ways, this restricts the conversation by its
linearity. While having research questions close at hand afforded me comfort, I can also
see that it is a type of control, a way of unnaturally steering a conversation in a certain
direction any time the discussion goes too far afield.
In my case, there was also the added experience of dealing with elites, and how this could
influence the process. For example, when interview participants began asking me
questions, I became a little unnerved. This happened on two separate occasions. Both
times, I felt it was a way for the interviewee to try to change the direction of the
interview. My response to this attempt by another to take control was unease, and a desire
to recast the dialogue along the lines I wanted. Thus, it seems to me, there are always
power dynamics taking place within the interview that make it difficult to have the kind
of friendly conversation that Lugones and Spelman regard as critical to feminist inquiry.
Sometimes, those interviews that go off track can offer the most useful data if a
researcher is willing to reflect on the reasons why the interview might seem to have
failed. In one case, an interview I conducted became somewhat confrontational. The
research participant found my interview questions exasperating. At one point, she
declared that all we were doing was going around in circles as I kept asking her the same
thing but from different angles. Phenomenologically, I suppose that was exactly what I
was doing but my interview approach was not one with which this person was
comfortable. I found myself becoming somewhat irritated by her negative responses. I
thought my spirited defense of my research would culminate in the end of the interview.
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Instead, her attitude softened, and she seemed to become genuinely interested in the
project. There was a change in the timbre of her voice, and she began asking questions
and sharing stories in a way that was very different from her demeanor at the start of the
interview. Here are two examples from the beginning and end of the interview that
illustrate this change of attitude.
My problem is I’m not into this whole framework. I’m sure that your study is
going to be very interesting, but you’re talking about leadership in ways that I
don’t normally think about so I’m having trouble getting into your mindset.
As we started out, I was thinking you know that this is going to be a very
difficult conversation because this seems to me speaking a different language
or too simplistic or whatever. But as we got into it, you’ve really made me
think.
The best way I can describe this interview experience is as a kind of thawing. It seemed
to me we entered into the kind of dialogue and dissent that Arendt argues is crucial to
understanding. In this particular situation, discord, rather than concord, brought about a
deeper understanding on both our parts.
Over the four month time span of interviewing, while I fine-tuned some of the questions,
I did not alter them substantially because I found that each interviewee’s response to each
question was different. For instance, I noticed that there were times when an interviewee,
in the midst of describing a specific instance, seemed to hesitate. When I asked a followup question to delve further, sometimes the interviewee remained silent. At times,
hesitations and silences may illuminate something that dialogue fails to do. If the
researcher pays attention to silent gaps, I believe she may gain a glimpse of something
usually hidden from view. For instance, as I read across the transcripts, I realised that no
one had spoken about how sexuality or disability may have affected their personal
leadership. Conversely, participants talked freely about race, class and gender issues. I
mention this to show there are still many things that are not discussed openly that have a
bearing on our lives.
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Questions that yielded seemingly superficial responses in one interview led to deeper
responses in another. As I mentioned earlier in the chapter, two participants stated that
embodiment played no relevance to the way in which they lead. This was in
contradistinction to other interviewees, who talked openly about embodied experiences.
For example, one woman, Dianne, spoke vividly about the way that she felt herself
shrinking in certain situations. In her words, “I definitely have an emotional and physical
sensation of shrinking, or getting smaller of being less colourful, less of me in a situation,
I’m sort of bending myself a lot.” This sense of not taking up space is indicative of the
way that other women spoke about the problems of finding themselves growing quieter in
different spaces. I suggest that silence is intrinsically linked to gender hierarchy in a way
that works to encourage some to speak while discouraging others. The decision to speak,
or remain silent, derives from learned experience of what is perceived as appropriate for
the public space. Many women learn to restrict themselves to what is considered proper.
To use Heideggerian terminology, that which is proper is always-already defined ahead
of time by social convention. These social niceties may serve to constrain authentic
discourse, which, in turn, has an impact on a person’s sense of self.
Active listening is a vital component of interviewing. However, I found that it was not
always possible to stay alert. Interviewing is both mentally and physically tiring.
Tiredness affects my ability to concentrate. At any moment, thoughts rush in that are hard
to keep under control. As an instance, my ability to listen to one interviewee was
interrupted by a scratching sound. Suddenly, I realized this was the sound of a mouse
trapped in the wall of our house frantic to get out. I was equally desperate to keep focused
on the conversation, while trying not to panic at the thought of what I would do if the
little creature suddenly burst through the wall. Of course, I realize that, logically, this was
an unlikely thing to happen but, at the time, it seemed possible. While one might desire to
be an active listener, it does not always work that way in the practice of conducting
interviews.
In one interview, Kate talked about how she had begun to realise how leadership changed
her personality. In her words: “I still think that it’s been an authentic journey, if you will,
and that I can still be the leader and the human being I want to be but I have to
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understand that just as I want to change the institution, the institution and the role
changed me.” This statement is interesting for it shows how leaders and their institutions
transform each other. In this case, Kate describes how being a President of an institution
had a profound effect on her sense of self. She described how people who knew her well,
that is, close friends and family members, saw her as a shy person. However, in the
context of her role as leader, she thought most of her colleagues would be surprised to
learn of her shy disposition. Kate’s distinction between herself in private and her public
role mirrors Arendt’s belief that we take on a personae whenever we act within a public
context. Thus, the notion that we are authentic within a social context, or even a private
one for that matter, is somewhat contradictory. While there were some interviewees such
as Laura who viewed their private and public personae as the same, this was not a
common perspective.
In this section, I have discussed the interview process. Now I would like to consider how
this research is related to ethical matters.

4.5.3

Reflexivity and Ethical Issues

Each interviewer brings a particular stance to her inquiry, which influences the themes
that come to light from each interview. This unique orientation affects the ways in which
a researcher approaches her work. Feminist theory, like hermeneutic inquiry, makes one
aware that it is important to be cognizant of how one’s situated perspective shapes the
research process. Yet while I am aware of some of my prejudices, I also have blindspots.
Reflexivity can only go so far, as we know from Arendt that we cannot see ourselves
from the outside. What this means in terms of the interview process is that there is an
ambiguity inherent within any research endeavour, because each person interprets the
world from a different, situated perspective. As Merleau-Ponty tells us, we can only
know ourselves in ambiguity.
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We are each differently situated and, hence, perceive the

world in a distinct manner. Thus, each interviewer will approach her work differently.
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Moreover, past experiences will influence a researcher’s approach to a topic. For
example, I first became acquainted with the concept of authentic leadership through my
experience setting up a Leadership Institute for Women at Brescia University College.
Over the course of several years in developing a plan and a vision for the Institute,
extensive discussions took place with faculty, staff, alumnae and community
representatives regarding what kind of leadership the Institute was going to provide, and
to whom. My recollection from many of those meetings was friction between those who
wanted the Institute to be more overtly feminist in its pursuits, and others who saw this as
too narrow a focus. Additionally, extensive dialogue took place concerning whether it
was even possible to be an authentic leader in today’s workplace. Over the years, I was
involved in this planning and execution, I thought a lot about the term “authentic
leadership.” This phrase, for me, conveys a contradiction. When I think of authentic
leadership, the term “honesty” often springs to mind, yet this word occurred only once in
the interviews I conducted. Does that mean, then, that my initial understanding was
wrong? Not according to Merleau-Ponty, who argues that “all views are true provided
that they are not isolated, that we delve deeply into history and reach the unique core of
existential meaning which emerges in each perspective.”
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This is what I have been

trying to do throughout this project.
In thinking about the relationship between interviewing and ethics, Patricia Benner
argues that an ethical stance is one that respects the interviewee's experiences, while also
staying true to the text. One way I approached ethics was by encouraging research
participants to give me feedback at the end of the interview as to whether they felt that
there was anything that we had not spoken about which they considered important. For
instance, at the end of her interview, Dianne suggested that one thing she had been
expecting me to ask, which I did not, was a question about social capital. The term was
not familiar to me so I asked her what she meant. In her view, social capital means what I
am willing to do to ensure that my objectives are met. That is, on what occasions will I
fight for what I believe is right, and when are the times when I am willing to negotiate
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with others. This negotiation is useful for the future since it will, hopefully, ensure that
others will secede to her viewpoint when she most needs assistance. I find myself a little
uneasy about this way of operating for it seems to me that this is how issues may become
uncontested. I recognize that this is the modus operandi that many people adopt in the
workplace. While I can see that it makes sense strategically to store up social capital;
whether it is ethical or not is a different matter.
Another way of considering ethics in terms of interviewing is for the researcher to be
critically reflexive of prescribed methodologies, individual knowledge and social
378

context.

I tried to reflect upon my research questions and methodological approach to

ensure that as a white, heterosexual, feminist researcher, I did not misappropriate the
voices of others. I took field notes, both before and following each interview, so that I
could explore my reactions to what was unfolding, as well as reflect upon my preunderstandings. This reflexivity enabled me to delve deeper into my own assumptions
regarding gender, authenticity and leadership, and the ways in which this prior
understanding is contested by study participants. While it is conceivable that I could have
conducted a phenomenological inquiry without conducting interviews, I sense that my
overall account may not have been as evocative or meaningful without their diverse
opinions.
If the researcher's views are not changed in some way, Benner argues that the process is
insufficient. However, at the time of conducting the interviews, I did not understand what
she meant by “reasoning in transition.”
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I have included below some of my field notes

from three interviews to show how this reasoning in transition works. These notes were
taken directly following each interview, and then after I have typed up the transcript.
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In most cases, I typed the transcript up directly following the interview. I then shared the
specific transcript with the research participant, giving each person plenty of time to respond,
usually four-six weeks. When I had not heard from someone, I sent two follow up emails.
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Field Notes – August 15
Today’s interview was much more difficult. For one thing, SKYPE didn’t work again. I
don’t know why. She seemed very curt at first. No curt isn’t the right word but I felt that
she was too much in her head. At one point, I thought that it would be over in thirty
minutes but then I began to really hone in on what she was saying. I spoke a lot more
than in the first interview but this was a necessary tactic in order to draw her out. And it
worked, I think. She had problems with the question about comfort – something about
that word displeased her almost. I also felt at times that she was interviewing me but then
I thought well that’s fine, if we think about it as a conversation, it’s good for me to have
to explain what it is I think I am doing.
The most interesting answer I thought was related to her background where she talked
about how learning to act had enabled her to find her voice and to get out from a
patriarchal household as a young woman. But all in all, I have to give myself a pat on the
back for making the interview work. She also said that she liked the questions and that
they had made her think. I still need to go deeper with people, but this interview showed
me how hard that might be on occasion.
Field notes after transcription
This was a much better interview than I thought it was. What I saw as her negativity was
just her way of approaching questions. She is a thoughtful person; hence the long pauses.
It was because she was thinking about the questions that it seemed to me as if she wasn’t
interested. This is the problem, I guess, with telephone interviews. But this also says a lot
about the way I jump to conclusions about people without having enough information –
something that I accuse others of doing, but now I have to see that this is the way that we
ordinarily go about the world. And, it’s a problem, as Helen would say.
Field Notes – August 24
This was the first interview I had done in the afternoon. It was only 4:30 p.m. but for
some reason I wasn’t really looking forward to it. The other interviews had gone well if
one discounts the issues with technology. I found it difficult to get her to talk. This is the
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second time this has happened. This time it was not due to a reticence but to a lack of
openness. It did not appear that way on the surface because she answered without
hesitation. I got the sense that she had answered similar questions in the past. She was
very sure of what authentic leadership was making no distinction between personal
authenticity and authentic leadership. It was only at the end of the interview when I
pressed her that I found that she had left her last institution because of a moral dilemma.
She was very pleasant but I sensed, a lack of connection, even though I did try my best.
She was very clear, honest, and open but her answers to the embodiment questions were
non-existent. How can someone not have a bodily response?
Field notes after transcription
Again, I’ve misread an interviewee. This was a really thoughtful honest appraisal of her
notion of authentic leadership. It means so much to her not least because of her workingclass background. It is becoming clear to me that the people who this concept appeals to
have, at one time or another, been or felt themselves to have been on the margins. I don’t
think it matters how long the interviews take. Some people are just quicker I guess.
Field Notes

August 30

I was a little rattled in that I had forgotten that the guy was coming to do the roof vents.
However, I asked him not to be noisy at that time, and it was fine. She answered some
questions in a way that resonated with what I had just been writing. Namely, the problem
when leaders try and promote visions, or stick to plans, that go against the general will.
The notion of fear came up again this time, not physical fear, although she did mention
faculty meetings in which men threw chairs. Unbelievable! She talked about people
shouting, arguing and not listening to others.
Field Notes – following transcript
As I’m writing up the transcripts, I’ve just realised that a word that doesn’t come up is
honest or honesty. It’s peculiar because as I’m listening that is what I’m thinking about
some of the stories I’m listening to. How it is that people will talk openly to a complete
stranger who is recording their words about something deeply personal. It’s quite

164

amazing really and is happening in a way that may take many months with someone that
you get to know. What is it about this interview structure that makes people do this? Is it
anything to do with Foucault’s confessional, that in some way I represent an authority
figure? I hope not, but it is something worth paying attention to.
Reviewing these field notes now two years after conducting the interviews, it is
fascinating to see how quickly I made assumptions that upon reflection were not
necessarily an accurate representation of the interview. Conversely, they also show how
quickly I gained confidence doing interviews. Furthermore, much of the information that
I read about phenomenology and qualitative interviews only made sense to me after I had
conducted the interviews.
My initial assumptions about interviewing became unravelled by a particular experience,
or rather my response to it. I had not anticipated that a person disagreeing with the
written transcript would be disconcerting. Indeed, in my original submission to the
Research Ethics Board, I wanted research participants to have lots of opportunity to
engage in dialogue with me. But the Board informed me that I must be clear about how
much leeway interview participants would have to make changes to the transcript. This
proved to be good advice. At first, I wanted a more open-ended dialogue. Yet, my
following response to someone’s desire to change a transcript reveals how contradictory
my initial intent, and actual practice turned out to be.
When Clare sent back the transcript, she told me that she had rewritten some of her
answers so they flowed better. In her words, “she had run off at the mouth,” and wanted
to change the transcript so that her responses were more focused. In her view, these
alterations had improved what she was trying to say, rather than changed the meaning.
When I read through the transcript, I was surprised at the extent of her changes, which
probably took her considerable time to do. She had added words that she had not said,
and taken away others. I was surprised at my feelings of frustration at this “rewrite.” My
reaction confounded me because it contradicts my initial desire for an open-ended
dialogue. I had not realised how quickly I would begin to see these transcripts as part of
my research, and, thus, belonging to me. But Clare’s rewrite of our initial conversation
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served to deny the spontaneity of her original account. The immediacy of the dialogue
was lost in her revision of what took place.
Clare was the only person to make substantial changes to the transcript. With other
research participants, I received an “it’s fine” response indicating there were no changes
to make, while some interviewees requested minor alterations to inelegant phrases. These
phrases were spoken; I went back to the tapes to make sure that I had not been mistaken
in my transcription typing. It is strange to strike out what was said, and incorporate what
was not. This is where the co-mingling between researcher and research participant gets
messy. In one way, it does not matter; the changes that were suggested – other than
Clare’s – were inconsequential to the account. If people are unhappy with something they
said, then it seems wrong not to take their views into account. From another angle,
however, these changes to the transcript affect the integrity of the research process.
What is ethical in this regard? To respond with care to the person who asked for changes,
or to the original words that were spoken? Perhaps the dilemma arises from the fact that
we want to get it right. I do not wish to suggest that this is an either/or problem, but
perhaps researchers can become too possessive of their data. In so doing, they might
forget that the interview is, for the participant, a distillation of lived experience that has
significance over and above the research encounter. I mention this because on several
occasions, interviewees told me that the interview had affected them in a way they had
not anticipated. In follow-up emails, one person shared her ongoing insights into notions
of authenticity and leadership, from events that had occurred following the interview. At
first, I was surprised when a few research participants did not respond to repeated
requests regarding whether they had any changes that they wanted to make to the
transcription. I found this unresponsiveness odd given that all but one participant
indicated they would be willing to be involved in follow-up interviews.
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Then, I

received an email from one participant in which she told me how difficult it had been for
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While most participants did indicate that they were willing to engage in another interview,
these interviews did not take place as I determined, together with my advisor on the methodology
component of my dissertation, Dr. Anne Kinsella, that with 200 pages, I had sufficient material.
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her to go through the transcript. This made me realize how, as a researcher, my
connection with these stories was ‘once removed.’ Within an interview context, people
share words and worlds; this co-conversation is not anyone’s possession, although it may
seem that way.
When I began to think about ethics in relation to my study, it was in the context of
gaining approval to conduct my research.
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One of the problems I find with the research

ethics approval process in universities is that permission is requested from people ahead
of time. I did wonder whether some research participants would prefer not to be included
in the inquiry after the interviews have taken place, although no-one asked me not to use
their accounts. In choosing to be interviewed, these women leaders did, after all, agree to
take part in a research investigation into the nature of authentic leadership. However, at
times, I was unclear as to what was my foremost ethical obligation. Is it to the people
who shared their accounts? Or is it to the furtherance of knowledge? These questions of
ethics are more complex than I had anticipated when I began my doctoral research, and
illustrate that there are always tensions one encounters that cannot be fully resolved.

4.6 Conclusion
Troubling method, in the end, has led me to a consideration of what constitutes an ethical
process, and how one shares research findings in an ethical manner. In the role of the
interpretive researcher, I see my task as creating a dialogue between myself and the
participants’ lived experiences. The difficulty is how to conduct interviews in an ethical
way. Helen Fielding suggests that an ethical approach requires us to make “sense of what
we do according to a reality that consists of multiple perspectives and voices.”

383

Reality,

as Fielding notes, is always evolving and dependent upon a particular situation. It is this
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was asked to sign the consent form and return it to me before the interview could take place.
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ever-changing contingency that forms the basis for our ethical, embodied relationships.
But what constitutes developing ethical relationships within the context of interviewing?
In other words, what did I learn from the experience of interviewing? I think that the
most important thing I learned was that of the complexity with regard to ethical
responsibility in regards to representing someone else’s account. There were moments
where I felt unsure as to what was my foremost ethical responsibility – to the interview
participants, to my scholarship, or to the university. The way I have decided to deal with
this ethical quandary is to be clear that this is my particular interpretation. After all, this is
the basis of research that is grounded in an existential, hermeneutic approach. Or so it
seems to me.
If one holds to Arendt’s way of approaching research, each scholar must be willing to
offer us her own insights, and make judgments accordingly. In this chapter, I have shown
that through conducting a qualitative research project, I discovered ethical issues I had
not anticipated. It is in the act of doing that we become aware of the multiplicity of
questions regarding what constitutes ethics. In laying out my methodological approach
and offering some reflections on the process, my aim has been to explore my own preconceptions, as well as how feminist theory and hermeneutic phenomenology intersect.
In conducting interviews so as to better understand the interconnections amongst gender,
authenticity and leadership, I tried to act in an ethical way, although I acknowledge that
there is always more that could be said.
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Chapter 5

5

Telling Tales Out of School: Gender, Authenticity and
Leadership
“I wish you would write about what it is in people that makes them
want a story ... Life itself is full of tales.” Hannah Arendt.
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In a letter to her friend, the novelist Mary McCarthy, Arendt expresses her view
that storytelling is fundamental to human existence. For Arendt, narrative enables
us to find meaning, and gain sense of our lives. In this chapter, I explore the
situated, embodied nature of leadership through the narrative accounts provided by
ten senior women leaders in higher education. My main purpose is to show how
these diverse accounts offer insights into the interconnections among gender,
authenticity and leadership. I will also consider how Arendt’s work may be helpful
in creating a more inclusive way of thinking about leadership.
My original research question asked in what ways senior women leaders describe
their experiences of authenticity (or lack thereof) within an institutional context.
What emerges from these research findings is a more expansive way of thinking
about leadership. These women’s accounts serve to complicate the notion of what
constitutes an authentic leader, and run contrary to most scholarship on authentic
leadership especially in regards to the importance of self-knowledge. Through their
descriptive accounts, these women reveal how leadership is a relational enterprise,
founded upon mutual respect and trust. Viewing authentic leadership through a
relational perspective allows us to see previously hidden aspects of leadership. For
example, these women’s accounts reveal how gender differences reinforce
hierarchies in subtle and sometimes not so subtle ways. As a result, a woman’s
sense of belonging may be undermined by gender prejudice regarding normative
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ideas about what constitutes a good leader, which, in turn, may impede her ability
to speak or act in a manner consistent with personal conviction.
I have divided this chapter into two parts. In part one, I introduce the research
participants, and share two or three descriptive accounts from each participant. My
commentary in the first section is minimal to allow these women’s stories to be
foregrounded. In the second part of the chapter, I consider some common themes that
flow from the interviews. The first theme I discuss concerns the conflict that may arise
when institutional objectives are at odds with personal convictions. The second theme
relates to care and relationships. Gender and embodiment constitutes the third theme,
intersectional constitutes the fourth theme, while anxiety represents the final theme.
Then, I discuss some outlying themes that I consider to have phenomenological import.
Finally, I bring together the different strands of the discussion to consider how these
women’s descriptive accounts shed light on the interconnections among gender,
authenticity and leadership. Throughout this chapter, I connect these themes with
Arendt’s reflections on leadership.

5.1 Part I - In Their Own Words
As I pointed out in chapter four, the ten women leaders I interviewed came from different
economic, cultural and social backgrounds. Five women had extensive experience
leading at least one educational institution, two women were Vice Presidents, and three
had extensive experience running research institutes at their respective universities. Six of
the research participants had worked in the university sector for most of their working
lives; the other four moved into higher education following careers in other occupations,
such as school teaching, finance or the high-tech sector. Eight women held a doctorate in
either the social sciences, earth sciences, or the humanities. One participant was in the
final stages of her doctorate in leadership studies; the other held a master’s degree.
I will now turn to the descriptive accounts to see what insights these accounts offer into
the connections among gender, authenticity and leadership.
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Kate – Crossing Boundaries
Kate is the President of a large educational institution in a major Canadian metropolis.
She has also held other administrative posts including that of Vice-President in other
higher education institutions. Kate was the first woman, as well as the youngest person,
to be hired as President at her current institution. Authentic leadership, in her words, “is
about being genuine; but there are pieces of your life and your world, I think, that it’s
important that you don’t pour out in a leader role.” Here Kate highlights the importance
of keeping boundaries between one’s public and private life; she then described what can
happen when a leader allows their professional and private lives to become fused.
I used to say that the College was unloved and unlead. Part of the problem
was that the leader before me had his heart broken by the institution. He
wasn’t able to do what he wanted to do, and it just genuinely broke his heart.
So for the last two years, everywhere he went, everyone knew how much he
had fallen out of love with the institution, and how badly it had hurt him. I
think he needed for the good of XXX to keep that to himself. So these are the
kind of boundaries that I mean, and I think that there’s humanity that is good
to share, and that’s healthy, and then there are aspects that you need to be
able to control. And I don’t find it inauthentic; I just think it’s responsible to
keep some things out of that public arena.
Here, Kate illustrates Arendt’s point about the need to separate one’s public personae
from that of one’s private self. This separation between public and private was something
that Arendt regarded as critical to human flourishing. The problem if we always stay in
the light of the public realm is that we may lose a sense of depth, and even reality, since
we forget that we play a role in our social lives.
The separation between how a leader feels, and how much she shows to others is, to some
degree, determined by cultural ideas about leaders. Being confident, for instance, is
regarded in most Western societies as a positive leadership trait, while showing
disillusionment is perceived as negative. Kate’s comments suggest that the previous
incumbent’s expression of sadness was inappropriate given his leadership role, because it
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had a negative effect on staff morale. In her view, a leader “can remain true to yourself in
who you are but you still have to be able to inspire and to encourage.” To illustrate her
point, Kate gave the following description of her first meeting as President where she
addressed faculty and staff, and tries to engage others by sharing her vision for
organizational change.
I needed to build the case for change. I had to get them to start thinking that
we needed to do things differently, but we could do it together. It was through
stating the case in the most honest and blunt way I could. It was apologizing
for how the institution had let them down. And I’ll tell you that this drove my
executive colleagues crazy because, of course, none of us were there when all
this had happened but, to me, that didn’t matter. We needed to say that
leadership has let this place down, and leadership was going to help turn it
around ... It was about refocusing the whole institution. That day was the first
sort of laying it out catalyst, and then the job was to engage people and to be
challenged. I mean, I really did go anywhere I was invited, listen to everyone
who had an opinion. I did come with a plan, and a vision, because just
because there is humanity, and a kindness, and sincerity, and a passion in all
of this, it doesn’t mean that there’s not this need to deliver. So that day I said
this is the plan we are going to follow, and here’s how you can get involved.
... I joked with the audience that many years ago I had my thyroid out. I said
to them the night before I had my throat cut I wasn’t as nervous as I am
standing here in front of you today [Laugh]. Part of those nerves was just that
I really truly believed that if we worked together we could turn the place
around. And, for me, I felt like I had an hour and a half to at least get some of
the sense of excitement about where we could go, what we could do, and how
we could all be in this together. I’m extraordinarily lucky that XXX rallied to
that, and we are a fundamentally different place than we were.
Kate describes how important it is not just to have a vision, but to be able to encourage
others to become enthusiastic about organizational change. Getting other employees to
commit was critical to success. But she also discusses how nervous she was in standing
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up before an audience. What Kate demonstrates here is Arendt’s point that it is not what
we feel inside that matters but how we present ourselves to others. Courage comes not
from a lack of fear, but from being willing to hide those feelings in order to present a
confident outward appearance. I’ll return to this point later.
Later in the interview, Kate described an ethical dilemma she faced in her role as VicePresident at a different higher education institution. As she states,
I was working for this extraordinary man who talked a lot about integrity in
leadership, and all these kinds of things. But XXX’s political environment is
a little bit different than here. There’s a lot of politics, and it’s all small “p”
political. I received an email from the President saying he’d been called by a
priest in XXX about a student who was trying to get in to the College and
would I deal with it. So I followed up and, in a nutshell, this priest wanted to
get this young woman into our nursing program, despite the fact that she
didn’t qualify. He described her as a nice, good Catholic girl, and so I should
just let her in. And I had an absolute reaction to that. I actually encountered
that several times in XXX; this is the daughter of that politician, or this is the
cousin of that man, who’s a big man in that town. They either wanted you to
find them a job, or wanted you to find them a way into the College. In this
specific instance with this student, we managed to help her find a pathway by
putting her into a program that she was more academically suited to so, that if
she did well in, she could get in to nursing. ... I remember going back to the
President because I was disheartened by the sense that, despite the
conversations about integrity and values, and changing the place, I felt a not
so subtle pressure to do what was being asked of me by the outside people.
And, in the end, I was supported in that instance, and in others, in doing what
was right; but I found it extraordinarily difficult to feel I might be asked to
bend rules, to ignore a policy, to do something that fell out of line with my
values. ... I told every Board Chair that I will always act in the best interests
of the institution, and if ever I feel that I can’t, it will be the day I leave.
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In this account, Kate describes her difficulty in working for an organization where the
values that were espoused in theory were different from everyday practice. This
distinction between values that were espoused by the leader of the organization, and
being asked to bend the rules was, for her, an inauthentic way of leading that ultimately
led her to leave the institution. Being asked to ‘bend the rules’ was anathema to Kate, and
contrary to her idea of leading in a genuine way.
Jane – The vision thing
Jane is an Associate Provost of a large, public university in the American Midwest. A full
professor, Jane has worked in a university setting for most of her career. She recently
moved into an administrative post, where she is responsible for gender issues universitywide. Jane describes authentic leadership as
being aware, as much as possible, of who you are and bringing all the pieces
of that to your job, to your leadership to open things, and get the obstacles out
of the way so that other people that I work with can bring great ideas forward.
And, to me, that’s what an authentic leader really does.
She contrasted her view of what constitutes authenticity in leadership with what she
described as “command and control” leadership.
The command and control kind of leader is not particularly authentic because
they are not making room for other people to be authentic themselves, and to
bring what they can, all that they can, to the process. A command and control
person is saying, I don’t care what else you have, what I want from you is
this, and it better be exactly my way. …That’s what we have a lot of at the
administration level at the moment. And so they are perfectly happy for some
of us who are at the next level, or [a] couple of levels down, to be more about
opening things up for other people. After all, that is my job. They probably
would not view me as particularly good material for a Vice-Presidential post
because I don’t just lay it out and tell people what they are going to do ... I
ask people what they think needs [to be] done. I try to bring people together
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to talk about what we should do, and their tendency is not to do that. They
want to be able to check the box that says we collaborated, and we asked
opinions, but they don’t actually want to hear those opinions, and they
certainly don’t want to act on them.
In her negative assessment of what Jane calls ‘command and control’ leadership, she
reveals how important it is not only to ask for opinions, but to be willing to hear what
people say. She also indicates that her unwillingness to operate in this manner is likely to
affect her future prospects for advancement. Jane’s account reminded me of Arendt’s
insistence that dialogue and debate are critical aspects of plurality, and central to human
flourishing. The type of leader who is unwilling to hear others’ divergent opinions is
displaying a form of mastery that, while on the surface asks for input, is not interested in
receiving different perspectives.
I showed earlier how Kate described how important it was to gain support for her vision.
In the next account, Jane discusses some of the problems that ensue when visionary
leaders do not include the opinions of others.
We hired a new Director for the School of XXX. The Search Committee
decided that they wanted a visionary, and so that’s what they got. But the
visionary was completely incapable of doing straight administrative work,
which is okay; you can hire somebody else to do that. But the real problem, in
my mind, was that the person just assumed that the vision was shared, and
made no effort to explain it to anybody, to convince anyone that this vision
was good, to even ask anybody else if they had any other ideas, or would like
to have input on a vision. She just marched off on this vision, and spent four
years trying to convince the university of this vision. The rest of us [were left]
sort of looking at each other. And you know what? That’s not really what we
wanted to do. I’m not sure she ever really figured that out. At the end of her
four-year term, she asked to retain the job and they said no because she had
alienated so many people by not being at all interested in what anybody else
thought. Yet I know she thought that somehow she had consulted. She really
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believed that everyone was on board with this vision, but she just didn’t have
the first clue how to go about listening to other people. My sense is that the
reason why she didn’t dare ask anyone else is she wasn’t really that
confident; that is, she wasn’t authentic enough, sure enough of herself,
confident enough of herself to allow herself to open up to other possibilities.
And so she grabbed on to this vision ... and it gave her something to cling to,
and to aim for, and helped her to keep a shell around everything else so that
she didn’t have to hear from [others], or hear things that might not be
comfortable to hear, or try to incorporate ideas that were unfamiliar or alien
to her.
Oftentimes, leaders are hired because they have a specific vision as to where the
organization should be going. In Kate’s description, she explains how she spent a great
deal of time trying to get others involved and enthused. What Jane suggests here is that
trying to impose a vision on others is an inauthentic way of leading. When a leader shows
up with a ready-made vision about where an institution should be headed, this may lead
385

to unresolved conflict which, in time, may result in the leader’s termination.

What

Jane’s account brings to light is how leaders are dependent upon others.
Dianne - “A value perspective”
Dianne is Vice-President of External Relations at a women’s college in the Pacific North
West. She has held similar roles at different universities across The United States. In her
early forties, Dianne was the youngest person I interviewed. Authentic leadership, in her
words, is about “consistency of behaviour in keeping with a kind of internal compass.” In
the following account, she explores a time when her ethical beliefs were tested, and how
she responded.
At a former employer, a staff member came to me to express discomfort with
something that was going on with my manager. My manager was doing

We may also think back to how Heidegger’s desire to impose his vision on the University of
Marburg also failed in part because he was unable to obtain others’ support.
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something that was making my subordinate uncomfortable. For me, it was a
matter of integrity, and principle, and ethics to really deal with this in a very
forthright and direct way. And I think that, I don’t know whether that’s a
good example of what you are looking for, because it did end up involving a
sexual harassment suit or claim. For me, it was a big moment of saying, okay,
I claim that I adhere to all the laws, and all the values, and the spirit of the
law related to a sexual harassment free workplace, and here I am confronted
with a very awkward situation; how will I live with my principles and my
responsibilities? I got some advice from the University Ombudsman [who]
gave me a menu of options. I decided to pursue the most aggressive of those,
and turn the situation over to the people who had more expertise than me to
really raise it to the highest level. And so, to me, that’s an example of, you
know, it was hard, it was unpleasant. It led to pretty much a year of
unpleasantness, and yet it was something that I felt that I had to do. I had to
figure out the best way of doing it and the best support for this staff member
in this really uncomfortable position. I was very sorry for her that I was
putting this forward at this very high level. That was uncomfortable for her,
and we had to have a number of conversations about it. But, ultimately, she
felt, I think, really valued that we were on the same page from a value
perspective, and that we really mean what we say when we talk about, in this
case, a harassment-free work place. It developed a very high level of trust for
us, and a degree of mutual trust, mutual loyalty that has endured. I certainly
think about my relationship vis-à-vis people who have managed me - the
person in this sexual harassment situation at my former employer. I mean this
lack of authenticity, and integrity, and ethical standard that were part of his
behaviour. He certainly violated the sense of being a common shared team
and loyalty.
In this description, Dianne shows how it is not enough to adhere to particular values, it is
necessary to act upon them.
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Since the time of the sexual harassment suit, Dianne has worked at two different
universities. She contrasts her previous sense of disengagement with her current
experience.
At my last employer I felt very hesitant about speaking up. I did not feel that
I, or anyone else, was given the benefit of the doubt in those leadership/team
meetings. There was a very specific place or agenda that a couple of people
were driving, and the rest of us were sort of, kind of, [it] seemed like our
participation was for show. So, okay, we have to have these meetings, and
you are part of the senior leadership team, but your input isn’t really valued
and, in fact, we are going to be pretty skeptical of the input you provide. And,
over time, that has a very inhibiting impact for me. I became less engaged,
and less likely to share, or to give input or feedback, or attempt to play a
meaningful role setting organizational direction and priorities. By contrast, in
my current position, I very much feel that within the team of college officers
or cabinet members that people do recognize the value that I bring even when
it’s a topic where it’s not in my particular scope. That has a great source of
meaning and gratification for me that I can take part in the sessions about
other areas - not just my own - and that my input is valued. It doesn’t mean
everyone agrees with me, by no means [laugh].
There are similarities here between Dianne’s account and Jane’s in that both show
the problems that ensue when leaders do not provide an environment where
dialogue and dissent is respected. Further, as we saw with Jane, asking for input
when contrary views are not wanted is counterproductive, since employees may
become disengaged. In her new place of employment, when meetings are open to
different viewpoints, Dianne states she is more engaged. It does not seem to matter
that people disagree with her; what counts is that people are willing to listen to her
perspective. In turn, this sense of being valued enables Dianne to stay engaged.
Alison “It’s all about relationships”
Alison is responsible for a university leadership program in The Rocky Mountains.
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Her path to leadership was different from the other women I interviewed. For most
of her career, Alison was employed in the corporate sector, rising to become VicePresident in a large high-tech corporation. She decided to leave the corporate
setting, in her words, “because I wasn’t able to go deep enough in that environment.
I wanted to provide something that was more transformative for people.” Since
leaving the corporate sector, Alison has developed and facilitated leadership
programs for an international not-for-profit organization and a university. In
response to a question about authenticity and leadership, she replied:
It’s not that either you’re an authentic leader or you’re not. It’s really a kind
of an orientation toward a path. I don’t think it’s a steady state. I think it is
something that people aspire to, and every once in a while they are able to be
authentic. To me, that is when they are synchronized in what they are doing,
what they are saying, what they are thinking all match, and where they are
also in touch with the world. It’s all about being in relation to others. Having
authentic relationships means being genuine with one another, creating clear
expectations, talking with one another about the relationship, rather than just
enacting the relationship, and having meta-conversations about how we are
doing what we are doing are all very important elements.
For Alison, authenticity is not something that can be possessed but rather flows from an
alignment in values, thought and action. This alignment results in what she terms
“synchronicity,” which appears to be founded on genuine relationships whereby each
person is clear about what is expected from them.
In response to a question about how past experiences influenced her ability to lead,
Alison described her discomfort with her family’s gender dynamics, and how learning to
act helped her find her voice.
In our family, the men were the more kind of verbal, outgoing ones and the
women were more in the role of being the audience. ... When I was in high
school, I wanted to find my own voice. I entered into a theatre class and
learned about acting and improvisation. Those were just wonderful ways for
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me to really discover my authenticity, although it was kind of odd because I
was discovering myself through other people, through playing roles as an
actor. I discovered existentialism in high school, and I learned about
authenticity. It just became a theme for me in my life. And it’s something I
have pursued ever since in just so many different ways. So I guess the theme
is something about finding voice and about being in a patriarchal situation
where I felt like I didn’t have voice, and that this whole theme of authenticity
became very important for me. ... My interest has always been in facilitating
opportunities for people to have genuine or authentic voice in the workplace.
What I find fascinating about this extract is how Alison describes how it was through
role-playing that she found her own voice. Alison discusses her choice to leave a
corporate setting in order to create a more holistic approach to leadership training. She
also described how her deeply-held spiritual beliefs – Alison is a Buddhist – play a
profound role in her desire for a deeper sense of connection with others.
For Alison, relationships are critical to her understanding of what authentic leadership
might look like. As she states:
Relationships are extremely important because they are the glue or the
connection that allows us to be in this dispersed, networked environment and
still remain connected to one another, and in ways that are meaningful ... You
can have rules, or guidelines, or even customer service agreements, or
whatever construct that you want to have that you think is creating connection
with people, but without authentic relationships it really lacks heart, resilience
and a feeling of continuity.
In her account, Alison seems to reinforce Arendt’s notion of the importance of plurality,
gained through creating deep connections between people.
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Olive - “Coming into focus”
Olive had been President at two higher education institutions. Of all those women
interviewed, Olive was the most negative about the notion of authentic leadership. In her
words:
I have problems with authenticity as a measure of the quality or aspirations of
a leader because authentic to me sounds like its simply drawing attention to
the alternative that you would be somehow hypocritical or flawed ... I prefer
integrity because I think you can show integrity even as you deal with
different situations in different ways if your personal balance, your moral
compass are still strong. But authenticity, to me, doesn’t convey what I think
leaders need.
Like Dianne, Olive mentions how a moral compass is vital for leaders. But the problem
with linking leadership to authenticity is that, for Olive, this suggests that leaders might
act in a hypocritical way.
In our conversation, Olive described how, as a young scholar, she was invited to apply
for the position of President of her alma mater. She described her surprise at this offer,
since at that time Olive had no experience in administrative roles, such as Dean or VicePresident, the usual stepping stones to a Presidential appointment. In her description of
what it was like to be a President, Olive states
It was a prickly kind of position in many ways and full of potential pitfalls
than being a professor in ways that you could go awry or make decisions that
wouldn’t help your institution so that you were always on the alert, in a sense.
There was always something else you ought to be doing, and your days were
incredibly full and demanding. ... It’s an exhilarating, demanding, sometimes
frustrating, energetic kind of job. It was a pretty demanding kind of role and,
therefore, there were times when you felt somewhat off-balance. Often, you
weren’t sure about the direction you ought to be taking, making decisions that
seemed the right ones but had certain, potential problems that you couldn’t
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avoid or hadn’t foreseen. ... I thought about trying to do the very best I could
as a leader of two institutions that I deeply valued. I thought about trying to
honor the post, and honor those institutions and be fair to the people with
whom I worked, and advance goals that were valuable for the people
involved as much as I possibly could. It never occurred to me that this was
either true to myself or not true to myself.
Olive went on to describe the initial strangeness of being a President.
It didn’t seem to me at the outset that this could possibly be me; as a sort of
an ordinary young woman college professor from XXX, or somebody from
the South, or whatever, it just didn’t fit. It didn’t seem easy at the start.
Maybe your word comfortable is relevant here, but that feeling didn’t persist,
or it didn’t impede my being able to do my work, and maybe following out of
what you’ve been saying, when it stopped feeling that way, when I sort of felt
well - for better or for worse - this is what the President of XXX is like … I
was at the point that you would call authentic leadership. At the time that I
was going through all this, I was also spending a lot of my energy trying to be
an effective president. So I didn’t spend a lot of time wrestling with it. But, as
I look back, I think it’s probably true that there would have been some point
at which it’s like an out of focus picture that comes into focus, not all of a
sudden, but gradually so where you sort of see doubled vision of something,
something happens where everything sort of fits together. As I look back on it
that may have been the way it was. I would certainly probably never have
been able to explain it that clearly at the time. But I think something like that
was going on.
Olive offers the visual metaphor of “double vision” to describe how leadership, over
time, became a fit for her. While the job at first seemed something that was foreign to
her, over time it became like an “out of focus picture that comes into focus.” I find this
metaphor striking as a way to describe how something that was initially strange, and
potentially alienating, becomes with time and practice more comfortable to us.

182

Teresa - “Thinking through”
Teresa had recently stepped down from her role as Principal of a university in The
Philippines, to head up an environmental organization.

386

Like Olive, Teresa spoke about

how difficult it could be to remain focused, given the multiple demands of being a
President.
There are a lot of things that could distract you, so that you constantly have to
be reminded of what you are really trying to achieve. ... You have to deal
with different personalities and how you keep the team going even in spite of
personal differences. When you are working with people, conflicts always
arise as to how you do things, or even in terms of getting the fair amount of
commitment. A lot of the work is actually doing conflict management. I
would have regular problems with the labour union. That is, for me, a very
difficult situation. But people, like the Board members, would comment that I
didn’t seem to be affected ... I like to think about how to solve these
problems, and how to establish your minimums, or your parameters. And how
do you deal with issues, how do you organize; for instance, get the rest of the
staff to your side, that sort of thing. So while this seems to be a huge problem
for others, it upsets them; for me, I think I have a gift for thinking through
and, you know, thinking of various ways of how to solve such problems.
In the extract above, Teresa relates her success as a leader to her ability to problem-solve,
which she describes as “gift of thinking through.” This “thinking through” enables her to
dwell with problems, and to see problems from different aspects. The way that Teresa
described her way of leading reminded me of Arendt’s call to “think without bannisters”
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Previous to working as a University President, she had worked at The World Bank in the
United States. Teresa was adamant that there was less gender discrimination in The Philippines
than in North America, especially in regards to pay. A recent World Economic Forum 2012
report on the Global Gender Gap substantiates Teresa’s claim. The Philippines was ranked 8th in
terms of gender equity whereas Canada and the United States rank 21st and 22nd out of the 135
countries studied. See Ricardo L. Hausmann, Laura Tyson and Saadi Zahidi, The Global Gender
Gap Report 2012 (Geneva: World Economic Forum).
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so as to arrive at a better understanding. For Teresa this meant trying to think about a
problem from different points of view in order to consider how best to act. Later in the
interview, Teresa reflected on the ethical dilemma that came with the realization that, as a
leader, she could wield power over others.
I question what my motives are for reacting that way, or doing this or that.
For instance, you know you are President but then you realize you cannot
dictate [laugh]. You have to persuade people even if you have probably the
authority. Sometimes that could be addictive, no? You know you have the
power, but then you cannot do as you want. So at that point, you examine
yourself to see why am I reacting that way to certain things that I hear, or
certain ways that people react to you?
Teresa perceives her leadership as involved in persuading others to her point of
view. She also describes how easy it could be for a leader to become addicted to
power, and begin to dictate to others. To avoid this temptation, Teresa suggests that
leaders need to examine their actions so as to reflect on why they are acting in a
particular way. This strikes me as similar to the “stop and think” that Arendt
suggests is a necessary component of an ethical approach to leadership.
In her next example, Teresa describes a conflict she experienced when institutional
priorities and workers’ demands were at odds.
I always had the welfare of the employees in mind but this is not the
institutional position. When you have a very demanding union ... you go
through this brinkmanship. ... There is an internal conflict that says you have
to reserve the resources of the school. Of course, that’s one thing you have to
be constantly conscious about ... So you try to put up a front, that’s okay,
that’s not a go. Of course, you have already set up how far you can negotiate
with them. You are just acting your role of the Chief. ... It’s a very difficult
thing being authentic, right?
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In Teresa’s examples, she describes how there are times when leadership requires a
person to forego compassion so as to deal with union negotiations. This was one of
several times that a woman leader talked readily about the distress she felt at wanting to
be more caring while knowing that this was not, in Teresa’s words, “the institution’s
positioning.” What Teresa reveals here is the dissonance between her role as leader, and
her desire to care for her employees.
Jill - “A sense of possibilities.”
Jill is the President of a women’s college in New England. For more than twenty years
she worked at a large co-ed university where she was employed, first as a faculty
member, and later in a series of administrative roles, culminating in Vice-President,
Research. Authenticity in leadership, in Jill’s view, refers to leading in a way that is
consistent to ensure every aspect of one’s life reflects personal values. She also discussed
how, in her role as President, she sometimes feels like an imposter, not least because her
working-class background makes her feel out of place. In the interview, she described
challenges she faced as a young woman, which she viewed as influential to her ideas
about leadership. In her words,
I grew up in a single parent household with a mother who dropped out of
school at the age of sixteen to marry my father, who was nine years older, and
who was in the military. ... I lived with [my mother], and worked with her in
the summers in a light switch factory. I saw how institutional or
organizational cultures really perpetuate and reinforce classism and sexism.
There were no men in the factory. The only men were in the loading docks, or
in the catering trucks, or in the boss’s office. All the workers were women
doing piece work. Yet I saw through my mother, in her role as a shop
steward, how you could confront head on those issues of classism and sexism,
and so it engendered in me a sense of possibilities in terms of women’s
leadership. And that had a profound influence.
In this description, Jill shows how the factory in which she and her mother worked was
divided on gender lines. However, her mother’s union activism engendered “a sense of
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possibilities.” Even though there was gender prejudice within the workplace, there were
still avenues for women to show leadership.
Later in the interview, Jill described how she decided to give up a scholarship in order to
look after her mother, and its impact on her sense of social justice.
I was the first person in my family to ever graduate from high school, and
first person to go to college. I attended two years of community college
before my mother became chronically ill. I needed to be a care-giver for her.
... That had an impact on my perceptions of social justice, and what it means
to live authentically. I lived for a while on the streets with my mother, who
was homeless, and got to know that people often don’t have control over the
circumstances of their lives, and it’s through no fault of their own. So my
commitment to looking at prisoners’ rights emerged from that as well - the
extent to which society’s failure to protect people from preventable harm
mitigates when the victimized become the victimizers. [This] has always been
a concern to me, because I have seen how people have been marginalized,
and disenfranchised, and how they act out. So I try to lead with a sense of
empathy and a commitment to social justice, and access to education for
people from all socioeconomic backgrounds.
Jill’s experience of homelessness had a profound impact, not only on her decision to do
research into prisoners’ rights, but also her ideas about authenticity and leadership. She
described the practical ways in which she tried to create a more humane work
environment. Here’s one example:
When I came to XXX, which is a women’s college, the structure for faculty
meetings was very different from what I was used to. I was at a state
institution for 23 years. Then I was at a private institution that was very
collaborative. [Here] the faculty meetings were set up so that the President sat
in the front, and the faculty was in this auditorium. It was a very patriarchal,
hierarchical structure, and I was running the meetings. I heard from junior
faculty that they had a couple of concerns. One was about child care, and the
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fact that the meetings extended past the time when child care ended. And the
other [issue] was that they felt unengaged with respect to shared governance.
The first issue was easy [as] we can subsidize day care until the meetings end.
The other issue I suggested we could deal with by saying okay, if you want to
be more engaged, why don’t you set the agenda instead of having the
President run the meetings. Why don’t you have faculty stand up and
facilitate the meeting? This was proposed at my first faculty meeting. It was
voted down because there was a comfort level with the way things had
always been done in the past. So I said my commitment to authentic
leadership, and to feminist principles, really argue against this kind of
structure, but I’m happy to accede to your will if this is what you want. But it
was, I guess, a willingness to say this is important to me to at least raise the
issues with respect to hierarchy.
In this description, Jill shows how she tried to alter what she saw as a hierarchical
structure that was negatively affecting younger scholars’ engagement at faculty meetings.
Her failure to get adequate buy-in reveals how difficult it can be for leaders to make
structural changes when they do not obtain support from others.
Laura - “Situational leadership”
Laura had been employed as a Vice-President at a prestigious Ivy League university in
America. She left that role to work at a smaller college for black students where she
heads up an international science and education project. In the interview, Laura described
how her childhood experiences were fundamental to her ideas about the interconnections
among authenticity, gender and leadership.
I came out of a type of society where the designated heads of households
were not necessarily those of management. It was a dominated society in
rural Jamaica; men may have had the leadership roles but, I know and I saw,
that women, my mother included, managed things and made things happen,
changed the dynamics of things, had her three daughters become educated
women even though she wasn’t, participated in organizational structures in
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her church, and pushed us along in programs learning to play music, and to
do algebra, and foreign languages, and so on. My mother who, by the way,
did not finish high school, grew up in a strange kind of time warp in rural
Jamaica. … Colonial society was dying. There was a move from rural to
urban, and large land owners were now becoming land poor. I grew up in a
transitional society and, for me to survive, I had to figure out ways to make
the transition. I had to be comfortable with change.
You know early on in life, I lived in a world of my own. I was lucky enough
to have space, maybe because it was structured by all of those male
expectations. And although I recognize there are boundaries set for women,
you know, we should be nurturers, I also understood from early interface with
smart women, who are always around, we just have to change our definition
of smart. The women who ran institutions in my village or my teachers, they
had purpose, and value and integrity. … I come to authentic leadership
through that kind of quiet recognition of how powerful situational leadership
can be. I grew up in a rural setting, and I had freedom. You see, sometimes,
you conceptualize the situation from which you come from as being deficient.
It doesn’t have elaborate schools, and so on, but leadership, having people
follow you, being recognized as having a set of ideas that you can change
something were an early part of my view of the world.
Laura describes how it was the women in her village who were the quiet leaders who got
things done. Their expertise was often discounted; that is why she argues we need to
change our definition of smart. I take her to mean that it is important to recognize that it
is not always those in power who are the ones who get things accomplished.
Then, Laura described her experiences as a student abroad.
I was accepted as an international student as part of a gesture to do good and
to reach out to the poor. … I actually had very little money when I went to
university. I, perhaps, was the poorest student there; but, for some reason, I
didn’t seem poor because I was on a quest. For my whole life what I
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originally thought were disadvantages have turned out to be advantages. … I
had women role models who kept saying to me you must defy the gods.
Being poor is not necessarily a disadvantage. Being a black woman at XXX is
not alone a disadvantage, because it allowed me to have double
consciousness. It allowed me to be very aware of who I was as an individual,
and to be very strategic in my thinking. Other women who were not
minorities were going there for the ride because the environment said to them
come along for this ride, you are entitled to it. My difference kept saying to
me you are not here for this ride, alone you are different. You are here for the
ride but it is required of you to give back, to be authentic. I am always aware
that I’m looking forward, but I have one hand reaching back.
In describing what she first viewed at first as the disadvantage of being a poor, black
woman, Laura shows how she changed her views. Being on the margins enabled her to
realise that her success was not hers alone, and that she had women role models in her
village encouraging her to succeed. Chief amongst these role models was her mother,
who she described in the following way,
My mother was a situational leader. ... She would say to you: “Oh no, my
child, I’m not a leader. I’m just a simple, rural woman trying to make sure the
church and the poor children are taken care of. She was, in fact, a powerful
woman. A storm blew down the church; a hurricane earthquake tore it down.
She rebuilt it. She had an after school program, she fixed the pipe organ so I
became a classical musician. I played the piano. I’ve done so all my life. ...
It’s my mother who made it possible for me.
While her mother described herself as a simple, rural woman, for Laura, her mother was a
powerful role model because she was willing to take action to improve the community’s
well-being. Thinking about Laura’s account, I was reminded of Arendt’s claim that it is
during a crisis that people show how courageous they are. In Laura’s description of how
her mother set about to rebuild the church following a devastating hurricane, we gain a
glimpse of how a woman takes on a leadership role in her community because she cares.
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It was caring for others that encouraged Laura to have the courage to succeed even when
she felt isolated in her North American environment. When she described the women
from her village it was as if they held her metaphorically as she attempted to “defy the
Gods” and become a successful leader.
Claire – “Mom taught me about authentic leadership.”
Claire retired recently from her role as President of a women’s college. Prior to her
presidency, she served in a variety of administrative roles in universities in North
America and Europe. In Claire’s words, an authentic leader “must think and act in the
context of her values.” As with Laura and Jill, Claire’s mother was an important role
model in shaping her daughter’s leadership values. Claire describes a particular event
from her childhood that she found meaningful:
My mother came from an affluent Greek family who, for a variety of complex
reasons, forfeited the family’s wealth to come to the United States. She was
raised to be thoughtful and open to the ideas of others, as well as to people of
other races and cultures. She observed and considered many things that others
in her day did not. When I was ten years old, we lived in XXX - at that time a
highly segregated small city – home of many of the old woolen mills.
Catholics dominated the town, primarily French Canadians, Irish and Italian
Catholics, as well as Ukrainian Orthodox. Nearly all activities and enterprises
were based in the many local churches that were themselves divided by
religion and ethnicity. The Boy and Girl Scout troops the churches housed
were also homogeneous. My mother – who had been a girl scout years before
- noticed this situation and didn’t accept it as normal or desirable, as most
people did. She said to me: ‘I don’t believe this was what Juliette Gordon
Low envisioned when she founded girl scouting years ago. Her vision was to
create an environment in which girls would develop skills, confidence, and
understanding of others in the company of girls and women leaders who have
different beliefs and come from many cultures. That’s not what’s happening
here. So she packed my brother and me in the car and drove to the state office
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for girl scouting in XXX. She told them about what she saw as inconsistency
between founding values of girl scouting and the way it was playing out in
XXX. She told them that she wanted to found an inter-denominational, crosscultural troop, but felt she had to ask permission to do so and didn’t want to
go against rules that might exist [laugh.] From the surprised manner in which
the officials looked at her, it was clear they had never thought to question the
status quo. ‘There are no rules against it,’ they said, adding that it sounded
like a good idea and wished her luck.
Upon returning to XXX, Mom found a few like-minded women who offered
the Unitarian Church hall for the troop meeting place, and assisted in getting
the word out to prospective girls. The response was strong and immediate.
First of all, African American, Hispanic, and Jewish girls who had no troop to
join before seemed to ‘come out of the woodwork’ to join the new troop. As
news about the new troop and its vision spread, girls from existing parishbased troops asked to join. When the new troop totaled fifty girls, another one
was started to accommodate the demand. The troops quickly became known
as the best ones in town. Watching my mother – who always described
herself somewhat disparagingly as ‘just a housewife’ – accomplish something
so transformational was a powerful, early learning experience for me. To
some extent, throughout my entire career, I’ve followed her example at the
schools, colleges, and universities in which I’ve served. She wouldn’t put it in
these words, but in effect, Mom taught me about authentic leadership.
Claire’s mother offered a powerful example of leadership that has stayed with her. We
see in both Laura and Claire’s descriptions how their respective mothers spoke of
themselves in self-effacing ways such as ‘just a housewife’ or ‘simple, rural woman.’ For
their daughters, however, their mothers’ actions proved how it was possible to move
beyond the gender stereotypes of their environment, and for women to take on a
leadership role. In both cases, we see how leadership emerges when individuals are
willing to act to improve their communities, primarily because they care.
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Later in the interview, Claire juxtaposed the positive mentorship she received as a school
teacher with her early experiences in university administration.
When I worked in the schools, there were many women role models to
emulate. … However, when I became an Academic Dean and later VicePresident for Academic Affairs in higher education in the early 1970s, I
quickly discovered that I was one of only a few women present among a sea
of men in dark suits at committee meetings and conferences. It was really
challenging since men weren’t used to having women in such positions. So I
would say that I started my career in the comparatively comfortable setting of
public school teaching in which I became confident about my leadership
ability and felt accepted. However, initially, higher education was another
story altogether. It was very challenging to be what can only be described as
an ‘outsider’ on formerly all-male terrain. It was much more difficult to help
create educational access and equity for women, girls, and students of color,
when I, myself, had to also work to be accepted by my colleagues as a
‘deserving’ peer. However, in the end, these personal and professional
experiences only heightened my resolve and sense of purpose.
In describing her positive experiences in a school setting versus higher education,
Claire indicates these latter experiences informed her resolve. In her case, the
marginalization that she experienced served to strengthen her determination to
succeed. Again, we see how being marginalized may, in the long term, offer a
person valuable leadership lessons.
Jennifer “I will always be the outsider”
Jennifer was, until recently, Chair of an Institute dedicated to African Diaspora Studies.
She lives in the United States, but is originally from Trinidad. Jennifer relates her earliest
leadership experiences with her current ideas about being a leader.
I was a leader in my church. I ran things like the women’s bible studies
groups, and so on. I tried to incorporate this idea of being humble,
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understanding the needs of the people, listening to each and every one of
them, and making them feel valued as individuals. I tried to develop a
democratic style where it wasn’t my ideas alone. I was leading but, at the
same time, people were also involved. I would listen to what they had to say
and try, so far as it was possible, to incorporate their ideas. When I became
Director of the African Diaspora Program, I used the same approach, not only
with the faculty who worked and taught in the program, but the
administrative staff, and also the students. ... I felt, for example, that faculty
couldn’t understand and teach about the African Diaspora successfully
without experiencing that Diaspora. So I started a faculty trip every year
where we’d go to a different place in the African Diaspora. ... So that was one
of the things that faculty felt that we were not just a team, but we were a
family. It was not like I’m up there, and they are down there. That’s one thing
I don’t like about a lot of leaders.
Part of successful leadership, is what you do and how you approach it. But
also part is who you are. And who you are is a composite of a lot of things
and, for me; the difficulty that I found at XXX was leading from a position as
the outsider. And so that creates its own problems, not of your making, but it
leads to either some people will accept you and overlook your difference,
your diversity, and others will not. And, in those cases, regardless of what
you do, you can’t please all of the people, all of the time. There will be
detractors so I just had to keep, just keep on my path, and not let these things
make you lose focus. You know, I will always be the outsider. I can’t change
who I am [laugh]. I don’t intend to.
To me, an authentic leader has to understand the culture that you are working
with, and also become responsive and sensitive. I learnt very quickly - that
you don’t compare, you don’t say: ‘Well, when I was teaching here this is
how we did it.’ Or ‘When I was leading in this space this is how I did it,’
because people become very resentful of that. So I learnt very carefully that
you don’t compare; you accept people for who they are, and you work with
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the conditions that you are faced with.
Jennifer shows how important it is for a leader to be comfortable in her own skin, as well
as to be responsive to the situation that she finds herself in, rather than assume that what
works in one context will work in another. This requires a leader to refrain from making
comparisons between one organization and another, and be willing to accept people as
they are, rather than as she wishes them to be.
In the next account, Jennifer recounts how showing courage is an essential component of
leading.
As a single mother, I have had to find my voice and an example of that - even
when I was not technically in a leadership position that people looked to me
as a leader – was when my son was in kindergarten. [The School] kept
sending these notes when they wanted to take them on field trips. The notes
would say ‘[W]e consent for our child to go on this outing.’ All the mothers
were complaining, and I was complaining, but nobody spoke up. So
eventually when one of the notes came home I crossed out We and I put
I/We. Then I put a p.s. at the bottom and said that in future create an option
for single parents. I was called into the Office and the Principal was not very
happy with me. I said to her: ‘Though I am a single parent and a woman, you
have to respect me.’ The next time the slips came back home they had the
I/We on them. All the other single mothers came and thanked me and told me
they didn’t like it, but they didn’t have the courage to speak up.
Someone has to have the courage to step up. To me, that is leadership
[however] women tend to not want to put their voice out there because they
feel powerless. But you have to because that’s the only way that you can get
people to listen to you. Sometimes if you are a little more courageous than the
others then you have to step out and lead.
We started with Kate’s example of feeling fear but displaying courage; again, in
Jennifer’s description, we see an example of how a woman is willing to take a lead so as
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to speak out against perceived injustices. Arendt argues that courage is not the absence of
fear. Rather a person shows courage, because they have decided that this is how they
want to be seen. The display of courage, for Jennifer, is at the heart of leadership.
In these narrative accounts, what emerges for me is that these women leaders have very
different experiences and views about gender, authenticity and leadership. At the same
time, one constant seemed to be that each of them was committed to leading by being
cognizant of, and willing to learn from, the people they work with. Their descriptive
accounts also reveal how specific childhood experiences shaped their leadership values.
In particular, three women noted how their mothers’ actions to help build community, or
stand up for workers’ rights were fundamental experiences that shaped their ideas about
authenticity and leadership. These narratives indicate how leadership emerges out of a
context whereby someone cares enough to try and change a situation which they regard
as unfair. In addition, in these women’s descriptions of the interconnections among
gender, leadership and authenticity, what emerges is how past events can have a lasting
effect on present and future action.

5.2 Part II Themes
In the second part of this chapter, I draw together some themes that emerge from the
interviews to see what insights they offer concerning the interconnections among gender,
authenticity and leadership. The first theme I discuss relates to ethical dilemmas, that is,
when personal convictions are at odds with institutional objectives. The second theme
concerns care and relationships. Embodiment is the focus of the third theme, while the
fourth theme explores intersectional identity. The final theme I discuss is anxiety. Before
turning to the themes, however, I want to examine participants’ responses to two
questions.
One of the problems with regard to some scholarly accounts of authentic leadership is the
attempt to fix meaning. In chapter one I showed how scholars privilege four dimensions
of authentic leadership (self-awareness, relational transparency, balanced processing and
internalized moral perspective). I wanted to ascertain what the women leaders I
interviewed thought about this topic. So I asked them two questions. In the first question,
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I asked them to tell me what came to mind when they thought about the term
“authenticity.” Then, I asked them to describe what came to mind when they thought
about the term “authentic leadership.” Figures one and two represent the collated answers
to these two questions. (When a word appears larger, it means that the word was used
more often across the different responses.)

Figure One – Responses to “What is Authenticity?”
The word that appears most frequently in response to “What is Authenticity?” is values,
closely followed by the term “integrity” and “self.” The other words to appear in multiple
responses were consistency and awareness. From these women’s responses, authenticity
appears to relate to adhering to particular values, and practicing integrity through being
consistent in one’s actions, and an awareness of the effect those actions might have on
others. Their responses suggest that a consistency of attitude and self-awareness are
important to their understanding of authenticity.
When we consider the responses to authentic leadership, we see a change in emphasis. In
responses to the collated responses to this question, we have much more diversity of
words used, as can be seen below.
Figure Two – Responses to “What is Authentic Leadership?”
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In terms of the responses to the question “What is Authentic Leadership?” the word that
research participants used most often was “genuine,” followed by “listening” and
“journey.” What is noteworthy here is that none of the responses to this question
mentioned the self, even though it appeared quite prominently in the responses to the
question “What is Authenticity?” Instead, interviewees used action-oriented words such
as “engagement” and “questioning.” From these women’s descriptive accounts, it appears
that “authentic leadership” relates to a genuine engagement with others. This genuine
engagement was sometimes described as a willingness to listen respectfully, and other
times as responding in a respectful manner.
Furthermore, it seems that there is a spatial and temporal quality to authentic leadership
since research participants often used the term “journey.”
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What these responses

indicate is that, for these women, there is an inner orientation with regard to authenticity,
and an external orientation in relation to authentic leadership. I suggest, tentatively, that
this different orientation may relate to the activities of acting and thinking. That is, when
we act, we are not reflecting upon what we are doing. It is only through the process of
thinking that we start to engage in inner dialogue. Acting requires that we participate in
the moment; reflection allows for what Arendt called “the stop and think.” It is through
the reflective process that we are able to consider whether our actions are in line with our
principles. Action requires a forward momentum, whereas thinking requires us to step
back, and this is why I see a different spatial orientation.
When we try and define a concept like “authenticity,” we attempt to crystallize something
that is essentially fluid. As I noted in chapter four, Heidegger argues words are like
wellsprings; we cannot fix their meaning since they change over time. If we try to pin
down meaning, words like “authenticity” lose their significance. Yet a desire for clarity
leads scholars to attempt to contain a concept. When we seek to define words in this
manner, we are in danger of losing a plurality of meaning. I suggest concepts like
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This idea of authentic leadership as a journey has been remarked upon by several leadership
scholars. See, for example, Bill George, David Gergen and Peter Sim, True North: Discover your
Authentic Leadership (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 2007).
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authentic leadership must be left open to contestation. These women’s responses to these
questions are not offered as an alternative to the four dimensions of authentic leadership,
but rather to show that there are different ways of thinking about these terms.
Indeed, while there are similarities in these responses, there were also divergences. As I
mentioned earlier, Olive rejected the idea of a connection between authenticity and
leadership because she argued it shines the light on its converse, that is, that a person
would be deliberately inauthentic as a leader. Instead of authenticity, she preferred the
word integrity to describe a genuine way of leading. The other nine women leaders might
be placed on a continuum with some regarding authenticity as central to their desired way
of leading, while others viewed it as an ideal to strive for. At one end of that spectrum,
Alison describes authentic leadership as a practice that people can aspire to, rather than a
steady state. On the other end, Laura was convinced authentic leadership exists since, in
her words; “I have lived it.”

5.2.1

Institutional Challenges

I want to turn now to a discussion of themes. The first theme I consider is the clash of
personal versus institutional values, a recurring motif in the interviews. Earlier, Kate
described an instance when she was under pressure to admit an unqualified student. This
was not an unusual occurrence she told me, and she expressed discomfort with what she
termed the “disconnect between what’s said to be valued and I guess reality.” In another
example, Jill described her frustration at being unable to change what she saw as an
unfair policy.
I started an initiative to make SATs optional because I believed that they are
discriminatory. There were gender biases and class biases inherent in the
standardized test that we used to get into the university, and into certain
schools, and so that was the case where I had some true supporters, but there
were many people who were opposed. I failed ultimately in my objective. …
It was frustrating and so I left the institution. ... I didn’t want to work in an
institution that didn’t share the values that I shared.
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Jill’s frustration at the institution’s decision not to change its policies led her to leave an
institution that she had worked at for 23 years was expressed in a change of vocal tone as
she spoke. Her voice became quieter, and took on a wistful tone. What this example
brings to light is a contradiction between an organization’s stated values and everyday
practices, something that we saw earlier in one of Kate’s descriptions. This contradiction
meant that, at times, these women leaders had to choose between upholding personal
values and complying with the institution. Some women described how they gave up the
fight for institutional change, choosing to seek new career opportunities, rather than stay
in an environment that did not allow them to remain true to their principles.
Yet while some women described experiencing moral angst as a result of institutional
practices that negated their sense of fairness, others expressed opposing views. For
instance, Olive argued that a leader’s primary responsibility was to support the
institution, and not to agonize over ethical dilemmas. Leaders have a duty to act for the
greater good, she contended, even when this meant acting contrary to personal principles.
Olive described an instance when she called in police to break up a peaceful student
demonstration because she judged the students’ actions to be potentially harmful to the
rest of the College community. She made this decision even though she agreed, in
principle, with the students’ cause. For Olive, this was not a comfortable decision to
make but necessary for what she saw as the community’s good.
Most of the women leaders I spoke with appeared to find it more difficult than Olive to
distinguish between ethical principles and their leadership responsibilities. In the
interviews, women described the tensions that surfaced regarding the quandaries they
faced regarding leading ethically and adhering to particular institutional priorities. For
instance, some women described how they were made to feel as if their leadership style
was not in step with institutional objectives. Here we may remember that earlier Teresa
noted how caring for the welfare of others was not “the institutional position.” In another
instance, Jane described how being regarded as sensitive to the needs of others, her
definition of authentic leadership, was unlikely to result in promotion in her university. In
both instances we see a tension between institutional priorities and what these women
regard as a more caring approach to leading.
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It is noteworthy that, for the women who were Presidents of institutions, their discussion
of ethical tensions appeared to centre on problems that arose when they tried to bring in
what they considered as fairer policies, and/or tried to effect institutional change. In Jill’s
case, trying to change the hierarchical structure was met with hostility. She argued that
when people get used to working in a hierarchical place, they are less open to embracing
new ideas. While some research participants talked about how concern for their
employees and students’ welfare was important to their ideas about authenticity in
leadership, others suggested that responding in a compassionate manner was often
perceived as a sign of a leader’s weakness. It seems that there is a delicate balance
between wanting to lead in a caring way, and institutional pressures to perform leadership
in a particular manner.
In many accounts, women describe the back and forth that occurs between thinking about
what is the best decision to make. In Dianne’s account of the sexual harassment case, she
asks herself whether the values she espouses in theory are ones for which she is willing to
take action. As I have previously mentioned, Arendt argues that who we are is defined by
our actions. Sometimes, a leader views her actions through the lens of what is deemed
socially acceptable. This may mean that for pragmatic reasons she judges it wise to
concur with majority opinion. On the one hand, this decision may be a positive outcome
if it has been arrived at following dialogue and debate. On the other, it could be negative
if a leader acts in accordance with “group think,” at the expense of personal principles. I
view this as a concern in relation to authenticity since what a particular group may think
is morally good may not necessarily be so. Leaders, just like the rest of us, need to stop
and think about what they value and why, rather than agreeing with what most people
think is right. What is crucial, according to Arendt is that irrespective of our motives
“success and failure in the enterprise of self-presentation depend on the consistency and
duration of the image thereby presented to the world.”
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5.2.2

Care and Relationships

Turning to the second theme, from these descriptive accounts there seems to be a strong
connection between leadership, authenticity and care. Some women contended that when
a leader encourages an atmosphere of openness, it is more likely to bring about a trusting
environment. It takes time, and sustained effort, for a leader to build meaningful
relationships. But it also requires a leader being candid about the reasons for unpopular
decisions that, in turn, means being willing to listen to points of contention, as Jill notes:
This type of leadership requires transparency and ongoing dialogue with
different groups. It is vital for a leader to lay out the choices, and then
identify shared values, and then prioritize in a way that reflects those values.
This is crucial for authentic leadership, because if people don’t understand
why we are making these decisions then there’s suspicion, and mistrust, and it
creates a toxic culture. However, if a leader makes decisions while keeping
people informed, this creates collegiality and collaboration in the face of
adversity.
Here Jill contends that it is important for leaders to ensure that people are both expected,
and empowered, to make decisions. In her words, empowering others creates an
atmosphere of collaboration and consensus-building. To avoid mistrust, it is necessary for
a leader to have the courage to share organizational problems so that employees work
together collectively to find solutions. Jill suggested that when a leader develops an
atmosphere of trust, it leads to shared governance and mutual respect, fostered through
meaningful conversations. Kate and Teresa voiced similar sentiments regarding the
importance of being as transparent as possible in one’s dealings with employees. These
sentiments seem to me similar to Arendt’s contention that the desire to care is related to
allowing others to express themselves freely. One way to ensure that different viewpoints
flourish is for a leader to welcome dialogue and debate. But this cannot be done in a
superficial manner. If leaders are seen to be asking for opinions, but not really engaging
with dissenting voices, this is likely to prove counterproductive.
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Several women mentioned how becoming a leader was a vehicle for them to try and
effect a more just environment. In some cases, there was a strong correlation between
their feminist politics and their desire to lead. As Olive stated “I wasn’t interested in just
being a college president to be a president. I had no ambitions for that at all, but when
XXX asked me to think about it, I mainly did it because I cared a lot about advancing the
cause of women’s liberation.” Other research participants made a connection between
feminist practice and caring leadership. In fact, Jill suggested that a feminist ethics of
care was crucial to her understanding of leadership.
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Indeed, some research participants

argued that it was their feminist principles that encouraged them to lead in a caring way.
What we must be cautious about, however, is the supposition that just because someone
espouses feminist principles that this will mean that they have a caring approach to
leadership. This would be tantamount to some earlier leadership scholarship which
argued that having more women in the workplace would improve the lot of all. That has
not happened. Therefore, we need to be cautious about suggesting that feminist principles
are conducive to a desire to eradicate injustice. We can tentatively suggest that an interest
in the structural and social effects of gender might encourage a leader to act in a more
caring way, but this might not always prove the case.
Other research participants described how building strong relationships through caring
was integral to their ideas about authenticity and leadership. Alison spoke about the
importance of self-awareness in relation to leadership.
One thing that interferes with authenticity is having an idea about yourself
that’s not accurate and trying to live up to that. So what I am trying to get at
here is being aware of one’s capacity and one’s capabilities - not to say that
you can’t continue to grow and learn, but knowing something about your
strengths and areas when you can contribute and being able to continue to
track that, rather than fall into trying to become someone that you are not.
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Of course, we cannot know for certain whether their words mesh with their actions. But I
suspect that giving up time to talk with a graduate student about what turned out, in some cases,
to be deeply personal matters, demonstrates a willingness to care.
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For Alison, there is a relationship between authenticity and learning about one’s
capabilities. Being self-aware, in her view, makes it easier to lead in a genuine manner.
Her views here would seem to align with authentic leadership scholars. However,
knowing who we are is not a simple task. In reflecting on her leadership experiences,
Teresa states: “you were asking are you true to yourself when you are doing this or that?
That’s always a question. I don’t know. Sometimes, you could see that it’s you but, in
other instances, it’s not very clear.” Hence, there are situations where it is difficult to
know whether you are acting in a manner in accordance with your principles. Teresa’s
assessment seems similar to Arendt’s assertion that self-knowledge is always a partial
understanding.
On a related note, Claire and Kate mention difficulties that may ensue when leaders
become caught up in their role. For example, Claire states:
I’m remembering an exchange I had with a colleague some years ago. He’d
just taken a college presidency, and I had not yet gotten to that point in my
career. I remembered him talking about what it’s like to be a college
president, and I thought to myself afterwards - he’s posing! He was primarily
talking about how he would act in new ways to be presidential and be taken
seriously. A few other colleagues also seemed to begin to behave differently
when they became presidents – posing is how I describe it. I think the most
effective leaders are those who remain authentic – true to themselves, and
their personalities, and don’t try to have a ‘make-over.’
Over time, Claire argues that leaders who indulge in leadership makeovers will be less
successful because others will see through their disguise. But there are institutional
pressures to perform in a manner that people expect. Kate states that sometimes, “people
try to be the leader that they think the organization wants or expects and that it pulls them
away, or they get trapped into feeling they have to lead in a particular way. I think, in the
long run it destroys your soul.” Instead of leading from one’s unique strengths, trying to
conform to an ideal may have a negative effect. This is why Kate argues it is important to
feel “comfortable in your own skin doing something that you love. And doing it the best
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way you know how ... I think that how we do things matters as much as what we do.”
This connection to the how of leadership emerged several times, and seemed to indicate
how important it is for a person to lead in a manner that feels right for them, while at the
same time, being cognizant of others. One has to be somewhat cautious here given that
what feels right for one person may actually be negative for others. It seems to me if they
keep the idea of self/world in mind, leaders may guard against the dangers of hubris.

5.2.3

Gender and Embodiment

Turning to the third theme of gender and embodiment, a prevailing theme arising from
several interviews is how a woman’s appearance can reinforce gender stereotypes
because how a woman looks is regarded as important. This can add an additional burden
in terms of trying to conform to what an ideal woman leader is supposed to look like, as
Jill notes:
All of these expectations about what it is to be an effective woman leader the
men never have to think about including wardrobe issues. And so that’s a
challenge to have to think about all of these things. That people will judge me
based on whether I have my nails done, whether my hair’s done, whether I
wear a particular dress, my weight, all of these things. [Laugh].
As I spent more time with the transcripts, I noticed that several women leaders referred to
the ways in which ‘wardrobe issues’ played a part in how they are perceived as leaders.
This brought to light different ways in which women leaders may be undermined by
stereotypical assumptions regarding how the ideal woman leader is supposed to look.
This does not stop at a woman’s wardrobe, but encompasses the body from top to toe.
Any deviation from what is considered culturally normative may prove prejudicial to her
leadership. This social prejudice may be further heightened when other social locations
such as race, class, disability and sexuality are mapped onto the leader’s body. If this is
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indeed the case, then variation from what is considered to be the bodily cultural norm in
terms of leadership may hinder a person’s ability to lead.
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It appears that it is not enough for a woman leader to do a good job; she also has to make
a good job of herself. For women leaders, the connection between their appearance and
their role can be a source of frustration. Indeed, some of the leaders I spoke with
expressed irritation at how a focus on their appearance sometimes detracted from their
actions. Kate offered a striking description of this type of gender stereotyping.
I have done presentations to rooms where because of the grace of the
audience they’ve jumped up to their feet, and it’s been wonderful and
spontaneous and amazing, and I’ve come off the stage and I’ve had a man say
to me: ‘That was fantastic, that’s wonderful, but where did you get your suit?
I’d like to buy it for my wife.’
Such a superficial evaluation serves to marginalize a woman leader’s performance since
her actions are dismissed in favour of her outfit. These trivial comments reinforce gender
hierarchy by discounting a woman leader’s words in favour of her appearance. A
woman’s attire thus becomes a defining factor in how she is perceived by others to such
an extent that this focus on the visual body may serve to undermine her actions. At times,
too much emphasis on the visual body may prove detrimental to a woman’s leadership.
Yet, at other times, Kate regards being a woman as advantageous to leadership, especially
in regards to expressing emotion. Following the accidental death of a faculty member,
she described how being a woman leader gave her an opportunity to publicly express
grief. In her words:
When I was standing up in front of our folks welcoming them back, and
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While I am not suggesting that men do not have to conform to a leadership dress code, I do
think that a woman leader’s figure is “read” more carefully than a male leader’s body. For
example, too much attention to her wardrobe may work to undermine a woman’s credibility as a
leader, while too little may lead to cries of derision.

205

talking about XXX, the tears were rolling down my face. I was brokenhearted, and everybody knew it. I think that was easier, that was more
accepted, and as I said, to some degree, expected because I was a woman.
Here we see how stereotypical notions about gender enable her to openly express her
emotion, since this is what is expected.

5.2.4

Intersectional Identity

It became apparent that gender on its own was not sufficient to understand these women’s
experiences of authenticity, or lack thereof, in relation to leadership. Many times in the
interviews, women made reference to class, race and age. Thus, gender while a critical
factor needs to be understood within a broader context of intersectional identity. As we
saw with Laura’s account, being a black woman in a predominantly white environment
helped her to gain a sense of who she was. It was, in her view, being on the margins that
gave her strength because it allowed her to reconnect with her past. In our conversation,
she mentioned that she felt far more comfortable at the margins of an organization.
But being on the margins is not necessarily a positive experience. For example, Jennifer
spoke of how she has to hide the knowledge that she learned from her experiences in
Trinidad, since it was not regarded as relevant by her North American colleagues. This is
surprising given that she currently works in a black college, but Jennifer was adamant
that she witnesses racism because she is seen to be the outsider. As a result, from time to
time, she experiences depression.
Class was also something mentioned in the interviews. For example, Jill spoke of times
when she has been made to feel an imposter. In her role as President of a prestigious
women’s college, she described how some alumnae express surprise when they learnt of
her working-class origins remarking on how strange it seems that someone from her
background could be so eloquent. In another interview, Claire discussed how her
working-class background had made her more aware of gender injustice, and encouraged
her to fight against prejudice in her work.
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Age was another factor that interview participants mentioned. It seems that age affects
how we see things, as well as how we are seen by others. Maturity can result in a greater
sense of confidence, as Jane notes:
When I was younger, I was only comfortable if I could control the situation,
and now I’m much better at being comfortable letting the situation become
something, and just letting or waiting to see what it’s going to become, and
working with that rather than trying to force it into some particular direction.
Rather than trying to control one’s environment, it seems that allowing situations to
unfold organically is one way for a woman to become more comfortable with the
contingent aspects of life. Several participants described how, when they were younger,
they were more likely to conform to the rules. As they grew older, however, women
described how they gained courage in speaking their minds. As Jane explains “I spent a
lot of time in my younger years trying to be the way that I was supposed to be … this is
how a professor is; this is how a graduate student is, rather than thinking about who am I?
And what do I bring to this?”
Interestingly, two women – Jane and Laura – used the same phrase to emphasize what
they saw as a barrier to women’s leadership, namely, that women had to “be comfortable
coming first.” Both women described how when they were younger they had not taken
some opportunities offered to them because of what they now describe as an uneasiness
with success. However, as they gained confidence and maturity, they were more open to
possibilities.
There are other ways in which a woman’s age can have an effect on her leadership. As
Kate demonstrates:
I had a very sort of humbling moment when I was negotiating my contract to
come to XXX. The Chair of the Board and I were negotiating my salary. I
told him what I expected, and he said that’s a lot of money for a young girl
like you. I was forty. This was my first one-on-one with the Board Chair. I
was tempted to say and if I were a man would you have even thought of
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making that comment?
Here we see that Kate’s attempt to negotiate her salary is belittled by a person who has
power over her. In this case, the Chair of the Board use terms like “young girl” to bring
Kate into line with what he considers appropriate expectations, given her age and gender.
Rather than her leadership capabilities, youth and gender were used to resist paying what
Kate regarded as an acceptable salary.
When we think about gender issues, we must also pay attention to other social factors.
For these women, gender on its own is insufficient to explain the connections between
leadership and authenticity.

5.2.5

Anxiety

The theme of anxiety was also mentioned by several interview participants. For example,
some women described times when their self-assurance was negated by anxiety. Dianne
offered a striking example of this angst when she described an instance when she chose
to remain silent following repeated attempts to put forward views that ran contrary to her
colleagues on the senior management team. In describing her experience, she states:
Sometimes, we think of people as taking up too much space, and that’s often
a criticism that someone is too loud, or too verbal, or too dominant. When I
said shrinking, I was sensing the opposite of that sort of not owning the space
that I could or should own. Taking up a smaller corner of that and trying to be
– maybe trying is the wrong word because that sounds conscious – but ending
up being smaller, littler and less influential, both in physical presence and in
impact. When I have been in situations where I feel uncomfortable, or
devalued, or disempowered, I have been a smaller version of myself, smaller,
quieter, and less impactful. I do experience a sense that I’m not behaving the
way that I aspire to behave, or that I believe that I should be behaving.
Feeling a sense of belonging to the group is one way that a person is able to share her
ideas. When Dianne senses this is not the case, the result is a sense of unease. Anxiety
allows some bodies to gain prominence while other bodies recede into the background, as
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Dianne’s account illustrates. According to Sara Ahmed, “the economy of fear works to
contain the bodies of others.”

391

In spatial terms, as Ahmed notes, “the regulation of

bodies in space through the uneven distribution of fear which allows spaces to become
territories, claimed as rights by some bodies and not others.”
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For some of the women leaders I interviewed, it appears that a refusal to speak out can
result in feelings of anxiety. I suggest that it is only when a woman leader feels a sense of
belonging to her institution, and to those whom she works with, that she is able to act in a
manner she judges to be authentic. The problem is that by not taking a stance against
something that you see as unjust, other instances may be ignored.
In discussing what made her feel anxious in her leadership role, Alison responded:
I feel uncomfortable when there are expectations that are hidden or unstated
or when there’s a mismatch between what I think I am to be doing or what I
think we have agreed on and the way things are unfolding. So that feeling of
discomfort is usually something that triggers me to move toward more
authenticity … I experience it in my body as tension, as anxiety.
Another issue to emerge in relation to anxiety was dealing with hostile environments. As
Claire explains, “I had to learn how to deal with not being loved and to stay focus on the
long-term good. That wasn’t easy.” A willingness to be unpopular was, at times, the only
way these women leaders told me it was possible to remain true to their principles.
Having the courage to go against the will of the majority seems, therefore, to be an
integral component of how these women viewed authentic leadership. However, this may
be more difficult for those who have been brought up to be self-deferential.
Submissiveness in childhood may mean that some people are reluctant to take a stance,
especially in a hostile environment. At times, therefore, there may be a dissonance
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between a woman’s learned behaviour, and her desire to act. Such passivity may have a
negative effect on a woman’s ability to lead. A woman’s desire to be pleasant, for
instance, may lead her to refuse to speak out.

5.2.6

Outlying Themes

I want to mention some outlying themes that seem to me to have phenomenological
import. As I noted earlier, most women saw authentic leadership as having a relational
quality. According to Laura, however, authentic leadership is also connected to what she
called “aloneness.” She described how important it was to her to spend time alone in
order to think. In the interview, she expressed the view that other women I interviewed
might suffer from aloneness. Laura views this isolation as necessary for a leader if she is
to forge her own path. I mention this comment by Laura because Arendt also thought it
important for each of us to be willing to spend time alone. Solitude is necessary so that
we can gather our thoughts, but also so that we can reconnect with others.
At the end of the interview, I asked each participant if they had anything they wanted to
add. Here are two responses; the first is from Dianne.
I think sometimes we can burn a lot of political capital by taking against the
majority when it has to do with something that’s important to you from a
principled or valued point of view. As a woman, one of the challenges for me
is thinking how I maintain my organizational power while, at the same time,
acting and influencing the organization in a way that is in keeping with my
internal compass.
We can see from Dianne’s description that she is constantly reflecting upon the balance
between keeping organizational power and taking principled action.
At the end of another interview, Olive returned to the question of leading ethically. In her
words,
I wouldn’t want to give the impression that I think that it doesn’t make a
difference whether leaders have a moral compass whether they are trying to
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behave as ethically as they can. I think it makes a profound difference. I just
don’t think it’s always easy to describe what moral, or immoral, leadership is,
particularly if you are trying to do it through the familiar lens of private,
personal ethical decisions.
Here, Olive expresses how important she perceives leading ethically to be. But she also
shows that describing what constitutes moral, or immoral, leadership is complex. What
constitutes authentic leadership may be much easier to describe in theory than it is within
the context of everyday life.

5.3 Conclusion
From these descriptive accounts, we see that the question of what it means to lead
authentically is a complex one. For some women, authentic leadership suggests a genuine
engagement that requires a willingness to listen to others. For others, a genuine approach
to leadership depends upon being consistent with personal values. Some women
emphasized caring while others focused on the need for a strategic approach. What
becomes clear is that authentic leadership evokes different things for different people.
This multiplicity of perspectives is due to the fact that each of us is unique, and that
uniqueness, which is made up of social factors as well as embodied lived experience, will
influence the way that we lead.
While my original intention was to concentrate on the connections amongst authenticity,
gender and leadership within an institutional setting, this was not where the interviews
led me. It became apparent that leadership within the context of an institution was only
one aspect of how these women conceived of what it meant to be an authentic leader.
They spoke on a variety of topics, such as politics, racism, family, and the interconnected
ways that their lived experiences shaped their ideas about what it might mean to be an
authentic leader. A common thread weaving through these different conversations is that
leadership needs to be conceptualized outside of hierarchical frameworks. Rather than
focusing on a person’s position in an institutional setting, it is important to redefine our
notions of what constitutes leadership, and show how different situations call for diverse
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kinds of leaders. This is a more expansive way of thinking about leadership, and
complements Arendt’s idea that leadership is situational.
Too often we have a narrow idea of what constitutes leadership. By making institutional
life the centre of attention, it is possible to underestimate, or even ignore, the important
leadership work that is carried out in the home, family, volunteer or church groups. This
situated knowledge, if considered at all, is perceived as less valuable than the “business”
of leadership. Too often the focus on leadership is where most of us think power resides,
that is, the public realm. Furthermore, the seeming disregard for other spaces/ways of
leading may be linked to a Western obsession with hierarchies, based on considerations
of profit and prestige. Hence, ways of leading that do not have a monetary value attached
to them may appear to have less cache.
For most of these women leaders, there is a strong correlation between wanting to lead in
a caring way, and a desire to be authentic in their leadership. Such openness shows itself
through our embodied relationships with others. This relational approach to leadership is
fundamental to creating an environment where others will be able to flourish. It requires
leaders to welcome different viewpoints. A relational approach to leadership is
fundamental to addressing the problems of instrumental ways of being that focus on a
means-ends way of thinking. This is why it is important, as these women leaders have
shown me, to think about leadership beyond an institutional framework. As Jennifer
states, “We have to explode the idea of being a leader as a thing created by a position.”
From these women’s narratives, we see how leadership is complicated by gender
socialization. This can lead to a dissonance between learned behaviour on the one hand,
and a desire to act in a manner consistent with her values on the other. Leaders, just like
the rest of us, must choose between acting in accordance with institutional practices and
upholding personal principles. At times, people will make a decision in line with their
values; at other moments they may not do so. From these interviews, I conclude that
authenticity cannot be contained within a conceptual framework of leadership that denies
difference. This is why a theory of leadership, based on authenticity, cannot take its cue
from the self.
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I leave the final word to Jennifer who states:
I just want to re-emphasize that you lead, not just for your own personal
embellishment and self-aggrandizement, but with the goal of moving the
community forward, or the group forward. That should be your primary focus
as a leader. That, to me, is authentic leadership.
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6

Concluding Remarks

This thesis has been concerned with the ways in which authenticity, gender and
leadership interconnect. I have contended that a significant shortcoming in current
accounts of authentic leadership is that scholars tend to privilege a leader’s selfknowledge at the expense of intersubjectivity. Such thinking is troubling since it ignores
how the intersections of identity, as well as cultural context, affect the theory and practice
of leadership. Defined in this way, authentic leadership is an example of a master
narrative that takes inner truth as its bedrock without paying sufficient attention to our
social, cultural and historical positioning. Such an abstracted way of thinking is not a
useful way of conceptualizing human existence. Rather, it is through our intersubjective,
embodied relationships that we define ourselves. These meaningful encounters always
take place within a world of others.
Arendt’s insights into the questions of uniqueness and plurality offer an important
correlative to problems inherent with the concept of authentic leadership, and what I see
as its overemphasis on the self. In contradistinction to scholars of authentic leadership,
she maintains that self-knowledge can only be a partial understanding. I suggest that
thinking with Arendt offers an important correlative to problems inherent with authentic
leadership and its focus on the self. In her view, uniqueness emerges from shared
communication through action and speech. I suggest, therefore, that Arendt’s concept of
uniqueness can expand our understanding of authentic leadership through its grounding
in an intersubjective way of viewing the world.
I have argued that Arendt’s work allows for a re-thinking of the notion of authenticity in
leadership that is attentive to difference. For example, to ensure uniqueness is fostered,
we need to create environments that are open to different opinions. Otherwise, we are left
with a hierarchical system of ruler and ruled that has adversely affected social relations
since ancient times. Arendt’s emphasis on uniqueness within a plural environment is
important with respect to how people choose to conduct themselves as leaders. When
leaders are unwilling to listen to different opinions, they will be unable to govern in a
manner that enables a society and its citizens to thrive. It is only when citizens are able to
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speak and act freely in the public sphere that a society prospers since it is through
dialogue and debate that we gain the plurality of viewpoints necessary for a society to
flourish. Moreover, ignoring the intersubjective dimension of everyday life may have farreaching implications, because it can result in leaders becoming separated from everyday
concerns and acting in self-indulgent ways to the detriment of everyone else. Indeed, the
differentiation between the few and the many have led to disastrous consequences.
Whether it’s the banking crisis or the negative effects of globalization, what becomes
apparent is that some leaders are failing to reflect upon, or care about, how their actions
negatively affect others, something Arendt regarded as a necessary requirement for a just
society. To ensure uniqueness is fostered, therefore, we need to create environments that
are open to different opinions.
A detailed engagement with the Arendtian corpus allows for a re-thinking of the place of
authenticity in leadership that is attentive to difference. Thinking with Arendt
complements existing leadership scholarship because of her emphasis on the myriad
ways in which leaders must be responsive to others. By seeing leadership in relational
terms that weave together diverse perspectives, her work opens up fruitful avenues of
investigation. As such, she offers us an alternative ethical guide from which to consider
the place of authenticity in leadership. In the course of writing this thesis, what I have
aimed to show is that, when we think about the interconnections among authenticity,
gender and leadership, we need to do so in a way that connects the universal with the
particular. It seems to me that Arendt’s call to “think without bannisters” helps us do this,
since what it allows for is a way of thinking that takes into account the ideas of others.
We are caught up in our times, and this is why it is so important to look at how notions of
authenticity show up in different ways. I have argued with Heidegger that language
changes over time and place. Hence, it is futile to define authentic leadership in terms of
four dimensions (balanced information processing, self-knowledge, relational
transparency and moral perspective) to the exclusion of others. These definitions,
common in the authentic leadership scholarship, serve to obscure the effect that gender,
and the multiplicity of lived experience, has on our understanding of leadership. I have
also contended that gender cannot be considered in isolation from other social factors. It,
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too, needs to be considered within the context of lived experience. Thus, when we think
about what constitutes authentic leadership, we need to take into account how various
social factors affect our understanding of leadership. In the interviews I conducted,
women described how – in different situations – race and class would surface alongside
gender. One of the major aspects that flow through the interviews for me is how much
thinking from the margins offers insights into leadership. This seems to me to reinforce
Arendt’s notion that it is the pariah, rather than the parvenu, who gains insight into the
workings of a society.
Authentic leadership remains troubling to me, not least because I perceive a tendency
amongst some leadership scholars to define and constrain the ways in which authenticity
reveals itself. There is a tendency to abstract and privilege the universal over the
particular. This is the problem with what Arendt termed the Archimedean worldview,
which seeks to explain and justify the world from the perspective of selfhood.
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It offers

us a particular worldview. As such, it represents a mode of investigation that, unwittingly
perhaps, suppresses possibilities, in favour of a regimented, abstract way of thinking. I do
not mean to imply that those who conduct research in this area are lacking an ethical
approach. In its current form, I do not believe that authentic leadership offers us a helpful
way of thinking about leadership. I find myself somewhat concerned that the theory of
authentic leadership leads to a flattening of individuality.
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Authenticity has many critics

but I have tried to show that it is not authenticity per se that is the problem but the way in
which we perceive it in the guise of self alone. Thus, I agree with those who suggest that
it may be possible to fashion an ethics of authenticity.
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Here is where I think Arendt can help. By considering uniqueness within the plural
context of the web of human relationships perhaps we can resist the impulse to place self
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Here I am thinking of Charles Taylor and Alessandro Ferrara whose work I have mentioned
earlier. What is missing in their accounts for me, however, is any deep discussion of gender.
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above world. In my view, authenticity must remain indefinable so as to allow for the
spontaneity of individual action. That being said, I do believe that it is fruitful to consider
some of the ways in which authenticity, or lack thereof, shows itself in leadership from a
gender perspective since it may offer insights into problems related to social conformity
and gender socialization.
We saw in chapters two and three the devastation that is caused on the political stage
when leaders are given free rein. While Robespierre may have initially acted out of good
intent, following Arendt, we note this is not enough. What matters is not whether a
leader’s action is good for the self, but whether that action is good for the world.
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Arendt maintains that political arenas that do not allow space for dialogue and debate are
anathema to human flourishing. Such dialogue takes place in the present but is a remnant
of the past and speaks to the future. I think that starting the conversation, as I did in
chapter two, with the Enlightenment helps us to see how authenticity shows up
differently in different times. I perceive a similarity between the women who tried to gain
a public voice then, and the women I interviewed, as the connection between authenticity
and courage. Having the courage to speak out is a thread that I now see running through
this dissertation. This notion of courage in leadership is, I think, connected to the
importance of creating spaces for dialogue and dissent. This is for me Arendt’s most
productive insight for leadership.
As I was involved in the final stages of writing this dissertation, I had the opportunity to
facilitate a discussion between women leadership scholars from various parts of the
world.
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In this discussion on gender, authenticity and leadership, I observed themes that
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This discussion took place as an informal table-top discussion related to gender, authenticity
and leadership as part of the International Leadership Association’s Women and Leadership
Conference in Asilomar, California on June 12, 2013. My role was to offer some context
regarding my research into gender, authenticity and leadership, and then facilitate discussion. All
the women who took part in this discussion taught leadership in different universities/colleges
across the world.
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flow from this dissertation come to life. One example was how one woman argued that
she was always authentic in her actions. If we asked her colleagues, she stated, they
would agree that what you see is what you get. The woman sitting next to her argued that
it is not possible for a person to be authentic all of the time. She contended that when she
is out running with her friends, she is a different person than when she teaches in the
classroom. A third woman sitting across the table said that she did not believe that it was
possible to be authentic in the workplace. Moreover, she argued it was important for a
person to have boundaries between their personal and private personas. Following this
comment, a fourth woman maintained that it was important to distinguish between
authenticity in relation to being and doing. In her view, being authentic and acting
authentically were not the same. In response, a fifth woman argued that all action is
performative. Just before the conversation ended, the first woman who had spoken
announced that she had been thinking about the question of boundaries. The notion of
boundaries had never occurred to her before, and she reflected that she needed to think
about this in relation to her ideas about authenticity, gender and leadership.
In addition, two of the women who took part in this discussion had recently conducted
qualitative studies on women and leadership. One study was conducted in The United
States and the other study was conducted in Malawi. While neither study had originally
concerned itself with questions of authenticity, it appears that the topic of authenticity
kept resurfacing in their interviews. What seems clear to me is that the concept of
authenticity is meaningful to questions of gender and leadership. However, there is much
to do in teasing out the many connections among gender, authenticity and leadership.
This thesis is just a starting point.
My original research question asked in what ways do senior women leaders experience
authenticity or lack thereof in the university workplace. By focusing on the institutional
context, as I mentioned in chapter five, I almost fell into the trap of comparing women
leaders in relationship to their male counterparts, rather than expanding our notion of
leadership to fit with diverse lived experiences. It is only by reconsidering what it means
to be an authentic leader beyond the confines of the work environment that we can see
the myriad ways in which gender plays a role in our understanding of what constitutes
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leadership. Ignoring the intersubjective dimension of everyday life has negative
implications because it can result in leaders becoming separated from everyday concerns
and acting in self-indulgent ways to the detriment of everyone else. Indeed, the
differentiation between the few and the many has led to disastrous consequences.
Whether it’s the banking crisis or the negative effects of globalization, what becomes
apparent is that some leaders are failing to reflect upon, or care about, how their actions
negatively affect others, something Arendt regarded as a necessary requirement for a just
society.
In Being and Time, Heidegger maintains that each person’s life is shaped partially by
things outside of her control, not least because we are “thrown into the world.” Yet
Arendt suggests that he may be in error. As she states,
Heidegger is wrong: man is not ‘thrown in the world;’ if we are thrown, then
– no differently from animals – onto the earth. Man is precisely guided, not
thrown, precisely for that reason his continuity arises and the way he belongs
appears. Poor us, if we are thrown into the world!398
For Arendt, we are guided in our entry into the world; this guidance takes many forms,
but an important aspect is that of a child’s relationship to her parent, especially her
mother. We saw how important that maternal guidance can be in relation to questions of
authenticity and leadership. But guidance takes many forms. In the process of writing this
thesis, I have been guided by many people whose consideration of authenticity in relation
to leadership has enriched my own understanding, although I find myself like Socrates as
puzzled at the end of this project as I was at the beginning. What constitutes authenticity
is thus an open question for me.
I began my research by looking at authentic leadership through an institutional lens to
look at some of the gender barriers that women encounter in leading within an
institutional context, especially as it relates to questions of authenticity. I wanted to
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ascertain the conditions whereby women leaders described a tension between their desire
to act in what they perceived as a genuine manner, and the limitations of the institutional
environment. I see now that my bias against bureaucracy played a significant role in the
way that I initially thought of my project. What I assumed to be central to my research,
that is, how ethical dilemmas are affected by bureaucratic restraints was not where my
research took me. What stops me feeling uneasy about this directional change is
something that Patricia Benner wrote that has stayed with me. She contends that any
researcher’s preconceptions need to be challenged; if this does not happen then the
research is not, in her opinion, sufficiently hermeneutical.399 My research certainly went
along different lines than what I had imagined. The research participants’ descriptive
accounts enriched my understanding of the role of authenticity in leadership in ways that
I had not anticipated. These women leaders, together with Arendt, led me to an
understanding that it is necessary to broaden our enquiry from institutional life to how we
live in the world. Through the sharing of words and worlds, I have been guided back to
what I had always known but had forgotten.
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Appendix A

Letter of Information and Consent Form
PROJECT: Women and Authentic Leadership
I invite you to participate in a university-based research projected entitled “Women and
Authentic Leadership.” This project involves conducting, recording, and transcribing
interviews with senior women administrators in higher education who have expertise in
the theory and practice of authentic leadership, as a supplement to a review of the
relevant literature. The project’s main goal is to consider how gender may have an
influence on the practice of authentic leadership.
If you agree to participate in this study, you will have one interview with me during
which you will be asked questions about (1) what authentic leadership means to you; (2)
your experience of authentic leadership; (3) the efficacy of this approach to leadership;
and (4) your observations regarding how gender may have an influence on the practice of
authentic leadership. This study has the potential to lead to insights related to gender and
authentic leadership which may be of interest to society at large.
The interview will last between 90 and 120 minutes and will be conducted either by
telephone at a time convenient to you, via email, or in person at a time and location
convenient for you. As researcher, I will audio-record the interview to ensure the
accuracy of data, and provide you with a transcript of the recorded interview so that you
may authorize its contents (i.e., delete or revise any part of it) before the researcher
makes any use of it as a source of information or quotations within the study. It may be
necessary to connect with you once more to ensure that I have a deep understanding of
your viewpoint. You will have final say with regard to discrepancies within the transcript.
Recordings and transcripts will be safely stored throughout the period of this doctoral
study. I anticipate that results from this study may be published in academic journals or
books. If this research results in publication, I will provide you with a copy upon request.
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Any personal identifying information will be removed from transcripts unless you have
authorized the retention of such information in the transcript (1) insofar as it directly
pertains to your work and (2) the use of the transcript as a source of quotations or
information for study purpose.
This letter is yours to keep for future reference. Please read this letter carefully to ensure
you understand all the implications of participation. Participation in the study is
voluntary, and you may refuse to participate, decline to answer specific questions, or
withdraw from the study at any time. For further details about this research, you may
contact me.
If you have questions about this study with regard to your rights as a participant, you may
contact the Office of Research Ethics at The University of Western Ontario, by telephone
at (519) 661-3036, or via email at ethics@uwo.ca.
Sincerely,

Rita A. Gardiner
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INTERVIEW CONSENT FORM

Principal Investigator:
Researcher:
I have read the Letter of Information, have had the nature of the study explained to me
and I agree to participate. All questions have been answered to my satisfaction.
 Please check this box if you are willing to allow direct quotes from the transcript
to be used.
__________________________________
Date
___________________________________________________________
Interviewee Name (please print)

Interviewee Signature
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Appendix B

Interview Guide
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study on women and authentic leadership.
The purpose of this interview is to discuss your experiences – as a successful female
leader – of authenticity and leadership. I have a number of questions to guide the
interview, but these are only guides. I am interested in understanding your experience as
a woman leader. Therefore, anything that you would like to share with me that will help
my understanding would be most welcome.
1. What does the term authenticity mean to you?
2. Similarly what comes to mind when you think about authentic leadership?
3. In your experience, what makes a leader authentic?
4. Can you think of any leaders you have known, or worked with, that exemplify
authentic leadership? If so, what qualities exemplified these leaders?
5. Could you give an example that exemplifies how you try to lead authentically?
Prompt: What impact do you think this type of leadership has on others?
6. Can you describe how your personal background has influenced your views on
authenticity and leadership? Is there a particular story that springs to mind?
7. What makes you feel comfortable or “at home” in your role as a leader?
8. Do you recall any physical or emotional sensations you experienced at this time?
9. Alternatively, what makes you feel ill at ease in your leadership role?
Prompt: Did you experience any physical or emotional sensations when you
feel ill at ease in your leadership role?
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10. As a woman leader, have you experienced challenges to your desire to be true to
yourself? Is there any instance that comes to mind?
11. Conversely, have you felt, that being a woman has given you any advantages in
your ability to lead authentically? Can you describe these?
12. Can you describe a time when your desire to be true to yourself was at odds with
institutional needs? How did this make you feel?
As we’ve spoken, have any other thoughts related to the theme of authenticity, gender
leadership come to mind that you would like to share?
Over the next few weeks, I will be transcribing the interview which I will send to you.
I may need to contact you in case of clarification. As well, I will send you the
interview transcript. I would like to do a follow up – either by telephone or email. Is
that okay?
It’s been a pleasure talking with you. Enjoy the rest of the summer.
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